*****************************************************************
02/12/04 ****     RADIATION BULLETIN(RADBULL)       **** VOL 12.36
*****************************************************************
   RADBULL IS PRODUCED BY THE ABALONE ALLIANCE CLEARINGHOUSE
*****************************************************************
Send News Stories to news@energy-net.org with title on subject
line and first line of body

                         NUCLEAR POLICY
 
1 UK: Butler WMD inquiryto be  held in secret 
2 US: [NukeNet] Text Of Bush's Hypocritical Speech Re Nuke
3 US: Las Vegas SUN: GOP Blames Clinton for Iraq Intel Lapse
4 AU SMH: Powell exposed by his barefaced lies on Iraq - Opinion -
5 AU SMH: One deal too far for nuclear salesman - 
6 US: Seattle Times: Opinion: Too easily persuaded into an unnecessary
7 BBC: Rumsfeld 'unaware' of WMD claim 
8 El Nuevo Herald: Kay Says Bush Slowing Intelligence Reform
9 Japan Times: Questionable intelligence
10 Guardian Unlimited: Blair's claim is simply incredible
11 Guardian Unlimited: This war is not yet over
12 Moscow Times Rumyantsev: Iran Fuel Deal Is Close
13 Hi Pakistan: Pakistan awaiting IAEA report on Iran, Libya N-plans
14 IRIB PERSIAN News: Iran, Russia study nuclear coop. 
15 Xinhuanet: Duration of six-party talks not set yet: FM   
16 Hi Pakistan: Results of N-probe to be shared with Japan - Musharraf
17 United Press International: Analysis: N.Korea softens stance on Japa
18 US: [du-list] Bush's Nuclear Proposal: Hypocrisy Charged
19 US: Las Vegas SUN: GAO: Contractors Owe $3B in Unpaid Taxes
20 US: ON THIS DAY | 12 | 1954: New authority for atomic energy
21 Hi Pakistan: Powell and Rice defend US. basis for war (17:00 PST)   
22 UN Nuclear Watchdog Calls For Tougher Non-proliferation Regime
23 news24: FBI in SA for nuclear probe 
24 Bellona: EFTA's financing mechanism slammed by EU auditors
25 BBC: UN urges toughening nuclear rules 
26 BBC: Backing for Bush on nuclear curbs 
27 Xinhuanet: China firmly opposes WMD proliferation - FM   
28 US: SF Chronicle: Bush offers plan to halt further spread of nuclear
29 Daily Times: Nuclear black market relied on past suppliers to Pakist
30 Guardian Unlimited: Briton key suspect in nuclear ring 
31 Hi Pakistan: No question of rolling back the nuclear program: Khalid
32 Hi Pakistan: Mushrooms
33 Hi Pakistan: Bush unveils anti-nuclear plan     --> 
34 Hi Pakistan: Nobody above law in N-proliferation case, says Kasuri 
35 Hi Pakistan: Spanish judge probes into firms linked to N-black marke
36 Hi Pakistan: Myanmar rejects US alarm over nuke ambitions
37 Hi Pakistan: N-probe details can't be divulged, court told
38 Hi Pakistan: Nuclear Pakistan now a partner in counter-proliferation
39 Hi Pakistan: IAEA backs US call on spread of nuke technology 
40 US: PRN: Remarks by President Bush on Weapons of Mass Destruction Pr
41 UK Independent: Libya decided 10 years ago against developing WMD,
 
                         NUCLEAR REACTORS
 
42 US: [NukeNet] Oyster Creek Campaign is gaining traction!!!
43 US: [NukeNet] White House Backs Away From Bush '02 Nuclear Power
44 The Australian: Radiation fear on cut to reactor safety
45 US: Democrat & Chronicle: RG nuke-sale bonus grilled
46 US: NRC: NRC Senior Officials Will Meet with Point Beach Management 
47 US: NRC: State of Utah: NRC Staff Draft Assessment of a Proposed
48 BBC: New Iran nuclear designs 'found' 
49 US: WSJ Opinion: Assure stable energy with nuclear power 
50 US: SLO TRIB: Diablo Canyon adds $642 million annually to local econ
51 US: Ohio News Network: Davis-Besse Asks To Restart Plant            
52 US: NRC: Nebraska Public Power District; Notice of Consideration of 
53 Prague Post: Plant neighbors seek aid      
54 US: Newsday.com - DEP chief says changes needed at nuclear plant
 
                          NUCLEAR SAFETY
 
55 [du-list] Fw: ICRP standards flawed
56 US: [du-list] Letter to Sen. Clinton re; DU
57 [du-list] (Fwd) Balkan Syndrome
58 [du-list] quantity of DU used in Iraq
59 US: NRC: Search under Way for Radioactive Sources Missing from N.J. 
60 Guardian Unlimited: U.N. Agency Eager to End
61 US: NRC: Best Practices To Establish and Maintain a Safety Conscious
62 BBC: On the trail of the black market bombs 
63 ITAR-TASS: Containers of radioactive cesium discovered in Georgian c
 
                         NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
 
64 Las Vegas SUN: Nevada senator cites health hazard, wants nuke dump w
65 US: NRC: NRC Considering Request by Utah to Amend its Agreement with
66 US: Salt Lake Tribune: Possible hot-waste loopholes have lawmakers i
67 Korea Herald: Court rules vote on Buan nuclear site can go ahead   
68 Las Vegas RJ: NUCLEAR WASTE PROJECT: Reid urges Yucca halt 
69 Guardian Unlimited: Undeclared Centrifuge Design
70 Bellona: MOX plan delayed by Bush administration budget documents
71 BBC: Sellafield drops union post
72 Las Vegas SUN: Reid seeks answers to Yucca dust
73 US: El Nuevo Herald: NRC Study Says Storage Facility Adequate
74 JoongAng Daily: Buan to hold vote on nuclear facility
75 DW: Germany, China Close to Deal on Plutonium Plant Sale 
76 US: FOX5 Las Vegas - Hazardous Waste On Valley Roads?
77 Whitehaven News: WE'RE THE UNCLEVERLY HILLBILLIES!
78 Whitehaven News: Bully for BNFL
79 Whitehaven News: BNFL INVESTS HEAVILY IN FUTURE WORKFORCE SKILLS 
 
                         NUCLEAR WEAPONS
 
80 [du-list] Fw: Three Minutes to Midnight: The Impending Threat
81 Daily Times EDITORIAL: Disarmament is the only effective measure aga
82 Hi Pakistan: Time for nuclear rethink - 
83 Indian Express: World may be headed for nuclear destruction
 
                        US DEPT. OF ENERGY
 
84 Albuquerque Tribune: Labs look to nuke juice for space missions     
85 DOE: Record of Decision: Final Environmental Impact Statement for th
86 DenverPost.com - EDITORIALS: Keep close eye on Rocky Flats
87 SF Chronicle: 2 ex-workers sue Livermore lab /
88 Oakland Tribune: Feds halt mock assaults on labs
89 U.S. Newswire - U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science
 
                          OTHER NUCLEAR
 
90 [du-list] AGI Save Corp. Major Melis" lobby in Sardinia
91 Google News Alert - nuclear
*****************************************************************
*****************************************************************
                         FULL NEWS STORIES
*****************************************************************
*****************************************************************
 1 UK: Butler WMD inquiryto be  held in secret 
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 22:40:20 -0600 (CST)

 
2004/02/13 02:35:21 GMT
BBC NEWS

Butler WMD inquiry held in secret

Lord Butler's inquiry into the intelligence that led to the war in Iraq will
meet behind closed doors.

The Butler Inquiry said private hearings were necessary to avoid giving a
partial or distorted public impression of the evidence.

The committee conducting the inquiry will start taking evidence in April but
will not discuss its proceedings before it makes its conclusions in the
summer.

It said it will focus on systems and procedures rather than individuals.

The Liberal Democrats have refused to take part in the inquiry because of
the limited nature of its remit.

After the Hutton report, Tony Blair has said there is no need for any
further investigation of the political side of the decision to go to war,
although the use of intelligence will be covered by Lord Butler.

Unlike the Hutton Inquiry, witnesses will be questioned by the committee,
rather than legal counsel.

Liberal Democrat foreign affairs spokesman Sir Menzies Campbell said: "This
entirely predictable announcement justifies the Liberal Democrat decision
not to endorse, nor provide a member for, the Butler review.

"Given the limited remit which the prime minister insisted upon, Lord Butler
and his colleagues could hardly do otherwise.

"The Tory claim that they had made a significant change to the original
remit has been blown out of the water."

Mr Blair called the inquiry after mounting pressure, caused in part by the
American decision to hold an inquiry, the remarks of former weapons
inspector David Kay, and the failure to find any weapons in Iraq.

There will be great interest in what the inquiry makes of the way the claim
weapons of mass destruction could be launched within 45 minutes, was
presented in the September dossier on Iraq.

Some newspapers took this to mean that weapons could be launched against
Cyprus within 45 minutes.

Even Mr Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw have said they did not know
it only referred to short-range battlefield weapons until after the decision
was made to go to war.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/3484435.stm

Published: 2004/02/13 02:35:21 GMT

) BBC MMIV

--------------
*****************************************************************
 2 [NukeNet] Text Of Bush's Hypocritical Speech Re Nuke
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:05:51 -0800

 
<x-flowed>

   NPT, Nuremburg & Other International Protocols:
  http://www.cornnet.nl/~akmalten/docs.html


The greatest threat before humanity today is the
possibility of secret and sudden attack with
chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear
weapons.

  Of course this excludes use thereof by USA,
Russia, China, Israel, UK, France and Germany,
Japan, Canada, etc. if they care to develop and
use them. Just so long as they're US [at least
Bush] allies.

  Bush, of course dosen't address the fact that all
nuclear power facilities weather in countries
favored by him or not are stationary radiological
nuclear weapons- sitting ducks for terrorists and
prone to human eeror and natural phenomenon that
can unleash a torrent of radiological terror
courtesy of the commercial terrorists that build
and maintem them- GE, Westinghouse, Mitsubishi,
AB&B, Framatome, etc.
See: CRAC-2 Report:
http://www.mothersalert.org/crac.html


   http://www.nytimes.com
    http://snipurl.com/4g3o
http://snipurl.com/4g3o


http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/politics/10WEB-PTEX.html
  TEXT
Bush's Speech on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Published: February 11, 2004


ollowing is the transcript from President Bush's
speech at the National Defense University on
Wednesday, as transcribed by Federal News Service
Inc.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Thank you all. Be seated, please.

Thanks for the warm welcome. I'm honored to visit
the National Defense University.

For nearly a century the scholars and students
here have helped to prepare America for the
changing threats to our national security. Today,
the men and women of our National Defense
University are helping to frame the strategies
through which we are fighting and winning the war
on terror.

Your Center for Counterproliferation Research and
your other institution colleges are providing
vital insight into the dangers of a new era. I
want to thank each one of you for devoting your
talents and your energy to the service of our
great nation.

I want to thank General Michael Dunn for inviting
me here. I used to jog by this facility on a
regular basis, then my age kicked in.

I appreciate Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger from
Germany -- Ambassador, thank you for being here
today.

I see my friend George Schultz, a distinguished
public servant and true patriot with us. George,
thank you for coming. And Charlotte (sp), it's
good to see you.

I'm so honored that Dick Lugar is here with us
today. Senator, I appreciate you taking time and
thanks for bringing Senator Saxby Chambliss with
you as well.

I appreciate the veterans who are here and those
on active duty. Thanks for letting me come back.

On September the 11th, 2001, America and the world
witnessed a new kind of war. We saw the great harm
that a stateless network could inflict upon our
country -- killers, armed with box cutters, mace
and 19 airline tickets. Those attacks also raised
the prospect of even worse dangers, of other
weapons in the hands of other men.

In the past, enemies of America required massed
armies and great navies, powerful air forces to
put our nation, our people, our friends at risk.
In the Cold War, Americans lived under the threat
of weapons of mass destruction, but believed that
deterrence made those weapons a last resort. What
has changed in the 21st century is that in the
hands of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction
would be a first resort, the preferred means to
further their ideology of suicide and random
murder.

These terrible weapons are becoming easier to
acquire, build, hide and transport. Armed with a
single vial of a biological agent or a single
nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics or
failing states could gain the power to threaten
great nations, threaten the world peace.

America and the entire civilized world will face
this threat for decades to come. We must confront
the danger with open eyes and unbending purpose. I
made clear to all the policy of this nation:
America will not permit terrorists and dangerous
regimes to threaten us with the world's most
deadly weapons.

Meeting this duty has required changes in thinking
and strategy. Doctrines designed to contain
empires, deter aggressive states and defeat massed
armies cannot fully protect us from this new
threat.

America faces the possibility of catastrophic
attack from ballistic weapons armed with weapons
of mass destruction. So that is why we are
developing and deploying missile defenses to guard
our people.

The best intelligence is necessary to win the war
on terror and to stop proliferation. So that is
why I have established a commission that will
examine our intelligence capabilities and
recommend ways to improve and adapt them to detect
new and emerging threats.

We're determined to confront those threats at the
source. We will stop these weapons from being
acquired or built. We'll block them from being
transferred. We'll prevent them from ever being
used.

One source of these weapons is dangerous and
secretive regimes that build weapons of mass
destruction to intimidate their neighbors and
force their influence upon the world. These
nations pose different challenges. They require
different strategies.




The former dictator of Iraq possessed and used
weapons of mass destruction against his own
people. For 12 years he defied the will of the
international community. He refused to disarm or
account for his illegal weapons and programs. He
doubted our resolve to enforce our word. And now
he sits in a prison cell while his country moves
toward a democratic future.

      Advertisement



To Iraq's east, the government of Iran is
unwilling to abandon a uranium-enrichment program
capable of producing material for nuclear weapons.
The United States is working with our allies and
the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure
that Iran meets its commitments and does not
develop nuclear weapons. In the Pacific --
(applause). In the Pacific, North Korea has defied
the world, has tested long-range ballistic
missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear
weapons and now threatens to build more.

Together with our partners in Asia, America is
insisting that North Korea completely, verifiably
and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs.


America has consistently brought these threats to
the attention of international organizations.
We're using every means of diplomacy to answer
them. As for my part, I will continue to speak
clearly on these threats. I will continue to call
upon the world to confront these dangers and to
end them.


In recent years, another path of proliferation has
become clear as well. America and other nations
are learning more about black market operatives
who deal in equipment and expertise related to
weapons of mass destruction. These dealers are
motivated by greed or fanaticism or both. They
find eager customers in outlaw regimes, which pay
millions for the parts and plans they need to
speed up their weapons programs. And with deadly
technology and expertise on the market, there's
the terrible possibility that terrorist groups
could obtain the ultimate weapons they desire
most.

The extent and sophistication of such networks can
be seen in the case of a man named Abdul Qadir
Khan. This is the story as we know it so far. A.Q.
Khan is known throughout the world as the father
of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. What was
not publicly known until recently is that he also
led an extensive international network for the
proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how.


For decades, Mr. Khan remained on the Pakistani
government payroll, earning a modest salary. Yet
he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles
through the sale of nuclear technologies and
equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from North
Africa to the Korean Peninsula.


A.Q. Khan himself operated mostly out of Pakistan.
He served as director of the network, its leading
scientific mind as well as its primary salesman.
Over the past decade, he made frequent trips to
consult with his clients and to sell his
expertise. He and his associates sold the
blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium, as
well as nuclear design stolen from the Pakistani
government. The network sold uranium hexafluoride,
the gas that the centrifuge process can transform
into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs.


Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya
and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older
centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced
and efficient models. The network also provided
these countries with components, and in some cases
with complete centrifuges.

To increase their profits, Khan and his associates
used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key
parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts were
purchased through network operatives based in
Europe and the Middle East and Africa. These
procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear
technologies as a shortcut to personal wealth, and
they set up front companies to deceive legitimate
firms into selling them tightly controlled
materials.

Khan's deputy, a man named B.S.A. Tahir, ran SMB
Computers, a business in Dubai. Tahir used that
computer company as a front for the proliferation
activities of the A.Q. Khan network. Tahir acted
as both the network's chief financial officer and
money-launderer. He was also its shipping agent,
using his computer firm as cover for the movement
of centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir
directed the Malaysia facility to produce these
parts based on Pakistani designs, and then ordered
the facility to ship the components to Dubai.

Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other
European procurement agents to transit through
Dubai for shipment to other customers.

This picture of the Khan network was pieced
together over several years by American and
British intelligence officers. Our intelligence
services gradually uncovered this network's reach
and identified its key experts and agents and
money men. Operatives followed its transactions,
mapped the extent of its operations. They
monitored the travel of A.Q. Khan and senior
associates. They shadowed members of the network
around the world. They recorded their
conversations. They penetrated their operations.
We've uncovered their secrets.

      Advertisement



This work involved high risk, and all Americans
should be grateful for the hard work and the
dedication of our fine intelligence professionals.

Governments around the world worked closely with
us to unravel the Khan network and to put an end
to its criminal enterprise. A.Q. Khan has
confessed his crimes, and his top associates are
out of business. The government of Pakistan is
interrogating the network's members, learning
critical details that will help them prevent it
from ever operating again.


President Musharraf has promised to share all the
information he learns about the Khan network, and
has assured us that his country will never again
be a source of proliferation. Mr. Tahir is in
Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his
activities. Malaysian authorities have assured us
that the factory the network used is no longer
producing centrifuge parts.

Other members of the network remain at large. One
by one they will be found, and their careers in
the weapons trade will be ended.

As a result of our penetration of the network,
American and the British intelligence identified a
shipment of advanced centrifuge parts manufactured
at the Malaysian facility. We followed the
shipment of these parts to Dubai and watched as
they were transferred to the BBC China, a
German-owned ship.


After the ship passed through the Suez Canal,
bound for Libya, it was stopped by German and
Italian authorities. They found several
containers, each 40 feet in length, listened on
the ship's manifest as full of used machine parts.
In fact, these containers were filled with parts
of sophisticated centrifuge.


The interception of the BBC China came as Libyan
and British and American officials were discussing
the possibility of Libya ending its WMD programs.
The United States and Britain confronted Libyan
officials with this evidence of an active and
illegal nuclear program.


About two months ago Libya's leader voluntarily
agreed to end his nuclear and chemical weapons
programs, not to pursue biological weapons, and to
permit thorough inspections by the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We're now working
in partnership with these organizations and with
the United Kingdom to help the government of Libya
dismantle those programs and eliminate all
dangerous materials. Colonel Qadhafi made the
right decision, and the world will be safer once
his commitment is fulfilled.


We expect other regimes to follow his example.
Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead
to better relations with the United States and
other free nations. Continuing to seek those
weapons will not bring security or international
prestige, but only political isolation, economic
hardship and other unwelcome consequences.
(Applause.)


We know that Libya was not the only customer of
the Khan network. Other countries expressed great
interest in their services. These regimes and
other proliferators like Khan should know, we and
our friends are determined to protect our people
and the world from proliferation.

Breaking this network is one major success in a
broad-based effort to stop the spread of terrible
weapons. We're adjusting our strategies to the
threats of a new era. America and the nations of
Australia, France and Germany, Italy and Japan,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the
United Kingdom have launched the Proliferation
Security Initiative to interdict lethal materials
in transit. Our nations are sharing intelligence
information, tracking suspect international cargo,
conducting joint military exercises. We're
prepared to search planes and ships, to seize
weapons and missiles and equipment that raise
proliferation concerns, just as we did in stopping
the dangerous cargo on the BBC China before it
reached Libya. Three more governments -- Canada
and Singapore and Norway -- will be participating
in this initiative. We'll continue to expand the
core group of PSI countries. And as PSI grows,
proliferators will find it harder than ever to
trade in illicit weapons.

There's a consensus among nations that
proliferation cannot be tolerated. Yet this
consensus means little unless it is translated
into action. Every civilized nation has a stake in
preventing the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. These materials and technologies and
the people who traffic in them cross many borders.
To stop this trade the nations of the world must
be strong and determined. We must work together.
We must act effectively.

      Advertisement



Today I announce several proposals to strengthen
the world's efforts to stop the spread of deadly
weapons.

First, I propose that the work of the
Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to
address more than shipments and transfers.
Building on the tools that we've developed to
fight terrorists, we can take direct action
against proliferation networks. We need greater
cooperation -- not just among intelligence and
military services but in law enforcement as well.

PSI participants in other willing nations should
use the Interpol and all other means to bring
justice to those who traffic in deadly weapons, to
shut down their labs, to seize their materials, to
freeze their assets. We must act on every lead. We
will find the middlemen, the suppliers and the
buyers. Our message to proliferators must be
consistent and it must be clear: we will find you,
and we're not going to rest until you are stopped.
(Applause.)

Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the
laws and international controls that govern
proliferation. At the U.N. last fall, I proposed a
new Security Council resolution requiring all
states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict
export controls, and secure all sensitive
materials within their borders. The Security
Council should pass this proposal quickly. And
when they do, America stands ready to help other
governments to draft and enforce the new laws that
will help us deal with proliferation.

Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep
weapons from the Cold War and other dangerous
materials out of the wrong hands. In 1991 Congress
passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Senator Lugar
had a clear vision, along with Senator Nunn, about
what to do with the old Soviet Union. Under this
program, we are helping former Soviet states find
productive employment for former weapons
scientists. We're dismantling, destroying and
securing weapons and materials left over from the
Soviet WMD arsenal. We have more work to do there.
And as a result of the G-8 summit in 2002, we
agreed to provide $20 billion over 10 years, half
of it from the United States, to support such
programs. We should expand this cooperation
elsewhere in the world. We will retain WMD
scientists and technicians in countries like Iraq
and Libya. We will help nations end the use of
weapons grade uranium and research reactors. I
urge more nations to contribute to these efforts.


The nations of the world must do all we can to
secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical and
biological and radiological materials.

As we track and destroy these networks, we must
also prevent governments from developing nuclear
weapons under false pretenses. The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty was designed more than 30
years ago to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
beyond those states which already possessed them.
Under this treaty, nuclear states agreed to help
non-nuclear states develop peaceful atomic energy
if they renounced the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
But the treaty has a loophole, which has been
exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran.
These regimes are allowed to produce nuclear
material that can be used to build bombs under the
cover of civilian nuclear programs.


So today, as a fourth step, I propose a way to
close the loophole. The world must create a safe,
orderly system to fuel civilian nuclear plants
without adding to the danger of weapons
proliferation. The world's leading nuclear
exporters should ensure that states have reliable
access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian
reactors, so long as those states renounce
enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and
reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking
to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing
equipment and technologies to any state that does
not already possess full-scale functioning
enrichment and reprocessing plants.


This step will prevent new states from developing
the means to produce fissile material for nuclear
bombs. Proliferators must not be allowed to
cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the
material and infrastructure necessary for
manufacturing illegal weapons.

For international norms to be effective, they must
be enforced. It is the charge of the International
Atomic Energy Agency to uncover banned nuclear
activity around the world and report those
violations to the U.N. Security Council.


      Advertisement


We must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it
needs to fulfill its essential mandate. America
and other nations support what is called the
Additional Protocol, which requires states to
declare a broad range of nuclear activities and
facilities and allows the IAEA to inspect those
facilities.


As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only
states that have signed the Additional Protocol be
allowed to import equipment for their civilian
nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about
fighting proliferation will approve and implement
the Additional Protocol. I've submitted the
Additional Protocol to the Senate. I urge the
Senate to consent immediately to its ratification.

We must also ensure that the IAEA is organized to
take action when action is required. So as a sixth
step, I propose the creation of a special
committee of the IAEA Board which will focus
intensively on safeguards and verification. This
committee, made up of governments in good standing
with the IAEA, will strengthen the capability of
the IAEA to ensure that nations comply with their
international obligations.


And finally, countries under investigation for
violating nuclear nonproliferation obligations are
currently allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of
Governors. For instance, Iran, a country suspected
of maintaining an extensive nuclear weapons
program, recently completed a two-year term on the
board. Allowing potential violators to serve on
the board creates an unacceptable barrier to
effective action. No state under investigation for
proliferation violations should be allowed to
serve on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new
special committee. And any state currently on the
board that comes under investigation should be
suspended from the board. The integrity and
mission of the IAEA depends on this simple
principle: Those actively breaking the rules
should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules.


As we move forward to address these challenges, we
will consult with our friends and allies on all
these new measures. We will listen to their ideas.

Together we will defend the safety of all nations
and preserve the peace of the world.


Over the last two years, a great coalition has
come together to defeat terrorism and to oppose
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the
inseparable commitments of the war on terror.
We've shown that proliferators can be discovered
and can be stopped. We've shown that for regimes
that chose defiance, there are serious
consequences.

The way ahead is not easy, but it is clear. We
will proceed as if the lives of our citizens
depend on our vigilance because they do.
Terrorists and terror states are in a race for
weapons of mass murder, a race they must lose.
(Applause.)

Terrorists are resourceful. We're more
resourceful. They're determined. We must be more
determined. We will never lose focus or resolve.
We'll be unrelenting in the defense of free
nations and rise to the hard demands of dangerous
times.

May God bless you all.











_______________________________________________________________________
Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/
Change your settings at:
http://chrome.nocdirect.com/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 3 Las Vegas SUN: GOP Blames Clinton for Iraq Intel Lapse

Today: February 12, 2004 at 9:40:28 PST 
 
ASSOCIATED PRESS 


WASHINGTON (AP) - In a sign of how Republicans may try to quell
criticism of prewar intelligence in Iraq, the head of the House
Intelligence Committee tried Wednesday to direct blame to the
Clinton administration. 

Rep. Porter J. Goss, R-Fla., said he heard a 1998 speech in
which then-President Clinton warned that something must be done
about Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass
destruction. 

"Unfortunately, he did not complete that task before his term
expired," Goss said at a Capitol Hill press conference. 

Goss said the Clinton administration gutted intelligence assets
in the 1990s and today's intelligence analysts "did the best
they could with what they had." 

Goss also said Clinton rarely, if ever, met with intelligence
officials and that top officials in the administration were not
"particularly engaged" on the subject. 

Goss said an effort at political correctness prompted
intelligence agencies to stop using "distasteful people" for
human intelligence, meaning America lost people who served as
its eyes and ears around the world. 

Calls to Clinton's office were not immediately returned
Wednesday. But a former Clinton aide on security disputed Goss'
statement. 

"I respect Porter Goss and his service to the CIA, but I think
he's part of the administration's attempt to redirect attention
from what's really going on here, which is their distortion of
the evidence" against Saddam, said Robert Boorstin, who was
Clinton's national security speechwriter. 

The Bush administration has come under severe criticism for
saying it was going to war to disarm Iraq and then failing to
find alleged banned weapons. 

Critics want a review of why the intelligence was bad and
whether Bush and others in his administration purposely
exaggerated the intelligence to justify war and oust Saddam. 

"Nobody would disagree that the guy had to go," said Boorstin.
"But the question is do you distort the evidence ... do you
deliberately mislead the American people and the world." 

Now a senior vice president for national security at the Center
for American Progress, Boorstin also said it was actually Bush's
father who was first to cut intelligence spending after the fall
of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 

When intelligence spending was increased in 1993, Goss
complimented the Clinton administration "for going into this and
seeing our true need," Boorstin quoted Goss as saying at the
time. 

-- 


 
*****************************************************************
 4 AU SMH: Powell exposed by his barefaced lies on Iraq - Opinion -
                       
  www.smh.com.au [Sydney Morning Herald Online] 

February 11, 2004
 		 	   	   		
Like Janet Jackson's tawdry stunt, the war has sparked a cynical 
blame game among the guilty, writes Gary Younge.                        

Colin Powell, the United States Secretary of State, could learn a 
great deal from how his son has handled Janet Jackson's right 
breast. The singer bared her bosom during a raunchy dance with 
Justin Timberlake in the Super Bowl half-time show last week. 

Jackson apologised, saying she did plan a "reveal", but 
Timberlake was supposed to rip off only her rubber black bustier 
to show a red lace bra (so that's all right, then). Timberlake 
blamed it on a "wardrobe malfunction". 

The National Football League, which staged the match, blamed CBS, 
the TV network which screened it. CBS blamed MTV, to which it had 
contracted out the half-time entertainment. MTV blamed Jackson. 
And the media conglomerate Viacom, which owns CBS and MTV, 
insists it has nothing to do with them. 

So it was left to Michael Powell, the chairman of the Federal 
Communications Commission, to declare his "outrage" and order a 
"swift and thorough" investigation, which could result in fines 
worth millions of dollars if CBS and its affiliates are shown to 
have breached indecency guidelines. 

Let's leave aside for a moment the value system of a government 
that can order an immediate inquiry into a bare breast and take a 
year to launch one into a bare-faced lie presented as a pretext 
for war. 

At best on Super Bowl night there was an unfortunate mistake. At 
worst, and more likely, this was a cynical, tasteless publicity 
stunt. Either way it was wrong, and Michael Powell is going to 
make sure that whoever is responsible will pay the price. 

Hold that thought. Now cast your mind back to the United Nation's 
Security Council chamber a year ago last Friday. With the help of 
tapes, aerial photographs and a PowerPoint presentation, Michael 
Powell's father, Colin, illustrates the US Government's case that 
Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Jabbing the air and 
slapping the table, he offers "not assertions, but facts" and 
"evidence, not conjecture". 

Powell's "evidence" and "facts" have proved to be not only 
"assertions" and "conjecture", but erroneous ones at that. But 
one year, one war, no UN resolution and thousands of deaths 
later, we are still waiting for someone to pay the price for a 
conflict that never needed to start and sparked a resistance that 
shows no sign of ending. 

Fatal blunders like these, it seems, are priceless. The 
politicians who authorised the war say they were tricked. The 
intelligence agencies who provided the material to justify it say 
they were pressured or misinterpreted. The leaders who used that 
material to make their case for it say they were misinformed or 
misunderstood. And the military, of course, just follows orders. 
No one takes responsibility, no one has yet been held 
accountable. 

Sooner or later a hopeless minister or hapless civil servant, 
possibly even the head of the CIA, might be sacked. This would be 
the equivalent of Jackson firing her dressmaker. It will satisfy 
not those who want to solve the problem, but those who want it to 
go away. 

Sadly the inquiries to be launched in Britain and the United 
States have been limited to intelligence. The premise for this 
war was not security but politics - it's the politicians who 
should be in the dock. 

This war is not just killing Iraqi civilians, resistance fighters 
and coalition soldiers. It's murdering any pretence that we live 
in countries that value, let alone practice, the principle of 
democratic accountability. It calls into question our ability to 
rein in political excess and to root out state-sponsored 
incompetence. 

"We had no choice," President George Bush said this week. But the 
case for war was always weak. 

The most compelling defence of both governments is ignorance. 
They thought Saddam Hussein had WMD and it turns out he didn't, 
but it was impossible to know because he ran a dictatorship and 
had a record of lying. 

It is true that nobody knew for sure before the war if Iraq had 
WMD. But it is even truer that anyone who claimed to know for 
sure it did was lying. 

But for the US and Britain, ignorance was used as an excuse to 
attack. 

Now ignorance seems to be their only defence. Tony Blair says he 
did not know Saddam was incapable of firing long-range chemical 
and biological weapons. Well, somebody did. Bush now wants "to 
know all the facts". What did he want to know before? 

"The absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus," says 
Colin Powell. "It changes the answer you get." Wrong again. If 
the question is "Should we have gone to war?" then the answer is 
still no. 

What is changed is that with each dissembling statement, the 
public is listening just that little bit more closely. 

The Guardian 

Alan Ramsey's column will appear next week. 	 	

Copyright  � 2004. The Sydney Morning Herald.
*****************************************************************
 5 AU SMH: One deal too far for nuclear salesman - 

World - www.smh.com.au [Sydney Morning Herald Online] 

February 13, 2004
 		 	   	   		
Trapped by shipment destined for Libya ... Abdul Qadeer Khan.  
		 		 		 
The break for US spies tracking Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear 
network came in the August heat in Malaysia as five giant 
containers full of centrifuge parts were loaded on a nondescript 
vessel. 

The CIA had penetrated the factory of Scomi Precision 
Engineering, where they say one of the nuclear network's 
operatives was watching production of the delicate machinery 
needed to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs. 

Spy satellites then tracked the shipment to Dubai, where it was 
relabelled "used machinery" and transferred to a German-owned 
ship, the BBC China. When it headed through the Suez Canal, bound 
for Libya, Washington ordered that it be seized. 

The capture led to the unravelling of a trading network that sent 
bomb-making designs and equipment to at least three countries - 
Iran, North Korea and Libya - and laid bare the limits of 
international controls on nuclear proliferation. 

This week, the US President, George Bush, proposed tightening the 
system by restricting the production of nuclear fuel to a few 
nations. 

The scope of the illicit network is still not fully known. Nor 
has it been established whether the Pakistani military or 
government, which had supported Khan's research, were involved. 

But it is now clear that Khan, a Pakistani national hero who 
began his rise 30 years ago by importing nuclear equipment to 
secretly build his country's atom bomb, had gradually transformed 
himself into the largest and most sophisticated exporter in the 
nuclear black market. 

A US official called the transformation astounding: "First, he 
exploits a fragmented market and develops a quite advanced 
nuclear arsenal. Then he throws the switch, reverses the flow and 
figures out how to sell the whole kit, right down to the bomb 
designs, to some of the world's worst governments." 

The story of that transformation emerges from recent interviews 
in the Pakistan capital, Islamabad, in Kuala Lumpur, from the 
back streets of Dubai, where many of the deals were made, to 
Washington and Vienna, where spies and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency worked to defuse the threat. 

They show how Khan assembled an organisation of scientists, 
engineers and businessmen which operated untroubled by the bans 
on nuclear trafficking. 

Khan began in the mid-1980s, say intelligence officials, by 
ordering twice the number of parts the Pakistani nuclear program 
needed, and then selling the excess, notably to Iran. 

Later, his network acquired another customer, North Korea, and 
finally he moved on to Libya - selling entire kits, centrifuges 
to enrich uranium and crude weapon designs. In Libya, 
investigators found that Khan's network had also provided 
blueprints for a nuclear weapon. 

Hints of Khan's operation were an open secret for years among 
intelligence officers and officials in Pakistan, the US and 
elsewhere. But Pakistan's President, General Pervez Musharraf, 
confronted Khan only after the BBC China was seized. Last week, 
Khan publicly confessed and was pardoned by General Musharraf. 

Mr Bush says Washington has been assured that the Scomi factory 
is no longer producing centrifuge parts. The company maintains it 
was producing components that could have many legitimate uses. 

The New York Times 

Copyright  � 2004. The Sydney Morning Herald.
*****************************************************************
 6 Seattle Times: Opinion: Too easily persuaded into an unnecessary war
 	
Wednesday, February 11, 2004 - Page updated at 12:00 A.M.
 			 			 			 			
Bruce Ramsey / Times editorial columnist

Why did we invade Iraq? One scene from "The Price of Loyalty," 
Ron Suskind's look through the eyes of Treasury Secretary Paul 
O'Neill, helps answer that. The book is, of course, from the 
point of view of a man who was fired. But he was a man with a 
reputation for telling unpleasant truths. Furthermore, the 
president he describes does look like the president we see on 
television. 

O'Neill describes a meeting of the National Security Council, 
including George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Don Rumsfeld, Condi Rice 
and others. It was Jan. 30, 2001. Bush had been in office 10 
days, and 9-11 was more than eight months off. 

CIA Director George Tenet rolled out a photograph onto the big 
table. It was an aerial photo, enlarged and grainy, of a factory 
in Iraq. He said it might be making chemical or biological 
weapons. 

"Here are the railroad tracks coming in," he said, pointing with 
a stick, "and here are the trucks lined up over here. They're 
bringing it in here and bringing it out there." 

"You have to take a look at this," said Cheney, and they crowded 
around. 

To O'Neill, who had recently retired as CEO of Alcoa Aluminum, it 
looked like just another industrial building. What was so 
suspicious about it? Trucks were coming in night and day, Tenet 
said. 

That meant nothing. But Bush was already sold. "Actual plans were 
already being discussed to take over Iraq and occupy it in an 
unspoken doctrine of preemptive war," the book says. 

On my way to work, I sometimes see people with a banner, "BUSH 
LIED." There is not a hint of that in Suskind's book. Looking at 
the man, I think: No, he believes this. 

Maybe I am being kind because I voted for him. 

Apologists now say Bush was "misled" by bad intelligence. He says 
in his defense that others in the U.S. and British governments 
saw the same intelligence, and reached the same conclusions. The 
French and Germans didn't. The intelligence people, including 
Tenet, now say they never asserted such certainty. 

A national commission will dig into the intelligence � and report 
after the election. Meanwhile, a thought from O'Neill: A 
president with a probing, restless mind, like Richard Nixon, 
would not have been so easily persuaded. 

O'Neill worked for Nixon. Bush, he says, does not have that sharp 
and demanding an intellect. That is the conclusion of the book, 
and the best explanation, I think, of why America started an 
unnecessary war. 

Bush had run as a candidate opposed to hegemonic war and the 
follow-on "nation-building." But he made the mistake of 
recruiting his father's men, who thought differently. By all 
appearances, he was sold on the war by the people around him. 

In turn, he sold the Congress by asserting that Iraq had chemical 
and biological weapons. Its soldiers did not. We know that for a 
fact. For months, it has been suggested Saddam Hussein hid his 
best weapons, which is a very odd thing to do before the great 
battle of one's life. We have spent months looking, and have 
found Saddam in his spider hole, but not the "weapons of mass 
destruction." 

It has been nearly a year. It's time for Bush's supporters to 
admit that there weren't any such weapons. Essentially, the 
president did this in the "Meet the Press" interview with Tim 
Russert this past weekend. 

That is a serious admission. It means America was led to war 
under false pretenses. It means that in the first instance of the 
new American doctrine of preemptive war, we preempted something 
that wasn't real. 

From the Bush camp comes much blowing of smoke over this. Bush 
says Saddam could have developed a nuclear weapon and given it to 
a private group to set off in the United States. A lot of things 
can be imagined, but the world's mightiest power cannot go to war 
over an imagination. The justification for killing people has to 
be stronger than that. There need to be facts � facts that stand 
in your path, shout in your face and block all paths other than 
that of mechanized violence. 

The president didn't have the facts. Some people said in his 
defense that he probably knew more than he was saying. They 
overestimated him. 

Copyright � 2004 The Seattle Times Company More opinion headlines
*****************************************************************
 7 BBC: Rumsfeld 'unaware' of WMD claim 
 
  Last Updated: Wednesday, 11 February, 2004
 
[Government weapons dossier]                            

The 45-minute claim was publicised in the run-up to war                                                             

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says he cannot remember 
hearing the claim that Iraq could launch weapons of mass 
destruction within 45 minutes. 

The claim was a part of the UK government's September 2002 
dossier on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction arms dossier in the 
run-up to the war. 

It came to British intelligence from an Iraqi military source, 
but its use in the dossier has caused controversy. 

Tony Blair last week admitted he had not known full details of 
the claim. 

He told MPs he had not been aware before the war that it referred 
only to battlefield weapons rather than long-range strategic 
missiles. 

That admission prompted Conservative leader Michael Howard to 
call for the prime minister's resignation for failing to ask 
"basic questions" before the war. 

Asked his view of the claim, Mr Rumsfeld told reporters at a 
Pentagon briefing: "I don't remember the statement being made, to 
be perfectly honest." 

Continued controversy 

Last year, a committee of MPs said the way the claim was worded 
could have led to unhelpful speculation about its meaning. 

Some newspapers printed banner headlines suggesting it meant 
British troops in Cyprus could be attacked with weapons of mass 
destruction within 45 minutes. 

The claim became a central part of Lord Hutton's report into the 
death of government weapons expert Dr David Kelly. 

BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan reported that Dr Kelly had cited the 
claim as an example of how the dossier was "sexed up" before its 
publication to make the case for war. 

But Lord Hutton said the allegation that the government had 
embellished the dossier with intelligence it believed to be 
unreliable was "unfounded". 

*****************************************************************
 8 El Nuevo Herald: Kay Says Bush Slowing Intelligence Reform
 
AP Wire | 02/12/2004 | 
   
KEN GUGGENHEIM

 Associated Press

WASHINGTON - The Bush administration is hampering efforts to 
improve intelligence by clinging to the false hope that weapons 
of mass destruction may be found in Iraq, the former chief U.S. 
weapons inspector said Thursday. 

"My only serious regret about the continued holding on to the 
hope that eventually we'll find it is that it eventually allows 
you to avoid the hard steps necessary to reform the process," 
David Kay said in an interview with The Associated Press. 

Since resigning last month, Kay has repeatedly said U.S. 
intelligence was wrong in claiming that Saddam Hussein had 
stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and advanced 
nuclear weapons programs. Those programs were the main 
justification for the Iraq war. 

President Bush and other officials insist weapons could still be 
discovered. In an interview on NBC's "Meet the Press" last 
weekend, Bush said, "They could be hidden, they could have been 
transported to another country." Defense Secretary Donald H. 
Rumsfeld has also said he believes weapons could still be 
uncovered. 

Kay said the administration could fear the political costs of 
acknowledging error. "I suspect if I had their jobs I'd probably, 
to keep my sanity, be an eternal optimist about some things," he 
said. 

Kay stepped down from his role as CIA adviser for the weapons 
search after the military diverted resources from the search to 
bolster security for troops and fight insurgents. He described a 
constant battle to keep his staff of 1,400, in which he initially 
prevailed but began to lose ground in the fall. He said he wasn't 
informed of the final changes until after the decision had been 
made. 

"If a country like this could not devote that level of resources 
... to come to a conclusion about the reason we went to war, and 
couldn't find those people somewhere else to go to 
counterterrorism - you didn't have to rob one to increase the 
other," he said. 

Though he is persuaded that no large stockpiles of chemical and 
biological weapons existed, more work needs to be done to examine 
the foreign assistance Iraq received in its missile program, Kay 
said. 

"These same people are likely helping other countries trying to 
achieve missile programs," he said. 

Kay said "the dominance of analytical opinion" was that two 
trailers found in northern Iraq were meant to make hydrogen for 
balloons, not biological weapons. CIA Director George Tenet said 
last week that the issue was still under debate. 

Part of the problem, Kay said, was that the trailers had never 
been used for anything and that their equipment was not well 
suited for either hydrogen or biological weapons production. 
Documents and testimony from Iraqis point strongly toward the 
hydrogen idea, he said. 

Another issue was the discovery of thousands of high-strength 
aluminum tubes in Iraq. Before the war, Bush administration 
officials said those tubes were meant to be used in centrifuges 
to make nuclear bomb fuel out of uranium. 

Although Tenet said the issue was still open, Kay said analysts 
have concluded Iraq had no active nuclear program. 

"There's no substantial disagreement that there was no centrifuge 
program," Kay said. 

The most likely explanation for the tubes, Kay said, is that they 
were to be used for artillery rockets. Kay said the Iraqis were 
making rockets based on an Italian design which used the same 
kind and size of aluminum tubes. 

Kay said only a few Iraqi weapons scientists were still being 
held by the Americans, and most of those were not jailed for 
their participation in weapons of mass destruction programs. 

"Of those in detention, most are for activities other than their 
scientific activities," Kay said. 

An example, Kay said, is Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, a former 
scientist in Saddam's biological weapons program. She is being 
held because she was on Saddam's Revolutionary Command Council, 
not for her biological work, Kay said. 

Kay repeated statements that he did not believe analysts felt 
pressured to shape their reports to bolster the case for war, a 
claim made by some Democrats. 

Asked whether analysts believed their findings had been 
distorted, Kay said: "Were some people uncomfortable about some 
of the rhetoric? I think the fair answer to that is `yes.'" He 
stressed that analysts are generally uncomfortable with any 
change to their wording, but understand that is the nature of 
political rhetoric. 

"Politicians choose the best possible argument that will support 
the course of action they've decided on regardless of whether 
it's foreign policy or not," he said. "Is that cherry picking? 
That's the nature of the political process." 

Kay said the team he headed, the Iraq Survey Group, found 
widespread corruption in the United Nations oil-for-food program, 
which allowed Iraq to sell oil while it was subjected to 
sanctions. "There are going to be red faces among a lot of our 
allies and friends as to this because a lot of people took part 
in what was clearly a scam." 

--- 

Associated Press Writer Matt Kelley contributed to this story.   

*****************************************************************
 9 Japan Times: Questionable intelligence
    
    Friday, February 13, 2004   

EDITORIAL

 Confronted with mounting evidence that Iraq did not possess 
weapons of mass destruction at the time of last year's war, U.S. 
President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
last month decided to launch an independent inquiry into the 
quality of intelligence they used to justify the war. This is no 
small concern to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who supported 
the invasion and is now sending a large contingent of ground 
troops to postwar Iraq. 

The investigation, it must be hoped, will clear up all relevant 
questions. How was intelligence gathered and analyzed? How was it 
used? More specifically, was it exaggerated, or manipulated, to 
build the case for regime change in Baghdad? If the war was 
started on the basis of false intelligence, as it now seems 
increasingly likely, then the legitimacy of the war -- and the 
credibility of President Bush's doctrine of a "preemptive attack" 
-- will be thrown into serious doubt. 

Both Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair -- as well as Mr. Koizumi and other 
national leaders who backed them -- all believed, or seemed to 
believe, that former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's regime was 
hiding those banned weapons somewhere in the months leading up to 
the war. The chief justification they provided for the military 
action was that those deadly arsenals, somehow concealed entirely 
from weapons inspectors, posed an immediate threat to regional 
and global security. That rationale now seems out of kilter with 
reality.

 The fact is that so far no biological, chemical or nuclear 
weapons have been discovered in Iraq. The current evidence 
suggests strongly that they will never be found. Mr. David Kay, 
who has resigned as the chief U.S. arms inspector, has testified 
in Congress that no large stockpiles of unconventional weapons 
existed in Iraq. His conclusion was blunt: "We were almost all 
wrong."

 Prime Minister Blair, who has been hit by an intelligence fiasco 
on his own turf, appears to face a doubly difficult challenge. He 
had expressed confidence that those weapons would be uncovered in 
due course and that everyone should wait until the U.S. Iraqi 
Survey Group produced its final report. Mr. Kay's stunning 
testimony, however, has compelled Mr. Blair to follow President 
Bush in setting up an investigative panel. 

Last month an independent commission headed by Judge Lord Brian 
Hutton exonerated Mr. Blair from responsibility in the mysterious 
suicide July 18 of government weapons expert David Kelly, who had 
been "outed" as the source for BBC reports that Downing Street 
had manipulated British intelligence on Iraqi WMD. The Hutton 
report denied government interference and blamed the broadcaster 
for faulty journalism. 

The BBC's chief executive and director general, as well as the 
military reporter involved, resigned. Apparently basking in his 
victory, Mr. Blair said his government had never lied about 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and that the true lie was that 
the government had lied. He has a reputation as a man of 
conviction, but as far as his WMD rationale is concerned, large 
parts of the British public remain skeptical. 

According to media polls, only about 25 percent of Britons think 
that the Hutton inquiry is impartial, while as many as 55 percent 
believe that it was wrong to assign all the blame to the BBC. And 
about 60 percent feel that Mr. Blair cannot be trusted -- a de 
facto vote of no confidence. 

The prevailing perception, and not only in Britain, is that 
intelligence services may have oversold their findings under 
pressure from above. In Japan, too, it is difficult not to think, 
judging from last month's parliamentary dispute over an Iraqi 
security report, that "spin doctoring" may have taken place.

 The work of the new British panel, according to the Blair 
administration, will be limited largely to technical questions, 
such as whether prewar intelligence on Iraqi WMD was accurate and 
what disparities existed between such intelligence and results of 
on-the-spot surveys. The odd thing is that the most important 
question -- whether London had sufficient information to justify 
its decision to start a war -- is left out. 

In this regard, an editorial in a leading British newspaper 
offered a critical point to ponder. Noting that Mr. Blair knew 
that Mr. Bush would opt for war anyway, the paper commented, Mr. 
Blair decided to do the same, apparently in the belief that 
failure to do so would destroy Britain's strategic relationship 
with the United States. The forthcoming inquiry, it added, should 
look into the political process leading up to that decision. 

This is a grave matter that concerns the Japanese public as well, 
given the pervasive perception here that Prime Minister Koizumi 
seems to have put the Japan-U.S. alliance before everything in 
supporting the U.S.-led war.

 The Japan Times: Feb. 13, 2004 (C) All rights reserved 

*****************************************************************
 10 Guardian Unlimited: Blair's claim is simply incredible

A former senior intelligence officer challenges Lord
Hutton's account 		
		
Crispin Black
Thursday February 12, 2004
		
Imagine you are a retired and very proud guards officer watching 
trooping the colour. How embarrassed and puzzled you would feel 
if things started to go wrong. Small things, initially, that 
others not brought up in the system might not notice. The columns 
of scarlet-clad troops slightly out of sync with the marching 
music. Some of the orders being given by men in suits rather than 
by the sergeant majors on parade. I used to work for the defence 
intelligence staff (DIS) and the Cabinet Office assessments staff 
- who draft the papers for the joint intelligence committee (JIC) 
and intelligence reports for No 10 - and that's how I felt during 
the Hutton inquiry, and how I feel now. 

I left the assessments staff just six months before the dreaded 
dossier was published. From what came out at the Hutton inquiry I 
could hardly recognise the organisation I had so recently worked 
for. Meetings with no minutes, an intelligence analytical group 
on a highly specialised subject which included unqualified 
officials in Downing Street but excluded the DIS's lifetime 
experts (like Dr Brian Jones), vague and unexplained bits of 
intelligence appearing in the dossier as gospel (notably the 
45-minute claim), sloppy use of language, that weird "last call" 
for intelligence like Henry II raving about Thomas a' Becket - 
with "who will furnish me with the intelligence I need" 
substituted for "who will rid me of that turbulent priest". 

I looked forward to Lord Hutton making some serious suggestions 
about how to keep the intelligence process free of political 
manipulation and analysts free from the preparation of propaganda 
dossiers. I thought he might help explain, too, why the 
intelligence community had been taken by surprise by the 
aftermath of victory in Iraq. 

When the report came I was puzzled at first - serious people 
seemed to be taking it so seriously. And then everyone started to 
laugh. Some of the passages - particularly "the possibility 
cannot be completely ruled out that the desire of the prime 
minister ... may have subconsciously influenced ... members of 
the JIC ... consistent with the intelligence available to the 
JIC" are masterpieces of comic writing. 

In two years as an intelligence officer, and four-and-a-half 
years as an analyst at the highest level, I never once heard the 
phrase "consistent with intelligence". It means nothing. I have 
often been asked whether I was sure that I had reviewed all the 
available intelligence or whether I was sure I was on the right 
track. But no one has ever asked me whether something was 
consistent with the intelligence. Intelligence is by its nature 
inconsistent. Very often the right answer, the answer closest to 
the truth, draws on just a small part of the material available 
to you because you have discounted the rest. It was consistent 
with the intelligence for the German high command to expect that 
the D-day landings were going to take place near Calais. 
Consistent - except that the intelligence was part of a deception 
operation. 

But it has recently got even more embarrassing. The prime 
minister told the House of Commons that he was unaware at the 
time of the war debate that the 45-minute piece of intelligence 
referred only to battlefield rather than strategic weapons. Let 
me list just some of the procedures which must have been executed 
incorrectly to allow him to be kept in such a state of ignorance 
at such a crucial time on such a crucial matter when other 
members of his cabinet (Cook and Hoon) appear to have been in the 
know. 

One: neither Cook nor Hoon saw fit to tell the prime minister, 
for whatever reason. 

Two: the intelligence was not considered important or accurate 
enough to explain to him in detail - even though it appears in 
the September 24 dossier at least three times and in the prime 
minister's own foreword. 

Three: Blair had to rely on verbal briefings from the JIC 
chairman and others, who told him about the 45 minutes bit of the 
intelligence but omitted to mention that it referred only to 
battlefield weapons, and neither the prime minister nor any of 
the brilliant young staff asked the obvious question. 

Four: the original SIS report mentioned the 45-minute time, but 
made no attempt to distinguish between strategic and battlefield 
weapons - even though the service was aware that the report was 
about battlefield munitions. 

Five: the prime minister's daily written intelligence brief from 
the Cabinet Office included the 45 minutes point but not the 
crucial distinction between battlefield and strategic weapons. 
And not a single member of the Cabinet Office assessments staff 
(the most brilliant intelligence analysts in the UK) spotted this 
or thought it important. 

This is not the case of a few guardsmen out of step or a few 
trumpeters out of tune. This is like holding trooping the colour 
but forgetting to tell the Queen the correct date. 

� Lieutenant Colonel Crispin Black worked for defence 
intelligence from 1994-96 and was on the intelligence assessment 
staff from 1999-2002 


        Related articles 04.02.2004: Swift and secret, Blair's 
inquiry 04.02.2004: Blair says legal basis for war was sound 
04.02.2004: Kennedy spurns narrow brief that won't win trust 
04.02.2004: Lord Butler: the man who will investigate 04.02.2004: 
The Franks precedent

Comment 04.02.2004: Leader: Iraq inquiry 04.02.2004: Jonathan 
Freedland: Don't be fooled again over Iraq 04.02.2004: Kenneth 
Pollack: How did we get it so wrong? 04.02.2004: Sketch: Simon 
Hoggart 04.02.2004: Diary: Matthew Norman 04.02.2004: Letters: 
From one inquiry to the next

Guardian Newspapers Limited

*****************************************************************
 11 Guardian Unlimited: This war is not yet over
		 	
The consequences of Iraq could still break Blair and
Bush, and change forever the way our world is ordered 		
		
Jonathan Freedland
Wednesday February 11, 2004
The Guardian 		
		
It's the Alan Clark manoeuvre. When the old Tory reptile found 
himself assailed by a tricky argument, he would fire back with 
his most lethal weapon. "This is boring," he would say airily. 
"You are being the most frightful bore." Clark used the word 
often, keenly aware of its peculiarly English power to devastate. 

Now the government is deploying the Clark manoeuvre. Those who 
still insist on banging on about Iraq and its missing weapons of 
mass destruction are anoraks, they say, trainspotters on the fast 
track to Dullsville. Ministers declare that the rest of the 
country lost interest in this media fixation long ago. Only 
journalists, with their stained coats and plastic carrier bags, 
still care. 

It is beginning to work. Plenty of those whose blood was up in 
the immediate aftermath of the Hutton report - the backlash 
against the whitewash - suspect they ought to drop it now. Better 
to change the subject than be a bore. 

They should think again. For this is more than another political 
story de jour, one that looms enormous at the time but is soon 
forgotten. This is not the fuel protest or the Hinduja affair. On 
the contrary, the legitimacy of the Iraq war is about as serious 
a question as you could imagine; its answer could determine the 
way our world is ordered in the 21st century. And this is not 
abstract, chin-stroking stuff for the seminar room. It has direct 
political consequences; it could even break the governments of 
both Britain and the United States. 

The gravity should hardly need to be proved. Yesterday's suicide 
attack on a police station 25 miles from Baghdad, killing dozens, 
was a reminder of how Iraq remains a matter of life and death. 
The rising number of British and US casualties drives the point 
home just as intensely. What more serious question could there be 
than whether all these deaths are the result of a grievous 
mistake? If the war was not an error but built on a lie, then 
those dead are the victims of a terrible crime. 

Take the most recent dispute: whether Tony Blair should have 
known that the legendary 45-minute claim applied only to Iraq's 
battlefield weapons. Ministers insist this is an "obscure" 
question, of interest only to the nerd class of defence 
specialists. But surely it relates directly to whether Blair was 
right to brand Iraq a "serious and current threat" in 2002. If 
Saddam did appear to have long-range, strategic weapons of mass 
destruction deployable in under an hour, then the threat would 
indeed have seemed serious and current. But if it was just 
battlefield shells, then the danger was rather less pressing. 
Hardly an obscure difference. (Imagine what extra ordure Lord 
Hutton would have piled on Andrew Gilligan if he had broadcast a 
report on Iraq's arsenal, only later to confess that he never 
bothered to find out what kind of weapons he was discussing.) 

Still, the specific cost in human lives of the Iraq war is not 
the sole reason why this will remain the central question of 
current politics. There are wider reverberations. For this war 
was unique, the first truly pre-emptive attack lacking even the 
pretence of provocation. At least earlier, hotly controversial 
military adventures, whether over Suez or in Vietnam, had an 
initial, immediate prompt to action. But in 2002 there was no 
nationalisation of the canal, no threat by the north to topple 
the south. There was merely an ongoing stand-off with the United 
Nations, one that had been running for years and that, admittedly 
under the threat of military action, was beginning to unblock. 
Hans Blix and his men were making progress; they were not 
threatened or harassed. There was no provocation. 

The Bush administration makes no secret that it sees the Iraq war 
as the prototype for future conflicts; indeed, it has enshrined 
the idea in its official national security strategy document. 
Pre-emption remains the Bush doctrine. Witness Donald Rumsfeld's 
revealing remarks in Munich last week. Asked whether America is 
bound by any international system, legal framework or code of 
conduct, the US defence secretary replied: "I honestly believe 
that every country ought to do what it wants to do ... It either 
is proud of itself afterwards, or it is less proud of itself." 
Translation: the US can do what it likes - including making war 
on countries that have made no attack on it. 

Such pre-emptive wars are only possible with intelligence. 
Without some knowledge of the perceived threat that is to be 
removed, no case for preventative action can be made. Which makes 
the reliability of intelligence a centralissue of our time -and 
ensures that the use politicians make of such intelligence is not 
some fleeting, one-off issue that will die with the Iraq episode. 
Its legitimacy or otherwise will determine how wars are fought in 
future. If the lesson of the WMD debacle is that intelligence 
cannot be relied upon, for it will always risk what Blix calls 
"dramatisation" in the hands of politicians, then Iraq might be 
the last pre-emptive war. If Blair and Bush succeed in leading 
public opinion towards the reverse conclusion, we will soon live 
in a different world. 

Such consequences can almost seem too large to grasp. But there 
are some concrete ones to contemplate, too. A majority of Britons 
now believes that Tony Blair lied over the Iraq war and that he 
should resign, according to an NOP poll last weekend. When the 
prime minister's trust ratings took a hit in the past, the 
working assumption was that things would soon right themselves. 
Sure enough, formula one and the Mandelson home loan affair 
brought embarrassments, but the Blair numbers soon recovered. 
This is of a wholly different order. The PM said Iraq had WMD 
when it did not, and the public trust has been irreparably 
broken. It is as harsh and as simple as that. Whether it is at 
the next election or later, one cannot help but believe that 
somehow the Iraq adventure will destroy the Blair premiership if 
not the Labour government. 

In the US, that process might already be under way. Few would 
dare bet against the president just yet, but Iraq could be the 
undoing of Bush. His presumptive opponent, John Kerry, is running 
hard on the issue, even lashing out at the bogus 45-minute claim 
at the weekend. Al Gore, recast as an elder statesman, is making 
fierce speeches comparing Bush with Richard Nixon, who won 
re-election only to be brought down two years later. The 
president himself is looking defensive and shaky, most visibly in 
a feeble TV performance on Sunday. 

Blair and Bush must suspect that Iraq could be the breaking of 
them, even if they do not know how it will happen. Governments 
toppled in London and Washington, and the world order reshaped. 
Boring? I don't think so. 

j.freedland@guardian.co.uk
	
        Related articles 04.02.2004: Swift and secret, Blair's 
inquiry 04.02.2004: Blair says legal basis for war was sound 
04.02.2004: Kennedy spurns narrow brief that won't win trust 
04.02.2004: Lord Butler: the man who will investigate 04.02.2004: 
The Franks precedent

Comment 04.02.2004: Leader: Iraq inquiry 04.02.2004: Jonathan 
Freedland: Don't be fooled again over Iraq 04.02.2004: Kenneth 
Pollack: How did we get it so wrong? 04.02.2004: Sketch: Simon 
Hoggart 04.02.2004: Diary: Matthew Norman 04.02.2004: Letters: 
From one inquiry to the next

Hutton report Full coverage of the inquiry and report Read the 
Hutton report (pdf, 2MB)

Intelligence and security committee report Download the MPs' 
published report (pdf) 11.09.2003: ISC report: key quotes

Foreign affairs committee report Read the MPs' report in full 
(pdf) 07.07.2003: Conclusions and recommendations

The dossiers The government's September dossier on Iraqi WMD 
(pdf) The government's February dossier on Iraqi WMD (pdf)

Explained 03.06.2003: The different government inquiries

Political alerts Get daily headlines straight to your mobile

Sign up for the Backbencher Our free weekly insider's guide to 
Westminster

What do you think? politics.editor@guardianunlimited.co.uk

Guardian Newspapers Limited

                                
*****************************************************************
 12 Moscow Times Rumyantsev: Iran Fuel Deal Is Close
 
Friday, Feb. 13, 2004. Page 3 

Reuters 

The Nuclear Power Ministry said Thursday that it plans to sign a
deal with Iran next month to ship nuclear fuel for the $800
million Russian-built Bushehr power plant, defying U.S. pressure
to sever nuclear ties with the country. 

"I think in about two weeks all outstanding issues will be
settled, that is, by the end of February," Nuclear Power
Minister Alexander Rumyantsev told reporters. 

He said he hoped to sign the final document, which also requires
Iran to return spent nuclear fuel to Russia, during a visit to
Tehran in late March. 

"The United States has criticized us and will continue to
criticize us," Rumyantsev said. "They say Iran seeks nuclear
weapons under the cover of our peaceful technology transfer. 
"But we keep telling them they've got that wrong. We think we
abide by all international laws." 

Minutes after Rumyantsev's briefing, top U.S. arms control
official John Bolton accused Iran of failing to comply with the
commitment it made last year to suspend uranium enrichment. 

� Copyright 2002, The Moscow Times. All Rights Reserved.
*****************************************************************
 13 Hi Pakistan: Pakistan awaiting IAEA report on Iran, Libya N-plans

February 13 2004     
    
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan will be keenly awaiting the report of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on 
the nuclear programmes of Iran and Libya following its meeting in 
Vienna on March 8.

The forum will review the reports of IAEA inspectors, who have 
visited Iran and Libya after the two nations opened their nuclear 
programmes to international inspections. The programmes, at 
whatever stages they are, would be dismantled, and that is what 
Iran and Libya have agreed to, under international pressures, 
after months of resistance and dithering.

The inspectors� findings will contain a report on acquisition of 
nuclear technology by the two countries from the black market, 
with its sources concentrated in Europe. The father of Pakistan�s 
atomic bomb, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, according to his own 
confession, was also a major source.

The IAEA board may take into account measures to curb the nuclear 
underworld to stop spread of nuclear technology. Pakistan�s 
intense interest in the IAEA deliberations and the subsequent 
report that the international agency will issue around mid-March 
on the nuclear programmes of Iran and Libya is understandable 
because Dr Khan has confessed to have proliferated to these two 
countries as well as North Korea.

Pakistan came to this conclusion in the light of IAEA information 
that the agency got from Iran and Libya and handed over to 
Islamabad for verification. In addition, the United States 
provided to Pakistan solid evidence about transfer of nuclear 
designs, hardware and technology to these countries.

Officials are confident that the IAEA report on Iran and Libya 
would not contain any adverse comments on Pakistan on the basis 
of Dr Khan�s admission because it did not take much time to 
investigate the charges and complete the process. Additionally, 
no Pakistani government or institution has been found involved in 
the nuclear technology transfer. Proliferation activity was 
confined to individuals.

Pakistan has announced that it is prepared to share the findings 
of its internal probe into proliferation with the IAEA and to 
discuss it with the agency. Pakistan says it has cooperated with 
the IAEA and would continue to do so in future so that there is 
no proliferation. But Islamabad has categorically declared that 
it would not allow inspections by the United Nations or any 
country and vowed to protect its strategic assets.

Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 14 IRIB PERSIAN News: Iran, Russia study nuclear coop. 

IranNews Tehran Times Iran Daily   

  2004/02/12   
  
Moscow, Feb 12 - The Russian Federation Minister of Nuclear 
Energy Alexander Rumyantsev and Iran's Ambassador to Moscow 
Gholamreza Shafei here Wednesday reviewed cooperation on peaceful 
use of nuclear energy.

 At the meeting, the two sides stressed further expansion of 
nuclear cooperation particularly after signing up the additional 
protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by Iran.

 Return of spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr nuclear plant to 
Russia was one of the main topics of discussion between the two 
officials.

 The Russian minister also expressed hope that he could visit 
Iran soon.

 Rumyantsev was scheduled to visit Iran on February 15 to inspect 
Bushehr nuclear plant as well as hold talks on nuclear 
cooperation with Iranian officials.

 However, his planned trip to Iran was postponed.

mr/kd   

  Copyright 2004, All Rights Reserved By Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting News Network Sponsored By IRIB News Computer Center. 
*****************************************************************
 15 Xinhuanet: Duration of six-party talks not set yet: FM   
 
  www.xinhuanet.com

  www.chinaview.cn 2004-02-12 19:42:18   

    BEIJING, Feb. 12 (Xinhuanet) -- The duration of the upcoming 
six-party talks on the Korean nuclear issue has not been decided 
yet, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said here 
Thursday. 

    All relevant sides, which are China, the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK), the United States, Republic of Korea, 
Russia and Japan, were still consulting on the length of the 
second round of the talks, scheduled to open on Feb. 25 in 
Beijing,according to Zhang. 

    Relevant consultations on the talks were frequent recently. 
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, China's chief negotiator 
inthe previous round of talks, "has just concluded a trip to 
Japan and will head for DPRK," Zhang said. 

    "Appropriate arrangements will be made" after further 
consultation between China and the United States, Russia and the 
DPRK, said Zhang. 

    The first round of the six-party talks lasted three days from 
Aug. 27 and 29, 2003. Enditem   


  Copyright �2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved. 
*****************************************************************
 16 Hi Pakistan: Results of N-probe to be shared with Japan - Musharraf
 
February 13 2004     
    
ISLAMABAD: President Pervez Musharraf said on Wednesday the 
investigation into the illicit transfers to North Korea had not 
yet concluded and Pakistan would share with Japan the results of 
investigations.

Talking to Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Ichiro Fujisaki, who 
called on him at the Aiwan-e-Sadr, the president said Pakistan 
was fully aware and respected Japanese concerns about the dangers 
of nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. "It was inconceivable 
that Pakistan would do anything that would affect peace and 
security of North East Asia and especially of Japan."

He said, "Investigations with regard to illicit transfers to 
North Korea had not yet concluded. Pakistan would share with 
Japan, the results of its internal investigations on any illegal 
transfers to North Korea when the investigations were completed."

The president stated that as a responsible nuclear weapon state, 
Pakistan was committed to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. 
"Pakistan had taken effective steps to safeguard its nuclear 
assets and facilities which were now under the National Command 
Authority," he said.

Musharraf said reports of collusion between a few scientists with 
the global nuclear underworld were being investigated. "As a 
responsible state committed to non-proliferation, Pakistan has 
exposed the complicity of a few individuals with the nuclear 
black market and is taking appropriate action against them."

The Japanese minister conveyed to the president greetings and 
good wishes of Prime Minister Koizumi and exchanged views on 
bilateral and regional issues as well as on matters relating to 
nuclear non-proliferation.

The president warmly reciprocated the message of good wishes and 
greetings from Prime Minister Koizumi. He thanked Japan for 
providing valuable economic and technical assistance to Pakistan, 
and detailed Pakistan�s perspective on promoting peace and 
security in South Asia and the Middle East and stability in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.

The Japanese minister lauded the efforts of the president and the 
Government of Pakistan to promote peace with India and regional 
cooperation in South Asia under Saarc. The deputy foreign 
minister of Japan also met Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali. 
Jamali said continuity of reforms holds the key to a better and 
prosperous future. He said the continuity of economic reforms and 
policies have resulted in macro-economic stability in the 
country. He added that strict fiscal discipline and prudent 
economic policies have helped the country effect a complete 
turnaround in the economic field.

The prime minister briefed the deputy foreign minister on the 
rationale of the economic policies being pursued by the 
government. He also apprised him about the privatisation policies 
of the government and the encouragement of private sector and the 
foreign investors. The Japanese minister appreciated the 
democratic process and the economic development in Pakistan.

Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved. No part 
*****************************************************************
 17 United Press International: Analysis: N.Korea softens stance on Japan
 
By Jong-Heon Lee UPI Correspondent Published 2/12/2004 7:48 AM 

SEOUL, South Korea, Feb. 12 (UPI) -- Hopes of resuming 
long-stalled talks between Japan and North Korea have improved 
after the two nations exchanged moved ahead on the thorny issue 
of the abduction of Japanese citizens by the communist nation 
decades ago.

 A group of top Japanese diplomats traveled to Pyongyang this 
week to find a breakthrough on the issue, which has hindered 
progress on efforts to establish diplomatic ties between the two 
rivals. The talks would be the first government-to-government 
contacts since diplomatic negotiations ended in October 2002 over 
the abduction issue and the North Korean nuclear crisis.

 The Pyongyang meeting, which comes less than two weeks before a 
second round of six-nation talks over the North's atomic weapons 
program, also has boosted hopes for progress on the protracted 
nuclear standoff.

 Analysts in Seoul said they expect this week's talks to succeed 
because the two nations want to settle the abduction issue soon 
to resume normalization talks that have remained deadlocked since 
1992. Talks began in 1991, but the North broke off negotiations a 
year later when Tokyo raised the issue of Japanese it says were 
abducted by North Korea.

 "I see high possibility that the Pyongyang talks would produce 
tangible results to break the decades-long abduction impasse," 
said Yoon Duk-min, a researcher at the Seoul-based Institute for 
Foreign Affairs and National Security.

 Despite Tokyo's recent moves against North Korea, including the 
approval of a sanction law, Pyongyang accepted the visit by 
Japanese officials for talks.

 "This is a sign of North Korea's softer approach toward Japan," 
Yoon said. "North Korea seems ready to improve relations."

 During its four-day stay in Pyongyang, the Japanese delegation 
led by Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka was to discuss the 
abduction issue. The five-man team, which includes Mitoji 
Yabunaka, Japan's chief negotiator at the first round of six-way 
nuclear talks in August, returns home Saturday.

 "They will be meeting with foreign ministry officials of the 
North Korean government and they will discuss the bilateral 
issues including abductions and also at the same time nuclear 
issues," Tokyo's Foreign Ministry said.

 Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi was optimistic about 
the talks.

 "The Japanese government had been calling for inter-government 
talks, so I think this is a positive move," she told reporters in 
Tokyo.

 The Japanese delegates met North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister 
Kim Yong Il upon arriving in Pyongyang Wednesday night. During 
the two-hour talks over dinner, the team urged North Korea to 
hand over the North Korea-born children and spouses of five 
Japanese nationals who were kidnapped in 1978 and released in 
2002 after the landmark Tokyo-Pyongyang summit, diplomatic 
sources in Seoul here.

 North Korea acknowledged in September 2002 it had abducted or 
lured 13 Japanese to the nation and claimed eight died there. The 
surviving five returned to Japan in October that year, but their 
children and spouses remain in the North.

 The Japanese government wants to reunite the families. The 
stalemate over the issue has been one of the biggest obstacles to 
normalizing relations, which could give the impoverished North a 
large compensation fund for Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule.

 In a bid to ease the deadlock, the North proposed the remaining 
families would be allowed to come to Japan if the five 
repatriated abductees go to Pyongyang airport to pick them up.

 North Korea has also recently asked Japan to pay nearly $20 
million to repatriate each family member left behind in the 
communist nation. Since last summer, North Korea has demanded $19 
million per family member of the kidnap victims as compensation 
for the reunion, said Kyoko Nakayama, Japan's cabinet secretariat 
adviser.

 In a policy lecture in Nagoya, Japan, earlier this month, he 
said Japanese officials rejected the deal because it could 
encourage North Korea to kidnap more Japanese and use blackmail 
diplomacy to earn much-needed cash.

 The North's bid to use the humanitarian case to make money has 
contributed to frustration and anxiety among Japanese who take 
Pyongyang's nuclear weapons ambitions seriously.

 On Monday, Japan's parliament approved an amendment of the 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law so the government 
can unilaterally impose economic sanctions on North Korea. The 
law also makes it easier to block cash remittances to North 
Korea.

 Cash remittances from pro-North ethnic Koreans living in Japan, 
who make up about a third of the 600,000 ethnic-Korean community, 
are considered a vital source of funds for the impoverished 
communist country. The exact amount of cash, which is transported 
by visiting Korean relatives using a North Korean ferry that 
travels between the two nations, is unknown.

 "North Koreans are expected to use the abduction issue to win 
economic and food aid," Yoon said. "At talks, the North is also 
likely to try to drive a wedge between Tokyo and Washington ahead 
of upcoming the six-party nuclear talks."

 Japan is the key support for the U.S. administration's tough 
stance against the North's nuclear drive. The two Koreas, China, 
Russia, Japan and the United States are scheduled to hold the 
second round of six-party talks in Beijing from Feb. 25, 
following the first meeting held in the Chinese capital last 
August.                 Copyright � 2001-2004 United Press 
International
  			
*****************************************************************
 18 [du-list] Bush's Nuclear Proposal: Hypocrisy Charged
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:05:52 -0800

 
<x-flowed>
Institute for Public Accuracy
915 National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20045
(202) 347-0020 * <http://www.accuracy.org>http://www.accuracy.org * 
<mailto:ipa@accuracy.org>ipa@accuracy.org
___________________________________________________

          For Release 4:30 p.m. ET -- Wednesday, February 11, 2004

          Bush's Nuclear Proposal: Hypocrisy Charged

JOHN BURROUGHS, (212) 818-1861, cell: (917) 439-4585,
<mailto:johnburroughs@lcnp.org>johnburroughs@lcnp.org, http://www.lcnp.org
Burroughs is executive director of the New York-based Lawyers' Committee on
Nuclear Policy. He said this afternoon: "While Bush proposes ad hoc
measures to limit the capacity of other countries to produce nuclear
materials usable in reactors or bombs, his administration has yet to agree
to start negotiations on a verified treaty (the Fissile Materials Cutoff
Treaty) that would bar all countries, including the United States, from
their production for weapons purposes. All other major countries --
including China -- are ready to work on establishing such a ban.... In the
2005 budget he just proposed to Congress, spending would increase on
planning for a facility to produce plutonium triggers for warheads..."

JACQUELINE CABASSO, (510) 839-5877, (510) 306-0119, 
<mailto:wslf@earthlink.net>wslf@earthlink.net,
http://www.wslfweb.org
Cabasso is executive director of the Western States Legal Foundation and
co-author of the report "Nuclear Weapons in a Changed World." She said
today: "The central bargain of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is
indeed flawed. Under Article IV of the treaty, in exchange for giving up
the right to possess nuclear weapons, the nonnuclear weapon states were
promised an 'inalienable right' to develop nuclear technology for
'peaceful' purposes. In reality, that means that any country with a
civilian nuclear power program has the potential to develop nuclear
weapons. There are at least 44 of those countries -- not three, as Mr. Bush
would have us believe. Only, at the moment, most of those countries,
including our World War II enemies Japan and Germany, are our friends. Even
more importantly, Article VI of the NPT requires the U.S., Russia, France,
China and the U.K. to negotiate in good faith the total elimination of
their nuclear arsenals...."

GREG PALAST, (212) 505-5566, 
<mailto:greg@gregpalast.com>greg@gregpalast.com, http://www.gregpalast.com
In 2001, the BBC broadcast an expose co-investigated by Palast which
reported that Bush's National Security Agency effectively stymied the probe
of Khan Research Laboratories.

ARJUN MAKHIJANI, (301) 270-5500, <mailto:arjun@ieer.org>arjun@ieer.org, 
http://www.ieer.org
President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Makhijani
said today: "President Bush said this afternoon that he wants North Korea
to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program; that he wants
governments to stop making nuclear weapons 'under false pretenses.' But he
seeks to maintain a huge U.S. arsenal and build new weapons. The consistent
assertion by the United States that it needs nuclear weapons for its
security and that it retains the prerogative to use them against any
country, including non-nuclear states, is in violation of commitments given
to them under the Nonproliferation Treaty. These U.S. policies have been a
principal part of creating the desire, the demand for nuclear weapons...."

FELICE COHEN-JOPPA, (520) 323-8697, 
<mailto:freevanunu@mindspring.com>freevanunu@mindspring.com,
http://www.nonviolence.org/vanunu,
<http://www.msnbc.com/news/wld/graphics/strategic_israel_dw.htm>http://www.msnbc.com/news/wld/graphics/strategic_israel_dw.htm
Cohen-Joppa is the coordinator of the U.S. Campaign to Free Mordechai
Vanunu. She said today: "How can Bush pretend to seriously address nuclear
weapons proliferation while the U.S. government continues to support the
fiction that Israel does not have a massive nuclear arsenal? Israel's
nuclear weapons have driven much of the proliferation problem in the
Mideast. All the facts need to be on the table. Unfortunately Mordechai
Vanunu -- the whistleblower who revealed the scale of Israel's nuclear
capacity in 1986 -- has been silenced in an Israeli jail for 17 years, most
of it in solitary confinement. He is scheduled for release on April 21,
2004, but there are moves in Israel to keep him imprisoned even longer, or
to find some way of keeping him muzzled."

For more information, contact at the Institute for Public Accuracy:
Sam Husseini, (202) 347-0020 or (202) 421-6858; David Zupan, (541) 484-9167




To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to 
du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com.  In the body of the message type 
unsubscribe and send.


Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
ADVERTISEMENT
<http://rd.yahoo.com/SIG=12clsigdh/M=267637.4521717.5694185.1261774/D=egroupweb/S=1705083269:HM/EXP=1076653102/A=1945637/R=0/*http://www.netflix.com/Default?mqso=60178397&partid=4521717>1ce0c9.jpg
1ce135.jpg


----------
Yahoo! Groups Links
    * To visit your group on the web, go to:
    * 
<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/>http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/
    *
    * To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    * 
<mailto:du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe>du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com 

    *
    * Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the 
<http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>Yahoo! Terms of Service.

</x-flowed>


Attachment Converted: 1ce0c9.jpg: 00000001,26402ce0,00000000,00000000
Attachment Converted: 1ce135.jpg: 00000001,26402ce1,00000000,00000000
*****************************************************************
 19 Las Vegas SUN: GAO: Contractors Owe $3B in Unpaid Taxes

Today: February 12, 2004 at 11:30:25 PST 

 By MARY DALRYMPLE ASSOCIATED PRESS 

WASHINGTON (AP) - A total of $3 billion in unpaid taxes is owed
by more than 27,000 defense contractors, according to government
records reviewed by congressional investigators. 

Auditors at the Government Accounting Office, the investigative
arm of Congress, studied taxes owed in budget year that ended
Sept. 30, 2002. 

They concluded the Pentagon should have made a dent in the
billions owed by collecting at least $100 million in unpaid
taxes that year. A 1997 law requires federal agencies to
withhold 15 percent from payments to individuals or businesses
with unpaid tax bills. 

Since 1997, the Defense Department has collected only about
$687,000. 

"The Pentagon needs to start targeting more firepower on the
management side on fraud and abuse in the system and go after
the thousands of defense contractors that routinely renege on
paying their taxes," said Sen. Norm Coleman, R-Minn. 

The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee's investigations
subcommittee reviewed the findings Thursday and members asked
why the contractors hadn't been held accountable. 

"Why is the Department of Defense, which is among the most
sophisticated purchasers of goods and services of all federal
departments, continuing to do business with these companies?"
asked Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine. 

The Internal Revenue Service, too, failed to move aggressively
against contractors with unpaid taxes, the GAO concluded. In
some cases, a tight budget and mounting workload prevented the
tax agency from pursuing the contractors. 

The agency also must first encourage taxpayers to voluntarily
pay their taxes before taking more drastic measures. 

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., said the missteps at the two agencies
means thousands of contractors take home taxpayer dollars but
fail to pay the taxes they owe. 

"Tax dodging hurts honest taxpayers, honest businesses and our
country as a whole," he said. 

Although privacy laws prevent the GAO from identifying the
companies and individuals to lawmakers, they concluded most were
small businesses. Most of them failed to send to the Internal
Revenue Service the taxes withheld from their employees'
paychecks for Social Security, Medicare and federal income
taxes. 

The group also included some individuals who failed to pay their
own income taxes. 

One such individual was a dentist who had a multiyear contract
with the Defense Department for over $400,000 and paid income
tax in only one year since 1993. The dentist owed over $100,000
in unpaid payroll and unemployment taxes from a previous
business going back to the early 1990s. 

The small businesses described in the GAO's findings included
those who provided janitorial services, engineering studies,
artillery and weapons parts manufacturers and security guards. 

One custodial contractor owing nearly $10 million in unpaid
taxes borrowed almost $1 million from the business and bought a
boat, several cars and a home abroad. The Defense Department
paid the company $3.5 million in 2002. The business was
dissolved in 2003 but continues to submit invoices and receive
payments from the Defense Department. 

A construction company that repaired aircraft hangars at
military bases was paid $2.8 million in 2002 while owing over
$700,000. The business is under criminal investigation. 

Another construction company, which provided construction
services at military installations, owed nearly as much as it
was paid in 2002. The company owed almost $150,000 in taxes and
was paid $152,000. The IRS has received $70,000 in taxes owed by
the company collected by agencies other than the Defense
Department. 

-- 


 
*****************************************************************
 20 ON THIS DAY | 12 | 1954: New authority for atomic energy
 		 
bbc.co.uk

12 February

1954: New authority for atomic energy   A new body has been 
established to control the production and development of atomic 
energy in the UK. 

The Atomic Energy Authority Bill was introduced in the House of 
Commons by Minister of Work Sir David Eccles yesterday and has 
been published today to update legislation passed in 1946, when 
the first facilities were established. 

Former Chief Planning Officer to the Treasury Sir Edwin Plowden,
47, will chair the new authority. 

He will be joined on the Authority by between six and 10
members, who have so far been identified as: 
  + Sir John Cockcroft, 47, Director of the Atomic Energy
Research Establishment since 1946; 
  + Sir Christopher Hinton, 53, Deputy Controller of Atomic
Energy since 1946; 
  + and Sir William Penney, 44, who designed Britain's first
atomic bomb. 

The Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) will be responsible for
producing and disposing of atomic energy and radioactive waste
and with government approval it may allocate grants and loans
for developing research and production. 

The government will retain close links and strict control over
atomic weapons. 

The Waverley Report

The re-organisation is in line with the findings of the
committee set up by the government last April under the
chairmanship of Lord Waverley. 

The Waverley Report - which is not publicly available for
security reasons - formed the basis of a White Paper presented
to parliament last November. 

It described the growing importance of atomic energy and the
variety of commercial applications for it which suggested it
would be better run as a large industrial facility than by a
government department. 

Changes began at the beginning of the year when responsibility
for atomic energy was moved from the Minister of Supply to the
Lord President of the Council, Lord Salisbury, a
non-departmental post. 

His role is to decide government policy for the industry and to
distribute large sums of money voted for it by parliament. 	 	

  In Context   		 		 		 			
   			 				 				 	The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
(UKAEA) has continued to pioneer the development of nuclear
energy. 

It is responsible for six sites at Dounreay in Caithness, Risley
in Cheshire, Sellafield in Cumbria, Winfrith in Dorset and
Culham and Harwell in Oxfordshire,. 

Much of its current work is concerned with safely
decommissioning old nuclear sites for conventional or other use. 

It remains a non-departmental public body, under the direction
of the Department of Trade and Industry. 

The UKAEA provides the UK's input into the European fusion
research project and expert advice on nuclear installations
round the world. 
			 			   		 		 		
*****************************************************************
 21 Hi Pakistan: Powell and Rice defend US. basis for war (17:00 PST)     --> 
 
February 13 2004     
    
WASHINGTON : Two top members of President Bush's Cabinet defended 
his decision to invade Iraq despite finding no weapons of mass 
destruction there. 

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated before the House 
International Relations Committee that Saddam had to be dealt 
with and the president made the right decision" in going to war, 
Powell told the committee. 

"The dictator is no longer filling up mass graves or building 
weapons of mass destruction," he said.
 
Bush's national security adviser Condoleezza Rice agreed that 
Saddam "was a dangerous man in the most dangerous part of the 
world." And, she said, Bush had to act in America's best 
interest. 

"After 9/11, this president has borne a heavy burden to be 
certain that we are responding to threats and not simply allowing 
them to gather," she said. 

Rice said the president promised after September 11 that he would 
do everything possible to avoid another attack on U.S. soil. 


Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved. No part 
*****************************************************************
 22 UN Nuclear Watchdog Calls For Tougher Non-proliferation Regime
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 16:00:53 -0500

 
UN NUCLEAR WATCHDOG CALLS FOR TOUGHER NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
 
New York, Feb 12 2004  4:00PM
The head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency today called 
for the urgent strengthening of the world's non-proliferation 
regime to ensure that nuclear materials and even weapons are not 
acquired by terrorists.

Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), <"http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2004/medadvise200402.html">said 
the existing rules and safeguards 
are not tough enough to deal with modern realities and the world 
risks "self-destruction" unless it updates them.

Speaking at the IAEA's headquarters in Vienna, Mr. ElBaradei said 
he welcomed proposals unveiled yesterday by President George W. 
Bush of the United States to introduce such measures as tighter controls 
over the export of nuclear materials and protocols allowing 
broader inspection rights.

"I have the same concern and sense of urgency expressed by President 
Bush to shore up the non-proliferation regime and international 
security system," he said.

Urging the international community to get together to quickly lay 
out appropriate reforms, Mr. ElBaradei said the IAEA needs more 
authority to conduct inspections, nuclear exports must be controlled 
more strictly and there must be accelerated moves towards nuclear 
disarmament.

Mr. ElBaradei elaborated on his proposals for improving and strengthening 
the non-proliferation regime in an opinion article published 
in The New York Times today.

"If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction," 
he warned in the article.

Mr. ElBaradei said there is currently not enough of a penalty for 
countries that withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons. He suggested an automatic review of the country's 
move by the UN Security Council as a minimum.

Mr. ElBaradei also suggested that the five States recognized under 
the treaty as nuclear powers - China, France, the Russian Federation, 
the United Kingdom and the US - must make verifiable and irreversible 
moves towards disarmament. This would include bringing 
into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
 2004-02-12 00:00:00.000 

________________

For more details go to UN News Centre at http://www.un.org/news

To change your profile or unsubscribe go to:
http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/subscribe.shtml
*****************************************************************
 23 news24: FBI in SA for nuclear probe 
        
Johannesburg - A US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) team 
are in South Africa to continue a probe of an illegal nuclear 
technology network involving a Cape Town-based businessman 
currently out on bail in Colorado, police said on Thursday. 

Senior Superintendent Mary Martins-Engelbrecht said the FBI team 
have had talks with Cape police regarding the alleged activities 
of former Israeli army officer Asher Karni. 

"They had earlier requested our help. I cannot say any more 
because it is essentially their investigation and it is going 
on," she said. 

Karni was arrested in Denver, Colorado, on January 2 and charged 
with trying to smuggle 66 nuclear weapon detonators to Pakistan 
through his South African company, Top-Cape Technology. 

Karni was later granted bail and released into custody of a 
rabbi. If convicted, he could spend the next 10 years in a US 
prison. 

Media reports said he was arrested in a FBI sting operation after 
a tip-off by a South African business associate.                          

 Edited by Elmarie Jack 

*****************************************************************
 24 Bellona: EFTA's financing mechanism slammed by EU auditors
 
The European Unions Court of Auditors has revealed that 
environmental renewal projects during the first 5-year period of 
the EEA agreement�from 1994 to 1999 have caused environmental 
damage in Greece and Spain. 

Hanne Bakke, 2004-02-11 15:29

The European Unions Court of Auditors focused attention on 
discrepancies between money disbursed and received by the EEA. 

The EU-auditors leveled their criticism at how money was 
earmarked for various environmental renewal projects during the 
first 5-year period of the EEA agreement�from 1994 to 1999. This 
is the same period during which Norway was annually donating 
NOK200m to EU�s poorest countries�Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece�for environmental renewal projects. 

The project of reconstructing the Dochiarou Monastery on the 
Athos Peninsula in Northeastern Greece stands out as a 
characteristic example: Building material and waste were dropped 
into the ocean and scattered into the environment. The expansion 
of Pireus harbour in the Port of Athens also caused immense 
damage to the environment when boulders were removed from the 
island of Salamis. So far, nothing has been done to correct the 
situation. 

Demands of improvement The gross misuse of funding was made 
public in the EU�s Court of Auditors� 2002 annual report, 
published October 8th last year, and presented to the European 
Parliament in December. 

Earlier this month, Bellona was in the European Parliament obtain 
information on the matter, and it was clear that it is being 
taken seriously by Members of European Parliamentarians, or MEPs. 
Now the European Commission and the European Investment Bank, or 
EIB, are probing the environmental damage and evaluating how to 
ensure that the environment is respected during projects funded 
by the 3-member European Free Trade Association, or EFTA. Special 
attention will be focused on the environmental damage caused by 
the expansion of Pireus Harbour, the report says.

  The EEA agreement and EFTA�s financing mechanism   

  In connection with the EEA agreement, a loan and grant 
arrangement with the purpose of economic and social leveling was 
established. EFTA countries committed themselves to finance 
direct grants of EUR500m plus interest subsidies on loans of 
another EUR1.5 billion, as outlined in the document�s protocol 
38. The funds were meant for development and structural 
adjustment in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Northern 
Ireland. Between 1994 and 1998 Norway�s contribution was on the 
average of NOK200m a year. 

The EEA-agreement was renegotiated in the summer of 2003 to
include the ten new EU Member Countries. According to the
renewed agreement, Norway and the EFTA countries will hand out
funding on the lesser side of NOK10 billion during the 2004-2009
period. The financing of environmental projects, like renewable
energy, is a top priority. Poland will be receiving more than
half of the EFTA funding. 
  
The EC is issuing a proposal to EFTA countries to tighten
financial control and certification before exceptional amounts
of money are disbursed. According to the Commission, there are
no sufficient guidelines governing these disbursals. The Court
of Auditors has, for instance, revealed a number of occasions
where the disbursement of funding does not tally with figures
from the beneficiary countries. 

�Truly disturbing� 
�This is really disturbing information regarding the fact that
Norway is about to divide about NOK10 bilion toEastern Europe
during the next five years,� Bellona President Frederic Hauge
said. He added that �if there�s been a lack of control in the
use of Norway�s annual NOK200m, it is frightening to think what
may happen when Norway allocates NOK10 billion over the next
five years. 

Bellona calls on Norwegian authorities to collaborate with
organizations that defend the environment in recipient countries
so as to ensure that scandals of this nature are not repeated in
the future. 

Bellona has on several occasions tried to obtain strategy notes
from Norway�s Ministry of Foreign affairs� on how Norway�s money
is to be spent, but has been rebuffed every time. �We simply
cannot get the information we need in order to make constructive
input to strengthen the environment,� he said. �Quite a paradox,
as the environment is top priority in the new EEA-agreement.   

  Publisher: , President: Information: , Technical contact: 
Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62  * P.O.Box 
2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway
*****************************************************************
 25 BBC: UN urges toughening nuclear rules 
 
  Last Updated: Thursday, 12 February, 2004
 
[IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei]                               
The IAEA wants the right to inspect all countries                                                           

The head of the UN nuclear watchdog has echoed President George W 
Bush's call for better international co-operation to curb the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 

Mohammed ElBaradei said quick action was needed to stop 
terrorists getting hold of nuclear weapons. 

"If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction," 
Mr ElBaradei said in an editorial in the New York Times 
newspaper. 

The comments follow a major scandal involving a top Pakistani 
scientist. 

Overhaul need 

Mr ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) said there was a "sophisticated worldwide network that can 
deliver systems for producing material usable in weapons". 

And there was also a high demand for them - by countries that 
perceive themselves to be vulnerable. 

The 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) needed to be 
"tailored to fit 21st-Century realities," the IAEA head said. 

Without threatening nation sovereignty, we can toughen the 
non-proliferation regime                [ src=] Mohammed 
ElBaradei      

He supported President Bush's priority - outlined on Wednesday - 
to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material with a 
view to enacting "treaty-based controls" and criminalising "the 
acts of people who seek to assist others in proliferation". 

But he also called for empowering his agency to allow it to carry 
out inspections in all countries, including the recognised 
nuclear powers sitting on the UN Security Council. 

Other proposals included: 


+ Universalising the control system of exports 


+ making the additional protocol that provides for snap 
inspections compulsory for all NPT members 


+ not allowing countries to withdraw from the NPT - something 
North Korea has done recently 


+ multinational control over nuclear fuels 


+ "verifiable and irreversible" nuclear disarmament - in the 
footsteps of recent agreements between Russia and the US - 
starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads 
still in existence. 

Mr ElBaradei said proliferation stemmed from insecurity and urged 
the world to begin addressing its root causes. 

[North Korean spent nuclear fuel rods in Yongbyon] North Korea 
withdrew from the NPT and admitted developing nuclear weapons                                                                 

Conflict areas - like the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean 
peninsula - could be expected to continue to seek weapons of mass 
destruction "as long as we fail to introduce alternatives that 
redress the security deficit". 

Mr ElBaradei said the world must drop the idea that nuclear 
weapons are fine in the hands of some countries and bad in the 
hands of others - an implicit criticism of US plans to forge 
ahead with research into the so-called mini nukes. 

"We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally 
reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass 
destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for 
security - and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and 
postulate plans for their use," he said. 



*****************************************************************
 26 BBC: Backing for Bush on nuclear curbs 
 
  Last Updated: Thursday, 12 February, 2004
 
[North Korean spent nuclear fuel rods in Yongbyon] 

After withdrawing from the NPT, North Korea admitted developing 
nuclear weapons                                                              

The head of the UN nuclear watchdog has echoed President George W 
Bush's call for better international co-operation to halt the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 

Mohammed ElBaradei said quick action was needed to stop 
terrorists getting hold of nuclear weapons. 

Mr Bush's call follows the nuclear smuggling scandal involving a 
top Pakistani scientist, who sold nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya 
and North Korea. 

China and Japan, as well Pakistan and India have lent their 
support. 

We must confront the dang with open eyes and unbending purpose 
George W Bush           

Meanwhile, a Western diplomat in Vienna, where the UN's nuclear 
watchdog is based, says that inspectors have discovered a new 
kind of centrifuge in Iran. 

Centrifuges are used to produce enriched uranium - a key 
component of nuclear bombs. 

Iran said last November that it had fully disclosed its nuclear 
programme. 

Mr Bush said international treaties intended to regulate the 
development of nuclear power needed to be strengthened to stop 
countries producing material which could be used for weapons, 
such as Iran and North Korea. 

[IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei] Without threatening 
national sovereignty, we ca toughen the non-proliferation regime 
Mohammed ElBaradei ElBaradei's proposals           

He called on the 40 countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
which sell nuclear technology, to refuse to sell equipment to any 
country not already equipped to make nuclear fuel. 

Mr Bush also urged law enforcement agencies - including Interpol 
- to join the battle to prevent the illegal movement of nuclear 
technology and materials. 

The BBC's Rob Watson, in Washington, says the timing of Mr Bush's 
speech was decidedly political, coming from a president seeking 
to regain the political initiative in the vital area of national 
security. 

But our correspondent adds that it was nevertheless radical stuff 
from Mr Bush, who proposed nothing less than the unpicking of the 
30-year-old bargain between the nuclear haves and have-nots. 

'Sophisticated network' 

In an editorial in the New York Times newspaper, Mr ElBaradei 
said: "If the world does not change course, we risk 
self-destruction." 

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said 
there was a "sophisticated worldwide network that can deliver 
systems for producing material usable in weapons". 

Mr ElBaradei proposed: 

+ A universal control system for the export of nuclear material 
and technology 


+ Making snap inspections compulsory for all Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) members 


+ Not allowing countries to withdraw from the NPT - something 
North Korea has done recently. 

He also said nuclear powers such as the US, along with Britain, 
France, Russia and China, should themselves "move towards 
disarmament". 

China declared its support for steps to stop illicit trafficking 
of nuclear material in what correspondents describe as an 
uncharacteristically prompt response to a US initiative. 

"China resolutely opposes the proliferation of WMD as well as its 
vehicles of transportation. China consistently advocates 
strengthening international co-operation in the field of 
non-proliferation," said foreign ministry spokesman Zhang Qiyue. 

[Abdul Qadeer Khan (left) meeting President Pervez Musharraf] 
Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan traded nuclear 
information                                                              

China's neighbour Japan also echoed the sentiment. 

"Our country has a great interest in the non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction from the viewpoint of security," 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda told reporters. 

South Asian nuclear rivals India and Pakistan also joined the 
chorus of support - with India hinting at the scandal involving 
the "father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb" Ahmed Qadeer Khan, who 
has admitted leaking nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and 
Libya. 

"Recent examples have showed that non-proliferation obligations 
have not always been treated with adequate seriousness," an 
Indian foreign ministry statement said. 

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri underlined 
state-to-state co-operation as the best way to deal with 
"non-state actors" like Dr Khan, who has admitted acting alone, 
and not telling the government. 

*****************************************************************
 27 Xinhuanet: China firmly opposes WMD proliferation - FM   
 
  www.xinhuanet.com

  www.chinaview.cn 2004-02-12 21:40:07   

    BEIJING, Feb. 12 (Xinhuanet) -- China firmly opposes the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their
meansof delivery and will be making more domestic and
international non-proliferation efforts, said Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue here Thursday. 

    Zhang made the remark at a press conference in response to a
question on US President George W. Bush's call for international
non-proliferation cooperation. 

    According to the spokeswoman, China, consistently supporting
the global non-proliferation action, has adopted concrete
measuresto reinforce a weapons export control regime, which
involves both self-control and cooperation with other countries
including the United States. 

    With an established legal framework on non-proliferation,
Chinais willing to adopt strong and effective measures to
implement related laws and regulations, said Zhang. 

    Zhang also elaborated on China's international
non-proliferation cooperation. 

    According to her, China has consultations and exchanges with
the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) and with the Missile and
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whose policies and practices
served as references for China in setting up its nuclear control
regime, a missile export statute and listing. 

    China has filed its application to join the NSG and sought
to join the MTCR. A Chinese delegation is having work
consultations in Paris with MTCR member countries after Chinese
Foreign MinisterLi Zhaoxing and MTCR president both expressed
interest in cooperation. 

    On a controversial Proliferation Security Initiative
designed to intercept suspected shipments in international
waters, she saidChina supports international non-proliferation
efforts but believes relevant issues should be resolved under
international laws and by political and diplomatic means. 

    "Any non-proliferation measures should be conducive to
regionaland global peace, security, and stability," said Zhang. 

    About Bush's suggestions to enhance the roles of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Zhang said China
supports the general goal of non-proliferation, and relevant
suggestions are worthy of serious discussions by the
internationalcommunity. 

    Bush called Wednesday in his speech at the National Defense
University for tougher global action to crack down on the
emergingblack market in nuclear arms. 

    He called for better regulations by IAEA and said he would
renew his appeal for the United Nations Security Council to
approve a resolution criminalizing the WMD proliferation and
enacting strict export controls. Enditem   

  Copyright �2003 Xinhua News Agency. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 28 SF Chronicle: Bush offers plan to halt further spread of nuclear weapons 
 Critics say system ignores international input
 
        Thursday, February 12, 2004

President Bush proposed Wednesday to plug what he described as 
major loopholes in the international system for stopping the 
spread of nuclear weapons, but many experts who welcomed the new 
initiatives said the president needed to pledge a greater 
willingness to rein in America's own aggressive nuclear weapons 
program. 

In a 37-minute speech at the National Defense University in 
Washington, the president painted a conspicuously dark picture of 
the threat the United States faced from the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. He called nuclear weapons "the 
greatest threat to mankind," and acknowledged the ease with which 
they were now being spread -- not just by so-called rogue regimes 
such as North Korea, but by critical U.S. allies such as 
Pakistan, which recently admitted that its top weapons scientist 
had run a virtual nuclear supermarket for decades. 

"These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, 
hide and transport," Bush said, adding, "America and the entire 
civilized world will face this threat for decades to come." 

The president also provided dramatic details of how U.S. and 
British agents last year tracked and ultimately stopped an 
illicit shipment of parts for machines to create weapons-grade 
fuel from reaching Libya. Bush called the operation a major 
intelligence success, in spite of the fact that Libya was able to 
put together an effective nuclear program unimpeded for years. 

Bush's proposals would prevent countries that do not already have 
the technology for creating radioactive reactor fuel from 
acquiring it, even for commercial power reactors open to 
inspection; toughen the inspection system of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, a U.N. body that his administration has 
criticized harshly in the past; tighten controls on the export of 
products or components for producing nuclear weapons; and 
increase the number of countries in an ad hoc arrangement for 
intercepting suspected shipments of illicit goods. 

A number of nuclear experts and members of Congress applauded at 
least some of the steps, but they expressed concern about what 
they said were shortcomings. 

For one, the budget the president sent to Congress just last week 
included sharp increases in spending on America's enormous 
nuclear weapons stockpile, but cuts in some important 
nonproliferation programs. William Potter, head of 
nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, said he was pleased Bush endorsed programs 
such as one that is securing weapons-grade materials in the 
former Soviet republics. But he added that the administration had 
recently reduced funding for these programs, and Bush said 
nothing in his speech about granting additional money. 

"While President Bush stands up to tell the world about his anti- 
proliferation proposal, Congress is sitting down to consider his 
pro- proliferation budget," said Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass. "The 
president's budget includes more than half a billion dollars over 
the next five years to develop a nuclear bunker buster and other 
new nuclear weapons but has no significant increases in 
nonproliferation programs. These misguided priorities will 
hasten, not slow, the spread of nuclear weapons." 

In addition, some experts said, the proposals have one big hole, 
because they would have little impact on countries that have not 
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which for 33 years 
has been the key agreement controlling the spread of nuclear 
technology. Three nuclear states, India, Pakistan and Israel, 
have refused to join the treaty, so their facilities are 
off-limits to inspectors, and North Korea recently withdrew from 
the treaty after acknowledging that it had secretly built 
warheads. 

Moreover, Bush's proposals involved an essentially ad hoc U.S. 
program rather than a carefully formulated international effort 
backed by treaties and international organizations. 

Administration officials have said they prefer this approach 
because it gives the United States more flexibility and less need 
to consult with allies before acting, while still allowing the 
government to enlist support selectively when needed. 

In an interview earlier this week, John Bolton, the 
undersecretary of state for arms control and international 
security, commented, "Sure it's ad hoc," saying that was a good 
thing because the treaties and agreements making up the old 
nonproliferation system had apparently failed to stop countries 
such as North Korea and Iran from building clandestine weapons 
programs. 

The new approach, under which the United States has sought to 
intercept illicit shipments of weapons-related technology, is 
known as the Proliferation Security Initiative, a loose-knit 
network of nations acting whenever intelligence is collected on 
suspicious shipments. 

"It's an activity, not an organization," Bolton said. "It doesn't 
have a headquarters. It doesn't have a bureaucracy. It doesn't 
have a lot of the attributes of organizations." 

But a number of experts said the United States would be more 
secure if the needed improvements in the nonproliferation system 
were formalized in treaties and through the United Nations to 
ensure broad cooperation. 

In addition, a number of experts said in response to Wednesday's 
speech that Bush was pushing for many smaller states to give up 
access to certain kinds of peaceful nuclear technology, but that 
America was offering to give up nothing nor to reduce its 
enormous arsenal of nuclear warheads. 

"That's the part that's disappointing," David Albright, president 
of the Institute for Science and International Security, said on 
CNN. "One of the first criticisms of the speech will be that it's 
hypocritical." 

�2004 San Francisco Chronicle 
*****************************************************************
 29 Daily Times: Nuclear black market relied on past suppliers to Pakistan 
 
Friday, February 13, 2004    

WASHINGTON: Several of the men believed to have helped Iran,
North Korea and Libya buy nuclear weapons equipment were on the
radar of US and European investigators two decades ago but still
managed to become enmeshed in the black-market network, US
officials say. 

The evidence developed by the United States points to at least
two college friends and three other associates of Abdul Qadeer
Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who admitted he was the
mastermind of the scheme, according to officials familiar with
the intelligence and to proliferation experts assisting the
international effort. All spoke to The Associated Press on
condition of anonymity. 

Khan�s friend from the Netherlands, Henk Slebos, was convicted
there in 1985 of trying to sell equipment to Pakistan�s nuclear
weapons programme. Slebos� wife told the AP this week he would
not talk to reporters. 

The officials said some evidence came from Khan himself and from
Iran�s admissions to UN inspectors, while other intelligence was
developed during a covert CIA operation aimed at cracking the
smuggling ring. Khan recently admitted selling nuclear secrets
and equipment. He was pardoned by President Gen Pervez
Musharraf. 

US, international and Pakistani investigations into Khan�s
network continue as they try to determine whether it provided
equipment or information to anyone outside the three countries
already named. President Bush said Wednesday the United States
would �find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers� and
stop them. 

Some experts are alarmed that black market figures suspected of
smuggling in the 1980s had a role in Khan�s effort. 

�You would have thought they would have been taken out of
commission, one way or another, by now,� said Leonard Spector, a
former top Energy Department counterproliferation official under
President Clinton. 

CIA Director George Tenet said agents worked for years to
penetrate Khan�s network; their efforts paid off in the October
seizure of a ship full of nuclear components headed for Libya.
That helped prompt Libya to reveal -and renounce -its nuclear
weapons programme in December. 

Khan�s network became a comprehensive one-stop-shopping venue
for countries wanting atomic bombs, experts from the United
Nations� International Atomic Energy Agency and US agencies have
said. 

The network provided the know-how, the materials, even 24-hour
technical support if problems cropped up, diplomats and
intelligence officials have said. 

Khan even had glossy brochures -complete with his own photo
-with pictures and specifications of some of the centrifuge
parts for sale. 

The network provided Libya and Iran with the resources to make a
centrifuge plant to separate bomb fuel from uranium. Libya also
got a rough but workable nuclear warhead design from Pakistan,
US intelligence officials and diplomats allege. 

The network evolved after Khan�s black-market deals to supply
Pakistan�s nuclear program in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Khan
began stealing centrifuge designs while working in the early
1970s for Urenco, a European uranium enrichment consortium. Khan
was convicted in absentia in the Netherlands for stealing the
designs, but the conviction was overturned because he was not
properly served with court papers. 

Several European businessmen Pakistan tapped for nuclear help
also are believed to have aided Libya and Iran, say senior US
intelligence officials and outside nuclear experts. 

One was Slebos, convicted in 1985 of trying to ship high-tech
equipment to Khan�s laboratory in Pakistan. The US officials
said evidence points to Slebos as a participant in the Khan
network that supplied nuclear weapons equipment to Libya in the
1990s. 

Slebos runs Slebos Research, a company that sponsored a
conference organized by Pakistan�s Khan Research Laboratories
last year. Dutch officials have said they intercepted five
shipments to Pakistan from Slebos Research and another company
in 1998. 

Slebos did not respond to telephone and e-mail messages left at
his firm. A woman who answered Slebos� home telephone and
identified herself as his wife said Slebos would not talk to
reporters. 

Iran identified to the IAEA three German businessmen among five
middlemen who were sources for some of its centrifuge
technology. The UN nuclear watchdog has not released their
names, but US officials and outside experts say they included
two former executives, Otto Heilingbrunner and Gotthard Lerch,
of a company that made centrifuge components. German prosecutors
investigated them in the 1980s for allegedly selling equipment
and blueprints to Pakistan�s nuclear program. 

Both men worked in the 1980s for Leybold AG, which got
nuclear-related designs from Urenco while bidding on a
centrifuge contract for the uranium enrichment consortium.
Leybold has publicly acknowledged it sold nuclear equipment
directly to Iraq and Iran in the 1980s. 

Heilingbrunner said in a telephone interview that he was
involved in selling aircraft engine parts to Iran in the 1980s.
He denied any involvement with nuclear sales. 

�I have nothing to do with Libya, Iraq, North Korea or any
others,� he said. 

Lerch could not be located for comment. 

Another German supplier named by Iran, the late Heinz Mebus, was
a college friend of Khan. Mebus worked in the early 1980s for
Albrecht Migule, who was convicted in the former West Germany of
selling equipment to Pakistan to help its uranium enrichment
programme. 

Khan�s network also used at least five factories in Malaysia and
other countries to make centrifuge components, the US officials
and outside nuclear experts said. 

Scomi Precision Engineering, or SCOPE, owned the most
sophisticated factory located in Malaysia. The majority owner of
SCOPE�s parent company Scomi Group is Kamaluddin Abdullah, son
of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. 

Scomi officials have said they did not know precision parts they
made were destined for uranium centrifuges. Centrifuge parts by
SCOPE were on the ship seized in Italy last October. 

The middleman for that deal was BSA Tahir, a Sri Lankan based in
the United Arab Emirates port of Dubai, a hub for Khan�s
network, Bush said Wednesday. Malaysian authorities have
questioned Tahir, Bush said. 

Tahir started ordering the centrifuge parts in 2001 for a
company, Gulf Technical Industries LLC. The multimillion-dollar
contract made GTI Scomi�s biggest customer in fiscal 2002,
according to Scomi�s public financial reports. �AP 
Home | National           


      Jamali calls for quality education, end to corruption   
      Hamas vows revenge as Israeli troops kill another member   
      Eight arrested, 600 shops closed in Wana   
      PIA bans chicken food   
      15 killed, 7 injured in Depalpur van-bus collision   
      Three Qaeda suspects arrested   
      Bird flu contained in Pakistan: UN   
      RSC-AP wants political role for women   
      India to build nuclear fallout shelters near Pakistan
border   
      Law Commission suggests new arrest rights   
      Pakistanis among 6 killed in UAE   
      Qadeer Khan�s �blank cheque� created nuclear ring   
      �Do not debate, just repeal Hudood laws�   
      Sheikhupura police arrest 702 in raids   
      Government disburses Rs 150m for education   
      15 markets to provide cheaper rates   
      Rs 7m incites Punjab against local govts   
      British fellowship plan announced   
      Pervaiz inaugurates national industrial exhibition   
      Punjab police patrol project on its way   
      Japan honours chief of cultural association   
      Millions going to cattle show   
      Puppetry museum to have Italian performance next month   
      �Nuclear states must cooperate to stop proliferation�   
      Baitul Maal provides Rs 6.86 billion for food support   
      58 million saplings to be planted in Pakistan this spring 
 
      WHO, UNICEF vow to end polio from Pakistan   
      13 BM Police charged with kidnapping-for-ransom   
      Afghan refugee finally allowed to proceed to US   
      Honour killing suspect sent to jail   
      Security increased for Muharram in Punjab   
      �Loopholes in law helping honour killing�   
      Senate opposition to seek proliferation debate   
      Man kills daughter, nephew for �family honour�   
      Man killed in police-villagers clash near Gilgit   
      �Over-subscription for bonds proof of economic stability� 
 
      Sehba says RSC-AP meeting a success   
      COMMENT: Advice Ms Bhutto is unlikely to take lightly   
      Pakistan facing threats due to Musharraf�s policies: Qazi 
 
      Winning war on terror Bush�s top priority, says Powell   
      EU demands release of Tasman Spirit crew   
      Dr Khan�s scale of proliferation still unknown: Straw   
      Rice doesn�t believe terrorists have WMD   
      US investigators in South Africa probing nuke technology
ring   
      Israeli envoy says India to get Phalcon radar soon   
      India hails Bush�s call to stop proliferation   
      US claims of Iraq-Al Qaeda relationship still unclear   
      China backs US to fight N-tech trafficking   
      Girl injured as two rockets hit Kabul   
      Jose Padilla allowed access to attorney   
      No human-to-human bird flu infection: WHO   
      Nuclear black market relied on past suppliers to Pakistan 
 
      Journalist housing colony soon: Pervaiz   
      PPPP�s protest week starts today   
      SNGPL signs Rs 561m contract for pipeline   
      Iran observes National Day   
      Sipra gets warm farewell   
      PIA�s post-Haj operations in full swing   
      Northern Areas polls to be held on November 3   
      Muharram moon sighting on 21st   

  

  
            
Daily Times - All Rights Reserved
 

  


*****************************************************************
 30 Guardian Unlimited: Briton key suspect in nuclear ring 
                    
Man accused of smuggling parts tells Guardian: 'I was framed'                 
		
Owen Bowcott, Ian Traynor in Zagreb, John Aglionby in Jakarta and 
Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington Thursday February 12, 2004 The 
Guardian            
		
A Middle East-based British businessman has emerged as a key 
suspect in a secret network supplying Libya, Iran and North Korea 
with equipment to build nuclear bombs.

Speaking for the first time yesterday, Paul Griffin denied that 
his company played any part in shipping prohibited material from 
the Far East. 

He told the Guardian: "We have been framed." 

His comments came as diplomatic sources and nuclear experts 
around the world stepped up their warnings of a growing 
proliferation crisis as atomic technology and expertise is 
increasingly traded on the black market. 

Regulators have warned of a dangerous illegal "supermarket" in 
atomic know-how, spanning five countries. 

Last night President George Bush added his voice to the growing 
chorus of alarm. He talked of the threat of black market dealers 
motivated by "greed, or fanaticism, or both". 

For the first time Mr Bush publicly accused Abdul Qadeer Khan, 
the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, of being at 
the centre of a network supplying North Korea with the centrifuge 
technology that is needed to make highly enriched uranium for 
atomic bombs. 

The names of individuals and companies supposedly involved in Dr 
Khan's clandestine network - including that of Mr Griffin - have 
been leaking slowly into the public domain. The US authorities 
have named a Dubai-based Sri Lankan businessman, BSA Tahir, as a 
key middle man in the nuclear proliferation network. 

Mr Bush last night named Mr Tahir as Dr Khan's deputy and said he 
ran SMB computers, a business in Dubai. "Tahir used that computer 
company as a front for the proliferation activities of the AQ 
Khan network. Tahir ... was also its shipping agent, using his 
computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to 
various clients." 

The CIA director, George Tenet, last week named a Malaysian 
company, Scomi Precision Engineering, as the firm that 
manufactured 14 components for a nuclear centrifuge dispatched to 
Libya last year. The equipment was seized in a high-security 
operation in October when the container vessel carrying it, the 
German-owned BBC China, entered the Mediterranean. Intelligence 
agents persuaded the owners to divert the ship to the southern 
Italian port of Taranto, where the material was confiscated. 

Pleading that it thought the components were destined for the oil 
or gas industry, Scomi in turn named British-owned and 
Dubai-based Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) as the company which 
placed the order. 

GTI, which was established in 2000, is run by Mr Griffin and his 
father, Peter. Its registration form with the Dubai Chamber of 
Trade and Commerce describes it as trading in "pumps, engines, 
valves and spare parts". It is listed on another Middle East 
website as a steel trading company. 

"The allegations are totally untrue," Mr Griffin told the 
Guardian from Dubai. "We trade in engineering products. The first 
I knew about the press release [from Scomi] was when I was 
telephoned about it at 7.15am on Tuesday. 

"I was asked whether we had really bought $3.5m of equipment from 
Malaysia. 

"It's total nonsense, rubbish. I'm trying to find out myself what 
[is supposed to have been going on]. I have approached the 
Malaysian consulate to find out how everything happened. I 
haven't bought anything from Malaysia at all. 

"If I was going to buy high precision parts I would order them 
from Europe; you know what you are getting from there. I would 
notice if I had brought some precision-engineered parts. They are 
not something you go pick up at a supermarket." 

Mr Griffin, 40, and originally from south Wales, said he had met 
Mr Tahir when GTI bought some computers from his company last 
year. GTI had also asked him to sort out a computer virus on his 
system. "That was it," Mr Griffin said. 

Asked whether he knew Dr Khan, the metallurgist, Mr Griffin said 
that he had, coincidentally, met him at a wedding in Pakistan 
"about 18 years ago". 

He added: "I went to a friend's wedding and he [Khan] was the 
local dignitary. I was introduced to him. 

"I have never met him in Dubai or since then. I don't even know 
where he lives. I haven't had any [other] contact with him. 

"If we were anything to do with [this smuggling], I would have 
thought British or US intelligence would have contacted me. The 
British embassy know me here. I haven't been contacted by the 
authorities here. If I was doing something dodgy, I would have 
been picked up." 

The bill of lading with the German company, BBC Chartering and 
Logistic, which owned the BBC China, would show he had nothing to 
do with the centrifuge order, he said. "They have promised to 
send me the documentation. They told me they had never heard of 
us. It's all a mystery. The last time I saw Tahir was eight 
months ago. These allegations are all a load of bullshit." Mr 
Griffin, who has lived in Dubai on and off since 1986, said his 
father, Peter, had now retired to Paris. GTI was still tendering 
for work with the oil industry in the region. 

GTI's registered office is in a low-rise building at the side of 
the eight-lane Sheikh Zayed Highway on the way to the UAE 
capital, Abu Dhabi. 

On the ground floor, House of Cars sells four-wheel-drives to 
expatriates and Jebal Arafat Tailors caters to the Arab residents 
of the building. 

Yesterday, the office smelled of paint and appeared to be in the 
process of being re-let. Mr Griffin lives in a single-storey 
villa in the smart Jumeirah area of the city, surrounded by palm 
trees. He told the Guardian his company had moved premises. 

Malaysian security authorities said they did not know the 
whereabouts of Mr Tahir, who allegedly ordered the centrifuge 
parts from Scomi Precision Engineering, which is controlled by 
the son of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. A centrifuge is used 
to concentrate, or enrich, radioactive material. A police 
spokesman said investigators were keen to speak to him. "He is a 
crucial part of our ongoing investigation so we are keen to talk 
to him but we have yet to locate him," the spokesman said. 

Mr Bush said that Mr Tahir, who has a Malaysian wife, "is in 
Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his activities". 

Western diplomatic sources in Kuala Lumpur say they would like to 
see the investigation intensified but in reality it is losing 
momentum because Scomi has been cleared of any wrongdoing by 
Malaysian police. A police spokesman said: "Our investigation is 
still ongoing and we want to get to the bottom of the matter." 

The Malaysian police chief, Mohd Bakri Omar, on Sunday absolved 
Scomi of any participation in the nuclear weapons trade. "So far, 
no wrongdoing has been committed," he said. 

Scomi is continuing its operations. It insists it believed it was 
making equipment for the oil and gas industry. 

A Scomi factory manager, Che Lokman Che Omar, told reporters 
during a tour of the site last week that the case was being blown 
out of proportion. 

"It is not difficult to make," he said. "It could be one of 
thousands of parts used by the oil and gas industry. In fact, we 
have made more complex and difficult parts before." In its latest 
statement Scomi said it was making "generic items", not 
"sensitive parts" and that it "never knowingly manufactured" 
nuclear weapons parts. 

The Foreign Office declined to comment about the allegations 
against GTI or Mr Griffin. 

Investigators at the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy 
Agency probing nuclear trafficking networks in at least a dozen 
countries believe Dubai is the centre for traders and middlemen 
running the black market. 

The Americans hailed the seizure of the BBC China as a triumph 
for US intelligence that helped to persuade Colonel Muammar 
Gadafy of Libya to renounce his weapons of mass destruction pro 
grammes under the deal announced in December. 

Other informed sources are convinced that, in fact, the boat was 
seized after the Libyans informed the CIA about it. 

BBC Chartering and Logistic GmbH, the shipping company based at 
Leer in northern Germany which owns the BBC China, said: "This 
was a regular container transport from Dubai to Libya. We were 
surprised by the visits from the secret service and the [German] 
economics ministry. We're not involved at all in this story." 

Rolf Briese, the company's managing director, said: "This is not 
so simple. We've made a declaration to the economic ministry and 
we have an agreement not to give any more information about it." 

Investigation sources say the shipping company has been cleared 
of any suspicion in the incident and the BBC China is plying its 
business as usual. 

While the IAEA investigators were denied access to the material 
on the BBC China by the Americans, the agency's inspectors found 
similar equipment in Libya during a visit in December. 

According to diplomats in Vienna, the equipment bore stickers 
bearing the name KRL, referring to Khan Research Laboratories, 
the facility south of Islamabad at the heart of the Pakistani 
bomb project and named after Dr Khan. 

The stickers found on the equipment in Libya explain why Dr 
Mohammed ElBaradei, the IAEA head, has taken to describing the 
clandestine nuclear trade as a "supermarket." 

The disclosure of Dr Khan's smuggling network has been punctuated 
by heated claims and counter-claims about whether US and western 
intelligence agencies penetrated the hidden trade or completely 
missed its significance. 
	
Guardian Newspapers Limited
*****************************************************************
 31 Hi Pakistan: No question of rolling back the nuclear program: Khalid

February 13 2004     
    
LAHORE: Punjab Governor Lt.Gen. (retd) Khalid Maqbool said 
Wednesday that there is no question of Pakistan rolling back its 
nuclear programme rather it will keep on upgrading it to maintain 
minimum deterrence level.

He was speaking at a seminar on 'Future of Pakistan's nuclear 
Programme' organised by the Pakistan National Forum at Avari 
Hotel this evening.

The Governor said Pakistan was a responsible country and it has 
to show to the international community that it is fully capable 
of safeguarding its nuclear assets.

He said the Government has handled the delicate issue of the 
nuclear scientists with maturity and in a prudent manner.

The Governor said the country has developed its nuclear programme 
indigenously to defend its itself from external dangers and to 
fulfill its security need in view of imbalance in conventional 
weapons vis-a-vis India.

He was of the view that the country must be fully equipped to 
defend itself in times of war as the past history has shown that 
Pakistan was left alone when faced with external security 
situation.

The Governor said Pakistan's nuclear programme has progressed 
gradually and is more developed today as compared to five years 
ago.

He said during the past four years Pakistan has successfully 
conducted missile tests in different categories and President 
Musharraf has also declared that the country will be testing 
advanced version of Shaheen missile next month.

The Punjab Governor said there was no harm in consulting the 
international community on ways of further safeguarding the 
country's nuclear assets.

"We have to work together with the rest of the world to curb 
blackmarketing in nuclear technology," he added.

Critisizing the Government's opponents, the Governor said few 
politicians sitting abroad were making hue and cry over the issue 
to settle their personal scores.

On the issue of discussing the issue in both Houses of 
Parliament, the Governor said there were more pressing social and 
economic issues such as Karo-Kari, honour killing, unemployment, 
sectarianism that need to be debated by parliament.

Senator S. M. Zafar, who pleaded Dr.A.Q.Khan in a case instituted 
by the Dutch Government in early 1970's, recalled that West never 
believed Pakistan will one day become a nuclear state.

He was of the view that Parliament be taken into confidence. 
Furthermore, he suggested creation of proactive media cell for 
the better Government-people liaison. 

He said the country must go on improving its minimum deterrence 
level by making use of available resources. Former Foreign 
Minister Sartaj Aziz, speaking on the occasion, said the world 
accepted Pakistan as a nuclear power in May 1998.

He welcomed the positive attitude of US Government over the issue 
of nuclear scientists. The PML-N leader stressed the need to hold 
All Parties Conference to discuss besides debating the issue in 
the Parliament.

Political analyst Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, Naib Amir, 
Jamaat-i-Islami Chaudhry Muhammad Aslam Saleemi, Senator Syed 
Sajjad Bokhari, Lt.Gen.(retd) Naseer Akhtar and Syed Mohawid 
Hussain, Special Assistant to Punjab Chief Minister, ex-Punjab 
Governor Shahid Hamid also spoke on the occasion and discussed 
various aspects of the issue.

Brig. Naeem Ahmed Salik, Director, Arms Control, Strategic 
Planning Division explained the overall structure of National 
Command Authority.

Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved. No part 
*****************************************************************
 32 Hi Pakistan: Mushrooms
 
February 13 2004     
    
Mushrooms - By Imran Husain     --> 
                				 
On the eve of the onslaught against Iraq, Bush said the United 
States "must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing 
clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof - the 
smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.... 

We have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent 
duty to prevent the worst from occurring." As it got closer he 
asserted that "intelligence gathered by this and other 
governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to 
possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever 
devised." The World has since learnt that these weapons do not 
exist, according to David Kay's, the Chief CIA investigator, 
testimony to Congress!

Secretary of State Colin Powell, it is said, became so alarmed at 
the level of intelligence distortion in the first draft of his UN 
speech (prepared for him by Cheney's chief of staff) that he lost 
his temper, threw several pages in the air and declared, "I'm not 
reading this. This is bullsh." The independent inquiry announced 
by Bush is conceived to shed responsibility, deflect the blame 
onto the intelligence services and thus delay political damage 
till after the upcoming election in the fall, thus serving his 
administration's needs well. 

In the backdrop of this huge intelligence fiasco, the US media 
has launched an unrelenting assault on Pakistan after the 
intelligence success in the discovery and admission of nuclear 
proliferation. Pakistan, including its President has been 
lambasted in the headlines. Despite unqualified support by the US 
government for the Pakistani action, the media continues to quote 
"senior US government" officials as contradicting repeated 
contentions by Musharraf and other senior officials that AQ and 
at least one other scientist acted out of greed. There is an 
obdurate refusal to exonerate Pakistan's top brass on their part. 

The overreaction of the international community to events in 
Pakistan do warrant strong proof rather than rumours, especially 
after Iraq. One must support Musharraf fully when he says, 
"Pakistan is a responsible nuclear power .. We need to convince 
the world of it". And also that, "What I get concerned about is 
there is apparently in the media a perception being created that 
Pakistan is the only culprit around the world and that is not the 
case. The media plays a very important role". Important yes, but 
not always fair. 

It therefore becomes imperative that we combat this negative 
media blitz effectively. The international media and its dynamics 
are entirely different to those at home. What pleases media 
audiences in Pakistan does not gel internationally. An 
intellectually inspired international media savvy person or 
persons must be assigned this task by the government. Is the 
information minister not sitting right now in Washington while 
the Beltway crowd is hurling invectives at us? I have not heard 
of even a single attempt by him to bring them round. 

The Association of Pakistani Professionals in the US held a 
seminar at Columbia University to consider the importance of 
engaging media in a proactive manner to create a better 
understanding about Pakistan, its society, people, diverse 
culture and the issues that confront them at the turn of the new 
millennium. 

The statement issued read "The media's single track agenda 
influenced by the political goals of special interest groups 
gives this dangerously false impression that Pakistan begins and 
ends with extremism. They acknowledged, "The tunnel vision of 
Pakistan, about our nuclear assets and extremism and the need for 
Pakistani Americans to change the image by creating interaction".

It is not Musharraf's job to be the sole defender of Pakistan at 
every forum and at every occasion when the country is in a 
negative focus. He has earned the right to review his troops from 
a perch and not have to stand alongside them on the first row at 
the front line. That is exactly what has happened and it has 
placed his life on a line. 

Not once, in four years, has any colleague of his, including 
those that have made a mess, suffered. Perhaps it is his 
largesse, his ability to forgive that drives him, for I certainly 
hope it is not an inability to distinguish between mediocrity and 
quality. But he has suffered due to this weakness. Now, the time 
has come when his survival depends on a quality team that will 
help guide this ship through trying times. Perhaps the most 
difficult of his tenure so far. 

Zbigniew Brezinski advised the Bush administration in the context 
of Iraq recently, "A small committee of experienced individuals 
trusted by the administration should be tasked on a short 
deadline to present to the President a plan for changing the 
priorities and modus operandi .." I would humbly advise the 
President to take this to heart for it is not only the United 
States who needs him, Pakistan needs him even more.
 					     							 				 				   				 				
Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 33 Hi Pakistan: Bush unveils anti-nuclear plan     --> 
 
February 13 2004     
    
WASHINGTON: President George W Bush, pointing to the recent 
disclosure of an extensive black market weapons network led by 
Pakistan�s Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, said on Wednesday that no new 
countries should be allowed to possess the ability to enrich or 
process nuclear material.

He argued that international efforts to combat the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction have been neither broad nor effective 
enough and require tougher action from all nations. "The greatest 
threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and 
sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or 
nuclear weapons.

"We must confront the danger with open eyes and unbending 
purpose," he said in a speech at the National Defense University. 
"I�ve made clear to all the policy of this nation: America will 
not permit the terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us 
with the world�s most dangerous weapons."

His call to prevent countries from acquiring the equipment and 
technology to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel for 
plutonium � even if the stated intent is to built civilian power 
facilities � was likely to anger Iran and North Korea and the 
countries that have supplied them.

Bush for the first time publicly accused Dr Qadeer�s network of 
supplying to North Korea the centrifuge technology that is needed 
to make highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The Bush 
administration previously had said that it believed Qadeer�s 
network was supplying weapons technology to North Korea, Libya 
and Iran but had not specified what.

With the president still under fire over whether Iraq possessed 
weapons of mass destruction, he also used the speech to outline 
the role that good US intelligence has played in the ongoing 
dismantlement of Dr Qadeer�s network, as well as Libya�s 
commitment last December to give up its weapons of mass 
destruction programmes.

He gave much of the credit for President Pervez Musharraf�s 
action against Dr Qadeer to the groundwork laid over several 
years by the US intelligence community. Bush singled out the UN�s 
nuclear watchdog organisation, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, for criticism, calling for the creation of a special 
committee to focus on safeguards and verification and to insure 
that nations comply with their international obligations.

He also complained that nations like Iran, which has been under 
investigation for proliferation, has been allowed to sit on the 
IAEA board of governors. He said no nation under investigation 
should be allowed to be on the board. "Those actively breaking 
the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules," the 
president said.

The agency is seen as ineffective by many in the Bush 
administration who cite the agency�s failure to stop weapons 
programs in Libya, North Korea and other countries.

The president also urged other countries to step up funding for 
programmes aimed at securing vulnerable nuclear arsenals in 
Russia and other former Soviet-bloc nations, and called for an 
expansion of similar efforts elsewhere in the world � though he 
made no mention of any additional US funding.

Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 34 Hi Pakistan: Nobody above law in N-proliferation case, says Kasuri 
 
February 13 2004     
    
WARSAW: Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri said on Wednesday 
that nobody was above the law, despite the country�s top nuclear 
scientist was pardoned after he admitted he shared information 
with other countries.

"We take international responsibilities very seriously. Nobody 
will be spared. Nobody is above the law," Kasuri told a joint 
news conference with his Polish counterpart Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz during a two-day visit to Poland.

"And this includes the father of the Pakistani nuclear programme 
Dr Khan," he said and added "A very strict watch is being kept on 
him". Kasuri said the probe into the sale of nuclear secrets had 
been launched following information from several countries� 
intelligence agencies, including that of the United States, and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, which had provided the 
names.

"There were two Pakistanis, one was a businessman, one was a 
scientist... Then there were three Germans, one Dutch, one Sri 
Lankan based in Dubai. On the basis of this information, we 
conducted an inquiry which lasted about 70 days in which we 
arrested 11 people," he said, adding the probe was still ongoing.

He said that among the people under investigation was "Dr Khan�s 
assistant." "Out of those people that we are investigating there 
are three security people, including two brigadier generals, one 
technician and four scientists," he said.

"The investigation is going on. We want to get more information 
from the other people and they will face the law," the minister 
said. Kasuri is paying the first ever visit by a Pakistani 
foreign minister to Poland.

Meanwhile, Kasuri and his Polish counterpart Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz were to sign a protocol on cooperation between the 
two ministries, according to Polish news agency PAP. It is 
expected that the protocol will facilitate an exchange of 
information and consultation of stands, and help initiating new 
undertakings both in bilateral relations and international 
cooperation.

Polish-Pakistani relations were boosted in 2002, when three 
rounds of political consultations, including those at the deputy 
foreign ministers� level, were held. The visit of Kasuri is 
expected to further develop bilateral relations.

Both sides will discuss issues of interest in the context of 
Poland�s accession to the European Union, Polish and Pakistani 
activities within the international anti-terrorist coalition and 
resumption of Pakistani-Indian dialogue. Much attention during 
talks will be paid to economic problems.

Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved. No part 
*****************************************************************
 35 Hi Pakistan: Spanish judge probes into firms linked to N-black market
 
February 13 2004     
    
MADRID: Spain�s leading investigative judge is probing Spanish 
companies suspected of being involved in a nuclear black market 
by providing Libya indirectly with components for its secret 
nuclear weapons program, the finance ministry said on Wednesday.

Judge Baltasar Garzon is investigating several machinery-parts 
producers who, perhaps unwittingly, sold parts that, after being 
exported to the United Arab Emirates, were diverted to Libya to 
feed the nuclear ambitions of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, a 
ministry spokeswoman said.

Garzon�s investigation began in June 2003, some two years after 
the UN�s International Atomic Energy Organisation, while 
dismantling Libya�s atomic arsenal, stumbled upon a nuclear black 
market in which companies from several countries were implicated, 
news reports said. Garzon is focusing specifically on one unnamed 
company that promoted exports of several Spanish firms, also 
unnamed, to Dubai in the UAE, leading daily El Pais said. The 
finance ministry on Wednesday said that it had not authorised any 
export of parts with ambiguous use since 2001.

Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 36 Hi Pakistan: Myanmar rejects US alarm over nuke ambitions
 
February 13 2004     
    
YANGON: Myanmar�s military junta on Wednesday rejected the 
suggestion by an aide to the US Senate�s Foreign Relations 
Committee chairman that Yangon was seeking nuclear weapons 
technology from North Korea. The ruling junta said in a statement 
that it was surprised that the senior aide to Senator Richard 
Lugar had raised "a false and disconcerting alarm" that Pyongyang 
may have been providing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to 
Yangon.

"The government believes that crying wolf or WMD just to attract 
attention in the derailment of our present envisioned 
nation-building process is not individually ethical and 
nationally moralistic and should be sensibly avoided." The senior 
aide, Keith Luse, warned on Monday that US policymakers must pay 
"special attention" to what he said was a growing relationship 
between Pyongyang and Yangon.

Luse, part of a US congressional delegation that visited North 
Korea�s Yongbyon nuclear plant last month, asked: "Is North Korea 
providing nuclear technology to the Burma military?" But the 
Junta rejected any such suggestion, adding: "This is not the 
first time such allegations are thrown at Myanmar."

Myanmar "does not require nor want to develop WMD when the 
country simply needs all her strength and resources pursuing a 
peaceful, stable ... transition to a multiparty democracy." In a 
jibe at Luse�s comments, the statement quipped that perhaps the 
WMD referred to "is the Myanmar people�s Will for Mass 
Development". The junta also highlighted the failure by US-led 
teams of investigators to find the banned weapons that Washington 
said ousted Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was developing and 
which it cited as its primary justification for war.

"The recent incident in the Middle East has been a glaring and 
proving example where the international community including the 
American public do not accept such a method." In January 2002, 
Yangon confirmed it was planning to build a nuclear research 
reactor to be used "for peaceful purposes" and that it was 
negotiating with Russia over the facility.

Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved. No part 
*****************************************************************
 37 Hi Pakistan: N-probe details can't be divulged, court told

February 13 2004     
    
ISLAMABAD, Feb 11: The federal government on Wednesday refused to 
place before the court the information and materials on the basis 
of which six officials of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) 
were detained. 

The federal government, at the seventh hearing of the habeas 
corpus petitions moved by relatives of six retired and serving 
officials of the KRL, stated: "The federation claims privilege in 
respect of all materials and information on which the order of 
the detention is passed." 

On the last hearing on Feb 9 the federal government had stated 
that the government was ready to disclose all sensitive details 
about the N-proliferation controversy before the court, provided 
the hearing was conducted in camera. The court, however, had 
insisted that it should first file the written statement. 

The government on Wednesday said that the KRL officials were 
detained under the Security of Pakistan Act 1952 as they were 
engaged in nuclear proliferation and were responsible for, inter 
alia, directly and indirectly passing on to foreign countries and 
individuals secret codes, nuclear materials, substances, 
machinery, equipment components, information, documents, 
sketches, plans, models, articles and notes entrusted them in 
their official capacity. 

The government said it was satisfied that the detention of the 
six accused was necessary with a view to preventing them from 
carrying on such activities in a manner prejudicial to the 
security of the country. 

The government stated that at present it was not in the national 
interests to disclose anything more than what had been already 
stated. It said the matter related to the nuclear programme and 
disclosures at this stage would have serious consequences for the 
defence, security and external relations of Pakistan. 

It stated that the Constitution provided an adequate alternate 
remedy to detenues to make their respective representations to 
the federal government and petition under Article 199 was not 
maintainable. 

The government also stated that the detention of the detenues was 
in accordance with Article 10 of the Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan. The bench consisted of Justice Maulvi 
Anwarul Haq and Justice Mansoor Ahmad of LHC, Rawalpindi Bench. 

The court adjourned the case till Feb 17 to allow the 
petitioners' counsel to file rejoinders. 

Those who have approached the Rawalpindi Bench of the Lahore High 
Court for their release are: Dr Mohammad Farooq, Director of KRL; 
Dr Nazeer Ahmad, Chief Engineer of Metallurgy Department, KRL; 
Brig (Retd) Sajawal Khan, retired director-general of KRL; Dr 
Naseemuddin, currently head of Missile Manufacturing, KRL, 
Kahuta; Brig (retd) Mohammad Iqbal Tajwar, former 
Director-General of Security, KRL, Kahuta, and Maj (retd) Islamul 
Haq, Principal Staff Officer of Dr A.Q. Khan. 
					     							 				 				   				 				
Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 38 Hi Pakistan: Nuclear Pakistan now a partner in counter-proliferation - 
 
February 13 2004     

By Nasim Zehra     --> 
                				 
A disturbed Pakistani nation finds itself at the heart of
the third wave of proliferation the world is now witnessing. Yet
there is a continuity to what we are witnessing. If the CIA
chief George Tenett talks of years of proliferators� tracking,
Pakistan�s agencies too have begun to reveal some information
now. According to officials Pakistan army�s leadership was first
confronted with some vaguely suspicious moves linked to KRL. KRL
was first raided in March 2000 by Pakistan�s Inter Services
Intelligence. Subsequently the KRL chief was called in and
warned. Finally the KRL chief was not given an extension in
April 2001. That is how far Pakistan�s establishment could act
on the basis of its own suspicions. KRL chief�s stature, the
sensitivity of the program and perhaps the fear of finding
unpleasant �truths� about others, prompted the State to avoid
investigations and opt for tighter controls. Meanwhile the
nation�s hero, the KRL chief�s retirement was made acceptable
for the nation by retiring another accomplished nuclear
scientist Dr Ashfaq.

On the nature of proliferation from Pakistan, according to US
accounts proliferation from Pakistani sources includes
transporting components of old models of centrifuges used
earlier by Pakistan and crude bomb designs passed on to Libya
are of 1955 vintage. No Pakistani source has exported fissile
material, designs of bombs tested by Pakistan, not ready-made
bombs and no sophisticated technology. By comparison after the
break-up of the Soviet Union US strategists feared
transportation of suitcase bombs were passed to non-state actors
by Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Fortunately proliferation from Pakistani sources has not altered
the state of the nuclear world. Only the beneficiaries of the
first and second wave of proliferation belong to the world�s
real nuclear club of 8 as opposed to the NPT�s wishful club of
5! Hence no Pakistani source has been responsible in actually
enabling a country to acquire a bomb. Also no sub-state actor
has been able to acquire technology through this third
unsuccessful wave of proliferation.

On the broader question of proliferation as the Indian Foreign
Minister has accurately pointed out on February 10, Pakistan is
not the only source of proliferation, other Asian and European
countries are involved. The first wave of proliferation gave to
the world the five premier nuclear powers. The second wave of
the seventies, from which Pakistan too benefited left an
expanded nuclear club with India, Israel and Pakistan as nuclear
powers. In the second wave too India, Israel and Pakistan
benefited from other proliferating nations. How these three
nuclear aspirant states benefited from proliferating European
and US governments and private companies was documented in
Leonard Spector�s book on how the second wave of proliferation
unfolded. There are other dimensions of proliferation too. For
example Scott Segan in Limits to Safety (1997) writes about
accidental launches and of unauthorized use of nuclear programs
gravely undermining custodial controls and safety measures taken
by nuclear powers. Similarly the limits to nuclear safety with
reference to human instability factor are also a given factor.
Imbalanced personalities leading to emotional chaos or wanton
greed were formally acknowledged in the seventies. The US
started the Personal Reliability Program (PRP) in the seventies
which tested 2.5% of the US people handling nuclear strategic
assets were declared unstable. This self-corrective measure did
not however mean that the entire US Command and Control system
was faulty.

However this mostly aborted and unsuccessful wave of
proliferation has underscored a significant aspect of the
proliferation context. That those state and non-state actors who
make non-proliferation an important policy priority often focus
on the supply side. Effort is made to prevent, albeit
selectively, transfer of nuclear technology for defence
purposes, from those who have the know how to those who require
it.

The demand side of proliferation ie the factors that prompt
states to seek nuclear technology, is often overlooked. In this
the third wave of proliferation countries, Libya, Iran and North
Korea heavily sanctioned and even attacked by the US sought to
establish nuclear weapons. What has been one of the key lessons
of US�s invasion of Iraq, that if you don�t have nuclear weapons
then you are attacked. In contrast the treatment of North Korea
conveys the fact that if you have weapons no one will attack
you. Instead the route to negotiations will always be adopted.

These demand-compulsions notwithstanding non-proliferation and
counter-proliferation will remain a high priority among
responsible nuclear powers. To achieve this goal an approach of
�constructive engagement� is also being adopted. US�s policy
towards Pakistan and the ring of proliferators is a case in
point. There is now a conclusion within the US policy-making
community and by extension in the IAEA on the parameters of the
Pakistan-related investigation on proliferation: that the
government of Pakistan, with the active cooperation of the
former KRL chief, is needed as a partner in the US
counter-proliferation efforts. Libya and Iran have already
obliged the US and the IAEA on this score.

The international community�s accountability thrust for Pakistan
is not headed in a punitive direction, instead in a
cooperation-seeking direction. It is about stopping
proliferation not about enforcing some nebulous notion of
justice. Similarly to coherently respond to the biggest fear of
nuclear technology getting into the hands of sub-state actors
states need to work closely. Not take punitive action against
one group of states. To tackle threat from sub-state groups you
need State-to-State level cooperation.

Repeatedly senior US administration officials, US
non-proliferation experts and even key men like former Under
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott have all supported the Bush
administration and IAEA�s using Pakistani sources to get to the
"roots of the underground nuclear black-market." There is
therefore a cross-party consensus in the US on this approach
towards Pakistan. Those asking for punitive measures against the
state of Pakistan, whose involvement in proliferation is far
from proven, are not being heard in the policy circles. The
international community meanwhile will remain unrelenting in
seeking to track and smash the �Wal-Mart of nuclear technology.�
In doing so it will expect 200% cooperation from Pakistan.
 					     							 				 				   				 				
Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 39 Hi Pakistan: IAEA backs US call on spread of nuke technology 

February 13 2004     
    
VIENNA: UN nuclear watchdog chief Mohamed ElBaradei called on 
Thursday for tighter controls on the export of nuclear technology 
and equipment, backing a new call by US President George W. 
Bush's call for a crack-down on atomic smuggling wordlwide.

"I have the same concern and sense of urgency expressed by 
President Bush to shore up the non-proliferation regime and 
global security system,"

International Atomic Energy Agency chief ElBaradei said in a 
statement released at the IAEA's headquarters in Vienna.

He said the IAEA, the UN's organization to monitor compliance 
with international non-proliferation safeguards, needs 
"additional authority."

ElBaradei said there should be "a much more stringent export 
control system and accelerated efforts towards nuclear 
disarmament."

"I call on the international community to engage in an urgent 
dialogue that can move us towards an agreed package of measures 
to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and international 
security system," ElBaradei said.
 					     							 				 				   				 				
Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 40 PRN: Remarks by President Bush on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation    

    WASHINGTON, Feb. 11 /PRNewswire/ -- The following is a 
transcript of remarks by President Bush on weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation:

    Fort Lesley J. McNair - National Defense University
    Washington, D.C.
    2:30 P.M. EST

    THE PRESIDENT:  Thanks for the warm welcome.  I'm honored to 
visit the National Defense University.  For nearly a century, the 
scholars and students here have helped to prepare America for the 
changing threats to our national security.  Today, the men and 
women of our National Defense University are helping to frame the 
strategies through which we are fighting and winning the war on 
terror.  Your Center for Counterproliferation Research and your 
other institutes and colleges are providing vital insight into 
the dangers of a new era.  I want to thank each one of you for 
devoting your talents and your energy to the service of our great 
nation.

    I want to thank General Michael Dunn for inviting me here. I 
used to jog by this facility on a regular basis.  Then my age 
kicked in. (Laughter.)  I appreciate Ambassador Wolfgang 
Ischinger, from Germany.  Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being 
here today.  I see my friend, George Shultz, a distinguished 
public servant and true patriot, with us.  George, thank you for 
coming; and Charlotte, it's good to see you.  I'm so honored that 
Dick Lugar is here with us today.  Senator, I appreciate you 
taking time and thanks for bringing Senator Saxby Chambliss with 
you, as well.  I appreciate the veterans who are here and those 
on active duty.  Thanks for letting me come by.

    On September the 11th, 2001, America and the world witnessed 
a new kind of war.  We saw the great harm that a stateless 
network could inflict upon our country, killers armed with box 
cutters, mace, and 19 airline tickets.  Those attacks also raised 
the prospect of even worse dangers -- of other weapons in the 
hands of other men.  The greatest threat before humanity today is 
the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or 
biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.

    In the past, enemies of America required massed armies, and 
great navies, powerful air forces to put our nation, our people, 
our friends and allies at risk.  In the Cold War, Americans lived 
under the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but believed 
that deterrents made those weapons a last resort. What has 
changed in the 21st century is that, in the hands of terrorists, 
weapons of mass destruction would be a first resort -- the 
preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random 
murder.  These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, 
build, hide, and transport. Armed with a single vial of a 
biological agent or a single nuclear weapon, small groups of 
fanatics, or failing states, could gain the power to threaten 
great nations, threaten the world peace.

    America, and the entire civilized world, will face this 
threat for decades to come.  We must confront the danger with 
open eyes, and unbending purpose. I have made clear to all the 
policy of this nation:  America will not permit terrorists and 
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most deadly 
weapons.  (Applause.)

    Meeting this duty has required changes in thinking and 
strategy. Doctrines designed to contain empires, deter aggressive 
states, and defeat massed armies cannot fully protect us from 
this new threat. America faces the possibility of catastrophic 
attack from ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass 
destruction.  So that is why we are developing and deploying 
missile defenses to guard our people.  The best intelligence is 
necessary to win the war on terror and to stop proliferation.  So 
that is why I have established a commission that will examine our 
intelligence capabilities and recommend ways to improve and adapt 
them to detect new and emerging threats.

    We're determined to confront those threats at the source. We 
will stop these weapons from being acquired or built.  We'll 
block them from being transferred.  We'll prevent them from ever 
being used.  One source of these weapons is dangerous and 
secretive regimes that build weapons of mass destruction to 
intimidate their neighbors and force their influence upon the 
world.  These nations pose different challenges; they require 
different strategies.

    The former dictator of Iraq possessed and used weapons of 
mass destruction against his own people.  For 12 years, he defied 
the will of the international community.  He refused to disarm or 
account for his illegal weapons and programs.  He doubted our 
resolve to enforce our word -- and now he sits in a prison cell, 
while his country moves toward a democratic future. (Applause.)

    To Iraq's east, the government of Iran is unwilling to 
abandon a uranium enrichment program capable of producing 
material for nuclear weapons.  The United States is working with 
our allies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure 
that Iran meets its commitments and does not develop nuclear 
weapons.  (Applause.)

    In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested 
long-range ballistic missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear 
weapons, and now threatens to build more.  Together with our 
partners in Asia, America is insisting that North Korea 
completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear 
programs.

    America has consistently brought these threats to the 
attention of international organizations.  We're using every 
means of diplomacy to answer them.  As for my part, I will 
continue to speak clearly on these threats.  I will continue to 
call upon the world to confront these dangers, and to end them. 
(Applause.)

    In recent years, another path of proliferation has become 
clear, as well. America and other nations are learning more about 
black-market operatives who deal in equipment and expertise 
related to weapons of mass destruction.  These dealers are 
motivated by greed, or fanaticism, or both.  They find eager 
customers in outlaw regimes, which pay millions for the parts and 
plans they need to speed up their weapons programs.  And with 
deadly technology and expertise going on the market, there's the 
terrible possibility that terrorists groups could obtain the 
ultimate weapons they desire most.

    The extent and sophistication of such networks can be seen in 
the case of a man named Abdul Qadeer Khan.  This is the story as 
we know it so far.  A. Q. Khan is known throughout the world as 
the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.  What was not 
publicly known, until recently, is that he also led an extensive 
international network for the proliferation of nuclear technology 
and know-how.

    For decades, Mr. Khan remained on the Pakistani government 
payroll, earning a modest salary.  Yet, he and his associates 
financed lavish lifestyles through the sale of nuclear 
technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from 
North Africa to the Korean Peninsula.

    A. Q. Khan, himself, operated mostly out of Pakistan.  He 
served as director of the network, its leading scientific mind, 
as well as its primary salesman.  Over the past decade, he made 
frequent trips to consult with his clients and to sell his 
expertise.  He and his associates sold the blueprints for 
centrifuges to enrich uranium, as well as a nuclear design stolen 
from the Pakistani government.  The network sold uranium 
hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifuge process can transform 
into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Khan and his associates 
provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for 
Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more 
advanced and efficient models.  The network also provided these 
countries with components, and in some cases, with complete 
centrifuges.

    To increase their profits, Khan and his associates used a 
factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges.  
Other necessary parts were purchased through network operatives 
based in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.  These procurement 
agents saw the trade in nuclear technologies as a shortcut to 
personal wealth, and they set up front companies to deceive 
legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials.

    Khan's deputy -- a man named B.S.A. Tahir -- ran SMB 
computers, a business in Dubai.  Tahir used that computer company 
as a front for the proliferation activities of the A. Q. Khan 
network.  Tahir acted as both the network's chief financial 
officer and money launderer.  He was also its shipping agent, 
using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge 
parts to various clients.  Tahir directed the Malaysia facility 
to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs, and then 
ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai.  Tahir also 
arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents 
to transit through Dubai for shipment to other customers.

    This picture of the Khan network was pieced together over 
several years by American and British intelligence officers.  Our 
intelligence services gradually uncovered this network's reach, 
and identified its key experts and agents and money men.  
Operatives followed its transactions, mapped the extent of its 
operations. They monitored the travel of A. Q. Khan and senior 
associates.  They shadowed members of the network around the 
world, they recorded their conversations, they penetrated their 
operations, we've uncovered their secrets.  This work involved 
high risk, and all Americans can be grateful for the hard work 
and the dedication of our fine intelligence professionals.  
(Applause.)

    Governments around the world worked closely with us to 
unravel the Khan network, and to put an end to his criminal 
enterprise.  A. Q. Khan has confessed his crimes, and his top 
associates are out of business.  The government of Pakistan is 
interrogating the network's members, learning critical details 
that will help them prevent it from ever operating again. 
President Musharraf has promised to share all the information he 
learns about the Khan network, and has assured us that his 
country will never again be a source of proliferation.

    Mr. Tahir is in Malaysia, where authorities are investigating 
his activities.  Malaysian authorities have assured us that the 
factory the network used is no longer producing centrifuge parts.  
Other members of the network remain at large.  One by one, they 
will be found, and their careers in the weapons trade will be 
ended.

    As a result of our penetration of the network, American and 
the British intelligence identified a shipment of advanced 
centrifuge parts manufactured at the Malaysia facility.  We 
followed the shipment of these parts to Dubai, and watched as 
they were transferred to the BBC China, a German-owned ship. 
After the ship passed through the Suez Canal, bound for Libya, it 
was stopped by German and Italian authorities.  They found 
several containers, each forty feet in length, listed on the 
ship's manifest as full of "used machine parts." In fact, these 
containers were filled with parts of sophisticated centrifuges.

    The interception of the BBC China came as Libyan and British 
and American officials were discussing the possibility of Libya 
ending its WMD programs. The United States and Britain confronted 
Libyan officials with this evidence of an active and illegal 
nuclear program.  About two months ago, Libya's leader 
voluntarily agreed to end his nuclear and chemical weapons 
programs, not to pursue biological weapons, and to permit 
thorough inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.  
We're now working in partnership with these organizations and 
with the United Kingdom to help the government of Libya dismantle 
those programs and eliminate all dangerous materials.

    Colonel Ghadafi made the right decision, and the world will 
be safer once his commitment is fulfilled.  We expect other 
regimes to follow his example. Abandoning the pursuit of illegal 
weapons can lead to better relations with the United States, and 
other free nations.  Continuing to seek those weapons will not 
bring security or international prestige, but only political 
isolation, economic hardship, and other unwelcome consequences. 
(Applause.)

    We know that Libya was not the only customer of the Khan 
network.  Other countries expressed great interest in their 
services.  These regimes and other proliferators like Khan should 
know:  We and our friends are determined to protect our people 
and the world from proliferation.  (Applause.)

    Breaking this network is one major success in a broad-based 
effort to stop the spread of terrible weapons.  We're adjusting 
our strategies to the threats of a new era.  America and the 
nations of Australia, France and Germany, Italy and Japan, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom have 
launched the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict 
lethal materials in transit.  Our nations are sharing 
intelligence information, tracking suspect international cargo, 
conducting joint military exercises. We're prepared to search 
planes and ships, to seize weapons and missiles and equipment 
that raise proliferation concerns, just as we did in stopping the 
dangerous cargo on the BBC China before it reached Libya.  Three 
more governments -- Canada and Singapore and Norway -- will be 
participating in this initiative.  We'll continue to expand the 
core group of PSI countries. And as PSI grows, proliferators will 
find it harder than ever to trade in illicit weapons.

    There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot 
be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is 
translated into action.  Every civilized nation has a stake in 
preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  These 
materials and technologies, and the people who traffic in them, 
cross many borders.  To stop this trade, the nations of the world 
must be strong and determined.  We must work together, we must 
act effectively. Today, I announce seven proposals to strengthen 
the world's efforts to stop the spread of deadly weapons.

    First, I propose that the work of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative be expanded to address more than shipments and 
transfers.  Building on the tools we've developed to fight 
terrorists, we can take direct action against proliferation 
networks.  We need greater cooperation not just among 
intelligence and military services, but in law enforcement, as 
well.  PSI participants and other willing nations should use the 
Interpol and all other means to bring to justice those who 
traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to seize 
their materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every 
lead.  We will find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers.  
Our message to proliferators must be consistent and it must be 
clear:  We will find you, and we're not going to rest until you 
are stopped. (Applause.)

    Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and 
international controls that govern proliferation.  At the U.N. 
last fall, I proposed a new Security Council resolution requiring 
all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export 
controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their 
borders.  The Security Council should pass this proposal quickly.  
And when they do, America stands ready to help other governments 
to draft and enforce the new laws that will help us deal with 
proliferation.

    Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep weapons from 
the Cold War and other dangerous materials out of the wrong 
hands.  In 1991, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation.  
Senator Lugar had a clear vision, along with Senator Nunn, about 
what to do with the old Soviet Union. Under this program, we're 
helping former Soviet states find productive employment for 
former weapons scientists.  We're dismantling, destroying and 
securing weapons and materials left over from the Soviet WMD 
arsenal.  We have more work to do there.

    And as a result of the G-8 Summit in 2002, we agreed to 
provide $20 billion over 10 years -- half of it from the United 
States -- to support such programs. We should expand this 
cooperation elsewhere in the world.  We will retain [sic] WMD 
scientists and technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya. We 
will help nations end the use of weapons-grade uranium in 
research reactors.  I urge more nations to contribute to these 
efforts. The nations of the world must do all we can to secure 
and eliminate nuclear and chemical and biological and 
radiological materials.

    As we track and destroy these networks, we must also prevent 
governments from developing nuclear weapons under false 
pretenses.  The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty was designed 
more than 30 years ago to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
beyond those states which already possessed them. Under this 
treaty, nuclear states agreed to help non-nuclear states develop 
peaceful atomic energy if they renounced the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. But the treaty has a loophole which has been exploited 
by nations such as North Korea and Iran.  These regimes are 
allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build 
bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.

    So today, as a fourth step, I propose a way to close the 
loophole.  The world must create a safe, orderly system to field 
civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons 
proliferation.  The world's leading nuclear exporters should 
ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to 
fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce 
enrichment and reprocessing.  Enrichment and reprocessing are not 
necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes.

    The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse 
to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to 
any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning 
enrichment and reprocessing plants. (Applause.)  This step will 
prevent new states from developing the means to produce fissile 
material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators must not be allowed to 
cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and 
infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.

    For international norms to be effective, they must be 
enforced.  It is the charge of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency to uncover banned nuclear activity around the world and 
report those violations to the U.N. Security Council.  We must 
ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to fulfill its 
essential mandate.  America and other nations support what is 
called the Additional Protocol, which requires states to declare 
a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities, and allow the 
IAEA to inspect those facilities.

    As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only states 
that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import 
equipment for their civilian nuclear programs.  Nations that are 
serious about fighting proliferation will approve and implement 
the Additional Protocol.  I've submitted the Additional Protocol 
to the Senate.  I urge the Senate to consent immediately to its 
ratification.

    We must also ensure that IAEA is organized to take action 
when action is required.  So, a sixth step, I propose the 
creation of a special committee of the IAEA Board which will 
focus intensively on safeguards and verification. This committee, 
made up of governments in good standing with the IAEA, will 
strengthen the capability of the IAEA to ensure that nations 
comply with their international obligations.

    And, finally, countries under investigation for violating 
nuclear non- proliferation obligations are currently allowed to 
serve on the IAEA Board of Governors.  For instance, Iran -- a 
country suspected of maintaining an extensive nuclear weapons 
program -- recently completed a two-year term on the Board.  
Allowing potential violators to serve on the Board creates an 
unacceptable barrier to effective action.  No state under 
investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to 
serve on the IAEA Board of Governors -- or on the new special 
committee.  And any state currently on the Board that comes under 
investigation should be suspended from the Board.  The integrity 
and mission of the IAEA depends on this simple principle:  Those 
actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with 
enforcing the rules. (Applause.)

    As we move forward to address these challenges we will 
consult with our friends and allies on all these new measures.  
We will listen to their ideas. Together we will defend the safety 
of all nations and preserve the peace of the world.

    Over the last two years, a great coalition has come together 
to defeat terrorism and to oppose the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction -- the inseparable commitments of the war on terror.  
We've shown that proliferators can be discovered and can be 
stopped.  We've shown that for regimes that choose defiance, 
there are serious consequences.  The way ahead is not easy, but 
it is clear.  We will proceed as if the lives of our citizens 
depend on our vigilance, because they do.  Terrorists and terror 
states are in a race for weapons of mass murder, a race they must 
lose.  (Applause.) Terrorists are resourceful; we're more 
resourceful.  They're determined; we must be more determined.  We 
will never lose focus or resolve.  We'll be unrelenting in the 
defense of free nations, and rise to the hard demands of 
dangerous times.

    May God bless you all.  (Applause.) END

    3:07 P.M. EST SOURCE White House Press Office Web Site: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov
	 		   	 
        Copyright � 1996-2004 PR Newswire Association LLC. All 
Rights
*****************************************************************
 41 UK Independent: Libya decided 10 years ago against developing WMD,
 Foreign Minister says
 
By Mary Dejevsky
 
11 February 2004

Libya decided more than 10 years ago not to develop any weapons 
of mass destruction, Abdul Rahman Shalgam, its Foreign Minister 
said yesterday. 

His appeared to contradict the co-ordinated announcements in 
London, Washington and Tripoli last December that Libya was 
renouncing its WMDs and would comply with international 
inspection regimes. Despite the reports that Libya would destroy 
its illegal weapons and programmes, it was not clear then how 
advanced Libya's programmes were and whether it had actual 
weapons to destroy. 

The first doubts were cast by Mohamed ElBaradei, the director 
general of the IAEA, who said after visiting Tripoli that Libya 
was several years from developing a nuclear capability. Yesterday 
Mr Shalgam said it was not true that Libya had made 
"concessions". This was a view put about by "poisonous" pens in 
the Arab media. Libya, he said, "reviewed a number of issues, 
including programmes and equipment called weapons of mass 
destruction. 

"We had the equipment, we had the material and the know-how and 
the scientists. But we never decided to produce such weapons. To 
have flour, water and fire does not mean that you have bread." 

Libya's renunciation of such weapons, he said, went back to at 
least 1992, since when it had been in periodic talks with the US, 
and was well-documented. Mr Shalgam insisted it was Libya that 
had taken the initiative in renouncing its weapons programmes and 
it would be subject not to "inspections" but to "verification". 

He admitted Libya had possessed "some equipment" that violated 
the non-proliferation agreement, but this had already been given 
up to the IAEA. Any suggestion that Libya had been scared into 
making concessions by the US and British use of force in Iraq had 
been put about by "malevolent journalists". Jack Straw, the 
Foreign Secretary, asked whether the war in Iraq was seen by the 
British Government as responsible for Libya's apparent change of 
policy on its weapons, pointed out that the rapprochement with 
Libya had begun in the late Nineties. 

The "breakthrough" had come with the visit of the Foreign Office 
minister, Mike O'Brien, to Tripoli 18 months ago, "a good while 
before military action was contemplated in respect of Iraq". But, 
he insisted, he would not "claim any crude connection ... between 
military action in Iraq and what has happened in Iraq and in 
Libya". 

It was rather, he said, that the removal of Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq had made for a "more secure environment" in the region and 
this, in turn, could have "eased" the delicate negotiations with 
Libya.             


UK Independent Ltd.

*****************************************************************
 42 [NukeNet] Oyster Creek Campaign is gaining traction!!!
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:06:04 -0800

 
<x-flowed>

Published in the Asbury Park Press 2/12/04

By NICHOLAS CLUNN

MANAHAWKIN BUREAU

The Oyster Creek nuclear power plant should not be granted a new license to 
operate beyond 2009 unless deteriorating equipment is replaced and security 
enhanced, the state's top environmental official said yesterday.



State officials are concerned that the facility in Lacey would fail to 
generate power safely during an extended operating period, which the plant 
has considered seeking.



Department of Environmental Protection Commissioner Bradley M. Campbell 
said officials have found problems that would warrant closing the plant 
when its current license expires in five years.



"We have very serious concerns about the plant and particularly any 
anticipated effort to renew the license," Campbell said.



Specifically, Campbell said, the state has found that the plant operators 
could fail to inform residents adequately about an accident that could 
prove hazardous to the public.



Officials also are concerned that aging equipment important to the power 
generating process could falter eventually, Campbell said in an interview.



Campbell said the DEP's concerns are shared by Gov. McGreevey, who has 
signed legislation improving plant security but has not declared a position 
regarding extended life for the 34-year-old plant, one of the country's 
oldest commercial reactors.





April deadline to apply

The plant will close in 2009 unless Exelon applies to the federal Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission for a 20-year license extension. The plant would need 
to apply by April or else risk shutdown if the application is pending when 
the current 40-year license expires. Opponents to license renewal have 
argued that allowing the plant to operate beyond 2009 would endanger the 
health of nearby residents. Those who have supported renewal argue that the 
health risks are slim and fail to outweigh the plant's economic benefits.



"If the plant had negative health effects on people, township residents 
would have already realized the plant's danger," said Karey Phulger, 20, 
Lacey. "I grew up by it, so if it was going to mess me up, it would have 
already."



Robin Wolf, 25, also of Lacey, said she moved to Lacey from Baltimore 
knowing she would be sharing the town with the Oyster Creek plant.



"It doesn't really matter what happens," Wolf said. But she added, 
"Obviously there is a reason why we have a power plant."



State officials say they have found that communication equipment at 
Exelon's emergency management headquarters in Lakewood could fail.



Also of concern are pipes and other components used in a system designed to 
cool steam used in the reactor process. Water, heated by the reactor into a 
vapor to spin the turbine, is used again after stream water that is pumped 
through pipes cools the vapor back into liquid.





Exelon: Plant is safe

Exelon spokeswoman Gina Scala said the plant has been operating safely and 
pointed to $10 million the plant spends each year upgrading equipment, 
improving safety and increasing efficiency. Scala said the plant meets 
strict federal requirements for security.



Governing bodies in 12 Ocean County towns -- the latest being Dover 
Township -- and one Burlington County town have called either for a plant 
shutdown or an independent health risk assessment.



U.S. Sens. Jon S. Corzine and Frank R. Lautenberg, both D-N.J., have 
expressed to the NRC their concerns about the plant's ability to operate 
safely through 2029.



State Sen. Leonard T. Connors Jr., R-Ocean, said the state's position 
"doesn't shut the door, but it tells them to get it up to speed or abandon it."



The DEP's stance angered Lacey Mayor John C. Parker, who maintains that the 
plant is safe as is and should continue to provide economic benefit to the 
township and the county.



"I don't care what anyone else says outside Lacey," he said. "If that plant 
is safe to run, and it is safe to run, then we should keep it open."





Rob Sargent

Senior Energy Policy Analyst

National Association of State PIRGs

29 Temple Place

Boston, MA 02111

P: 617-747-4317

F: 617-292-8057

C: 617-312-7546


_______________________________________________________________________
Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/
Change your settings at:
http://chrome.nocdirect.com/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 43 [NukeNet] White House Backs Away From Bush '02 Nuclear Power
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:06:13 -0800

 
<x-flowed>


White House Backs Away From Bush '02
Nuclear-Terror Warning


By ROBERT BLOCK and GREG HITT
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL


WASHINGTON -- The White House stepped back from a
high-profile assertion by
President Bush, in his January 2002 State of the
Union Address, that U.S. forces had
uncovered evidence of a potential attack against
an American nuclear facility.
In the speech, Mr. Bush warned of a terrorist
threat to the nation, saying that the U.S.
had found "diagrams of American nuclear power
plants" in Afghanistan.
Coming just months after the Sept. 11 terrorist
attacks -- and as U.S. forces were on
the hunt for al Qaeda in Afghanistan -- the
statement was offered as evidence of the
depth of antipathy among Islamic extremists, and
of "the madness of the destruction
they design."
"Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our
worst fears," Mr. Bush told Congress and
the nation in the televised speech. He said "we
have found" diagrams of public water
facilities, instructions on how to make chemical
arms, maps of U.S. cities and
descriptions of U.S. landmarks, in addition to the
nuclear-plant plans.
Monday night, the White House defended the
warnings about Islamic extremist
intentions, but said the concerns highlighted by
Mr. Bush were based on intelligence
developed before and after the Sept. 11 attacks,
and that no plant diagrams were
actually found in Afghanistan. "There's no
additional basis for the language in the
speech that we have found," a senior
administration official said.
The disclosure came amid increasing questions
about the Bush administration's use of
prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons capability
to justify the U.S.-led invasion that
toppled Saddam Hussein. Mr. Bush has been forced
to concede that the U.S. has found
none of the weapons of mass destruction that he
warned of before the war. It is also the
second time that the Bush White House has been
forced to back away from an
assertion in a State of the Union address. In the
2003 speech, Mr. Bush warned Iraq
was seeking raw uranium in Africa, a claim the
White House later conceded was
mistakenly included in the speech.
The suggestion that plant blueprints might have
been in the hands of terrorists sparked
concern among environmental activists and local
communities near the country's 103
nuclear stations, according to Greenpeace, the
liberal advocacy group. The White
House was forced to comb back over Mr. Bush's 2002
speech Monday after
Greenpeace released a letter from a senior
official at the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission that cast doubt on Mr. Bush's claim.
In a letter responding to a request by Greenpeace
to clarify Mr. Bush's assertion about
the nuclear-plant plans, NRC Commissioner Edward
McGaffigan wrote Feb. 4 to say
that he had testified two years ago in "one or
more" closed-door Congressional
hearings and told lawmakers that he "was aware of
no evidence" that plant diagrams
had been found in Afghanistan. The NRC is
responsible for maintaining security at the
nation's nuclear power plants.
An NRC spokeswoman confirmed the authenticity of
the letter, but said that Mr.
McGaffigan wouldn't have any comment. In the
letter, Mr. McGaffigan does say that al
Qaeda poses a danger. "I believe that based on the
evidence available there is a
general credible threat by al Qaeda toward
American nuclear power plants," he wrote.
While some evidence is public, he said, "The vast
majority is appropriately classified."
Sean McCormack, a spokesman for the White House's
National Security Council, said
Monday night that rather than being based on
actual diagrams that were actually found
in Afghanistan, the president's warning about
nuclear plants grew from information
collected by the U.S. intelligence community.
Among other things, U.S. intelligence had
received information from a suspected bin Laden
operative in the fall of 2001 and early
2002 suggesting that potential U.S. targets
include nuclear power facilities, dams and
water reservoirs. At the same time, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation reported a
series of suspicious incidents, including the
surveillance of U.S. nuclear plants. In
January 2002, the White House said, U.S.
intelligence warned that members of al
Qaeda might be tapping into the U.S.-based
Internet sites that included information
about nuclear facilities.
Write to Robert Block at bobby.block@wsj.com and
Greg Hitt at greg.hitt@wsj.com
Updated February 10, 2004 9:54 a.m.


**************************************************
*****************************************


Hidden Angle


What Does It Take to Make Page One Around Here?




Last night, more than two years after the fact,
the White House backed off from a statement made
by President George W. Bush in his 2002 State of
the Union address that "diagrams of American
nuclear power plants" were among "our discoveries
in Afghanistan [that] confirmed our worst
fears" --
but you'd have to have an eagle eye to find that
news in a couple of the nation's most prominent
newspapers today. The White House was forced to
retreat from the two-year-old presidential
assertion late yesterday after liberal
environmental group Greenpeace released a letter
from an
official of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that
cast doubt on the claim. The Wall Street Journal
did have the good sense to report the news on its
prominent Politics & Policy page (A4) this
morning, with reporters Robert Block and Greg Hitt
writing (subscription required) that the White
House now says the concerns highlighted by Mr.
Bush were based not on plant diagrams actually
found
in Afghanistan -- there were none -- but on a
variety of intelligence developed before and after
the Sept.
11 attacks. As a White House spokesman delicately
told The Journal, "there's no additional basis
for the language in the speech that we have
found." The Boston Globe ran the story on A3 but
framed it as a simple he-said, she-said, with the
headline, "Nuclear Groups Question Terrorist
Threat"
and the subhead, "Contend NRC official, Bush's
address offer divergent appraisals" and without
the
benefit of a delicately worded quote from an
administration official (the White House press
office didn't
return the Globe's calls seeking comment). But if
you're a New York Times reader, you didn't get
wind of this news unless you found your way to a
two-column story at the bottom of page A22,
where Matthew L. Wald writes that "the President
was probably wrong" when he said that American
forces had found blueprints for American nuclear
power plants in Al Qaeda strongholds in
Afghanistan.
Not only does the Times bury the story on the
A-section's third-to-last page, it buries it a
second
time with a headline that seems to miss the point:
"Nuclear Official Says Bush Erred on Details
of Threat to Reactors." Here, by contrast, is The
Wall Street Journal headline: "White House
Backs Away From Bush '02 Nuclear-Terror Warning."
Perhaps the headline reads that way
because Wald treats the news as evidence that
citizens need not be concerned about the
vulnerability of nuclear reactors, rather than as
the third time that the administration has stepped
away from one assertion or another in a State of
the Union address (remember "weapons of mass
destruction" and the claim that "The British
government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa"?) Still, even Wald's murky story is a
better deal
than readers of the paper-and-ink version of The
Washington Post got. They got nothing. In fact,
the only reference you'll find to the White House
peelback in either The Post or at
washingtonpost.com is in Dan Froomkin's online
only "White House Briefing" column -- where
Froomkin links to the Journal and Times versions
of the story. -- Liz Cox Barrett


















Jim Riccio
Greenpeace
702 H Street NW #300
Washington, DC 20001
202-319-2487
202-462-4507



_______________________________________________________________________
Subscribe/Unsubscribe Here: http://www.energyjustice.net/nukenet/
Change your settings at:
http://chrome.nocdirect.com/mailman/listinfo/nukenet_energyjustice.net

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 44 The Australian: Radiation fear on cut to reactor safety

[February 13, 2004]
 	 	
By Brendan O'Keefe

RESIDENTS living near the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor in Sydney 
have been alarmed by plans to cut safety staff at the plant.

The reactor's manager, the Australian Nuclear Science and 
Technology Organisation, plans to reduce staff after 
commissioning its new Replacement Research Reactor, due next 
year. 

Unions at Lucas Heights said they understood the four-person crew 
that runs the Hiflux Australian Reactor would be cut to three, 
and about six health physics surveyors, who monitor the reactor 
and the surrounding areas for radiation leaks on a 24-hour 
roster, would also be cut. 

Health physics coverage might be reduced to as little as eight 
hours a day. The unions said reactor operators would be required 
to cover the health physics shortfall through self-monitoring. 
Australian Manufacturing Workers Union industrial officer Colin 
Drane said: "Our position is that self-monitoring is a conflict 
of interest. Our members have rejected the notion." 

ANSTO acting chief executive Ron Cameron said the new reactor 
would be less manually intensive than the existing nuclear plant. 

"It's computer-controlled and doesn't require people to be around 
all the time - that gives us the opportunity to train reactor 
staff in radiation protection," Dr Cameron said. "There's no 
decision been made on manning levels, but this isn't 
cost-cutting." 

Federal Labor science spokesman Kim Carr said the matter would be 
addressed by a Senate estimates committee next week. "It has the 
appearance of cost-cutting and a reduction in safety," he said. 
		 		 		 
� The Australian   
*****************************************************************
 45 Democrat & Chronicle: RG nuke-sale bonus grilled
 
By Jay Gallagher 
Albany bureau chief 

(February 12, 2004)  ALBANY � A top official of Rochester Gas 
and Electric Corp. couldnt tell a state lawyer Wednesday how the 
company decided it should receive a $10 million �incentive� once 
it sells its Ginna nuclear power plant. 

How did the company arrive at that figure? Joseph Syta, the 
companys controller and treasurer, was asked at a hearing on a 
proposed rate increase. 

�It was a number that seemed appropriate,� Syta answered. 

�What does that mean?� asked the lawyer for the state Public 
Service Commission, Kevin Lang. 

�Just what it says,� Syta replied. 

The payment is one of the issues being considered by the 
commission, which Wednesday held a third day of hearings on an RG 
request to raise rates by 15 percent for its 355,000 electricity 
customers and by 7.4 percent for its 291,000 natural-gas 
customers. 

The company says it needs the $122 million the rate boosts would 
bring in to maintain reliable service. 

The hearings are expected to continue into next week. Then an 
administrative law judge will make a recommendation to the full 
commission, which is expected to rule on the matter later this 
year. 

RG President James Laurito has said that the utilitys ability to 
provide reliable service could be jeopardized if the 
rate-increase request is rejected. 

But the staff of the PSC says the company is overstating its 
financial woes and that rates should be frozen until April 30, 
2005. 

RGs proposed sale of the Ginna plant in Wayne County to 
Constellation Generation Group for $422.6 million is one of the 
issues in dispute. The plant supplies power to half of RGs 
customers, about 125,000 homes. 

The commission staff thinks that the company should use more of 
the proceeds of the still-to-be-approved sale to hold down prices 
for customers. 

But the company thinks that it should get an incentive payment 
for completing the deal because the state has been encouraging 
utilities to sell their plants. And the deal Constellation is 
offering is almost five times what it cost to build Ginna more 
than 30 years ago. 

The administrative law judge presiding at the hearing, J. Michael 
Harrison, asked both sides to provide him with charts showing 
what effect they think the sale of the plant should have on 
electricity rates. 

Lang kept hammering Syta on the incentive question, but Syta said 
the decision to seek $10 million evolved out of �confidential� 
discussions. 

�You pulled that number out of thin air?� Lang asked. 

�If you consider my professional opinion as thin air,� then yes, 
he said. 

Under prodding from Lang, Syta also acknowledged that RG and 
other utilities that owned part of the Nine Mile nuclear power 
plants in Oswego County did not get any incentives when those 
plants were sold. 

The PSC, the state panel that regulates utilities, has been 
prodding those companies for the last several years to sell their 
power plants, under the theory that having them owned by other 
companies would lead to competition and lower prices. 

JGGANNETT@yahoo.com 

*****************************************************************
 46 NRC: NRC Senior Officials Will Meet with Point Beach Management to Discuss Plant
                           Performance
News Release - Region III - 2004-00
 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Office of Public Affairs, Region III
  No. III-04-008           February 11, 2004   
  CONTACT:     Jan Strasma (630) 829-9663
 Viktoria Mitlyng (630) 829-9662     E-mail: opa3@nrc.gov  
  

Operations, William Travers, the Regional Administrator for NRC
Region III, James Caldwell, and other NRC officials will meet
with representatives of Nuclear Management Company on February
20 to discuss performance at Point Beach Power Station and the
results of a special inspection which thoroughly reviewed the
overall performance at the plant. The plant is located near Two
Rivers, Wisconsin. 

The meeting will be held at 9 a.m. at the Holiday Inn, 4601
Calumet Avenue, in Manitowoc, Wisconsin. The public is invited
to observe the meeting and will have an opportunity to make
comments and ask questions of the NRC staff before the meeting
is adjourned. 

The NRC conducted a special in-depth inspection in response to a
significant safety finding related to the auxiliary feedwater
system identified by plant personnel in 2001. 

NRC inspection findings are evaluated using a four-level scale
of safety significance, ranging from "green" for a finding of
very low significance, through "white" and "yellow" to "red,"
for a finding of high safety significance. 

The 2001 red finding was associated with a problem with valves
on the auxiliary feedwater system recirculation lines. The NRC
determined that if these valves failed to function because of
equipment damage, the protective recirculation flow required to
support the operation of the auxiliary feedwater pumps would
stop and result in pump damage. 

A second red finding was associated with potential blockage of
recirulation lines in the auxiliary feedwater system by debris
typically found in the plants service water system under
certain abnormal conditions. This blockage could also lead to
pump damage. This problem, which was related to the first red
finding in that they both affect the auxiliary feedwater
recirculation system, was discovered by the utility in October
of 2002. 

The auxiliary feedwater system is used to safely cool the
reactor if problems occur during plant operations and to
continue removing heat from the reactor after shutdown. The
service water system is the backup to the normal supply of water
to the auxiliary feedwater system. 

Normal plant operations were not affected by these problems. The
utility took action to revise procedures and train reactor
operators to address the immediate safety concerns and modified
the auxiliary feedwater system to further correct these
problems. 

The two red findings were treated separately because they
occurred at different points in time. 

The special inspection was tasked with taking a comprehensive
look at principal aspects of plant operations to identify other
possible performance problems. It examined the adequacy of the
utilitys investigation and the corrective actions to address
both auxiliary feedwater pump issues. The results of the
inspection were discussed at a public meeting in Two Rivers,
Wisconsin, on December 16, 2003 (refer to press release issued
on December 9, 2003).   



  


 	Last revised Thursday, February 12, 2004 	   
*****************************************************************
 47 NRC: State of Utah: NRC Staff Draft Assessment of a Proposed
 
                         FR Doc 04-3060 
[Federal Register: February 12, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 29)] 
[Notices] [Page 7026-7029] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr12fe04-95]                         
 
Amendment to Agreement Between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and the State of Utah AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: First notice of a proposed amendment to the Agreement 
with the State of Utah; request for comment.
 
SUMMARY: By letter dated January 2, 2003, Governor Michael O.
 
Leavitt of Utah requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) enter into an amendment to the Agreement with 
Utah (the Agreement) as authorized by section 274 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act).
 
Under the proposed amendment to the Agreement, the Commission 
would relinquish, and Utah would assume, an additional portion of 
the Commission's regulatory authority exercised within the State. 
As required by the Act, NRC is publishing the proposed amendment 
to the Agreement for public comment. NRC is also publishing the 
summary of a draft assessment by the NRC staff of the portion of 
the regulatory program Utah would assume. Comments are requested 
on the proposed amendment to the Agreement and the staff's draft 
assessment, which finds the program to be adequate to protect 
public health and safety and compatible with NRC's program for 
regulation of 11e.(2) byproduct material.
 
The proposed amendment to the Agreement would release (exempt) 
persons who possess or use certain radioactive materials in Utah 
from portions of the Commission's regulatory authority. The Act 
requires that NRC publish those exemptions. Notice is hereby 
given that the pertinent exemptions have been previously 
published in the Federal Register and are codified in the 
Commission's regulations as 10 CFR part 150.
 
 
DATES: The comment period expires March 15, 2004. Comments 
received after this date will be considered if it is practical to 
do so, but the Commission cannot assure consideration of comments 
received after the expiration date.
 
 
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following 
methods. Please include the following phrase, Utah Amendment, in 
the subject line of your comments. Comments will be made 
available to the public in their entirety. Personal information 
will not be removed from your comments.
 
Mail comments to: Michael T. Lesar, Chief, Rules and Directives 
Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
 
E-mail comments to: NRCREP@nrc.gov. Fax comments to: Chief, Rules 
and Directives Branch, at (301) 415- 5144.
 
Publicly available documents related to this notice, including 
public comments received, may be viewed electronically on the 
public computers located at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), 
O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland.
 
The PDR reproduction contractor will copy documents for a fee.
 
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are also available electronically at the NRC's 
Electronic Reading Room at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, the 
public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document Access 
and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image 
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to 
ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located 
in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference 
staff at 1- 800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by e-mail to 
pdr@nrc.gov. Documents available in ADAMS include: The request 
for an amended Agreement by the Governor of Utah including all 
information and documentation submitted in support of the request 
(ML030280380); NRC comments on the request (ML031810623), Utah's 
response to NRC comments (ML032060090); Utah's additional 
clarification (ML033640565), and the full text of the NRC Staff 
Draft Assessment (ML040370585).
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis M. Sollenberger, Office 
of State and Tribal Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001. Telephone (301) 415-2819 or e-mail 
DMS4@nrc.gov.
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Since section 274 of the Act was added 
in 1959, the Commission has entered into Agreements with 33 
States.
 
The Agreement States currently regulate approximately 16,850 
material licenses, while NRC regulates approximately 4550 
licenses. NRC periodically reviews the performance of the 
Agreement States to assure compliance with the provisions of 
section 274. Under the proposed amendment to the Agreement, four 
NRC licenses will transfer to Utah.
 
Section 274e requires that the terms of the proposed amendment to 
the Agreement be published in the Federal Register for public 
comment once each week for four consecutive weeks. This first 
notice is being published in fulfillment of the requirement.
 
I. Background (a) Section 274d of the Act provides the mechanism 
for a State to assume regulatory authority from the NRC over
 
[[Page 7027]] certain radioactive materials \1\ and activities 
that involve use of the materials.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- \1\ The radioactive materials are: (a) Byproduct 
materials as defined in section 11e.(1) of the Act; (b) byproduct 
materials as defined in section 11e.(2) of the Act; (c) source 
materials as defined in section 11z. of the Act; and (d) special 
nuclear materials as defined in section 11aa. of the Act, 
restricted to quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass.
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------- In a letter dated January 2, 2003, Governor Leavitt 
certified that the State of Utah has a program for the control of 
radiation hazards that is adequate to protect public health and 
safety within Utah for the materials and activities specified in 
the proposed amendment to the Agreement, and that the State 
desires to assume regulatory responsibility for these materials 
and activities. The radioactive materials and activities (which 
together are usually referred to as the ``categories of 
materials'') which the State of Utah requests authority over are: 
the possession and use of byproduct material as defined in 
section 11e.(2) of the Act and the facilities that generate such 
material (uranium mill tailings and uranium mills). Included with 
the letter was the text of the proposed amendment to the 
Agreement, which has been edited and is shown in Appendix A to 
this notice.
 
(b) The proposed amendment to the Agreement modifies the articles 
of the Agreement that: Specify the materials and activities over 
which authority is transferred; Specify the activities over which 
the Commission will retain regulatory authority; and Specify the 
effective date of the proposed Agreement.
 
The Commission reserves the option to modify the terms of the 
proposed amendment to the Agreement in response to comments, to 
correct errors, and to make editorial changes. The final text of 
the amendment to the Agreement, with the effective date, will be 
published after the amendment to the Agreement is approved by the 
Commission and signed by the Chairman of the Commission and the 
Governor of Utah.
 
(c) Utah currently regulates all radioactive materials covered 
under the Act, except for conducting sealed source and device 
evaluations which will remain under NRC jurisdiction, and the 
possession and use of 11e.(2) byproduct material, which would be 
assumed by Utah under the proposed amendment to their Agreement. 
Section 19-3-113 of the Utah code provides the authority for the 
Governor to enter into an Agreement with the Commission. Section 
19-3- 113 also contains provisions for the orderly transfer of 
regulatory authority over affected licensees from NRC to the 
State. After the effective date of the Agreement, licenses issued 
by NRC would continue in effect as Utah licenses until the 
licenses expire or are replaced by State issued licenses. The 
regulatory program including 11e.(2) byproduct materials is 
authorized by law in section 19-3-104.
 
(d) The NRC staff draft assessment finds that the Utah program is 
adequate to protect public health and safety, and is compatible 
with the NRC program for the regulation of 11e.(2) byproduct 
material and the facilities that generate such material.
 
II. Summary of the NRC Staff Draft Assessment of the Utah Program 
for the Control of 11e.(2) Byproduct Materials The NRC staff has 
examined Utah's request for an amendment to the Agreement with 
respect to the ability of the Utah radiation control program to 
regulate 11e.(2) byproduct material. The examination was based on 
the Commission's policy statement ``Criteria for Guidance of 
States and NRC in Discontinuance of NRC Regulatory Authority and 
Assumption Thereof by States Through Agreement,'' referred to 
herein as the ``NRC criteria'' (46 FR 7540, January 23, 1981, as 
amended by policy statements published at 46 FR 36969, July 16, 
1981, and at 48 FR 33376, July 21, 1983).
 
(a) Organization and Personnel. The 11e.(2) byproduct material 
program will be located within the existing Division of Radiation 
Control (Program) of the Utah Department of Environmental 
Quality. The Program will be responsible for all regulatory 
activities related to the proposed amendment to the Agreement.
 
The Program performed an analysis of the expected Program 
workload under the proposed amendment to the Agreement and 
determined that a level of three technical and one administrative 
staff would be needed to implement the 11e.(2) byproduct material 
authority. The distribution of the qualifications of the 
individual technical staff members will be balanced with the 
technical expertise needed for 11e.(2) byproduct material (i.e., 
health physics, hydrology, engineering). The Program currently 
has and intends to initially use existing qualified staff to 
conduct the 11e.(2) byproduct materials activities. At least two 
staff are qualified in each of the three technical areas 
identified in the Criteria: health physics, engineering, and 
hydrology.
 
The educational requirements for the 11e.(2) byproduct material 
program staff members are specified in the Utah State personnel 
position descriptions, and meet the NRC criteria with respect to 
formal education or combined education and experience 
requirements. All current staff members hold at least bachelor's 
degrees in physical or life sciences, or have a combination of 
education and experience at least equivalent to a bachelor's 
degree. Several staff members hold advanced degrees, and all 
staff members have had additional training plus working 
experience in radiation protection.
 
The Program also plans to hire three new staff into the program 
to supplement the existing staff (two professional/technical and 
one administrative). New staff hired into the Program will be 
qualified in accordance with the Program's training and 
qualification procedure to function in the areas of 
responsibility to which the individual is assigned.
 
Based on the NRC staff review of the State's need analysis, 
current staff qualifications, and the current staff assignments 
for the 11e.(2) byproduct material program, the NRC staff 
concludes that Utah will have an adequate number of qualified 
staff assigned to regulate the 11e.(2) byproduct material 
workload of the Program under the terms of the amendment to the 
Agreement.
 
(b) Legislation and Regulations. The Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality (Department) is designated by law to be the 
implementing agency. The law establishes a Radiation Control 
Board (Board) that has the authority to issue regulations and has 
delegated the authority to the Executive Secretary the authority 
to issue licenses, issue orders, conduct inspections, and to 
enforce compliance with regulations, license conditions, and 
orders. The Executive Secretary is the director of the Division 
of Radiation Control in the Department. Licensees are required to 
provide access to inspectors. The law requires the Board to adopt 
rules that are compatible with equivalent NRC regulations and 
that are equally stringent. Utah has adopted R313-24 Utah 
Administrative Code that incorporates NRC uranium milling 
regulations by reference, with a few exceptions, and other 
regulatory changes needed for the 11e.(2) byproduct material 
program. The NRC staff reviewed and forwarded comments on these 
regulations to the Utah staff. The final regulations were sent to 
NRC for review. The NRC staff review verified that, with the one 
exception of the alternative groundwater standards, the Utah 
rules contain all of the provisions that are necessary in order 
to be compatible with the regulations of
 
[[Page 7028]] the NRC on the effective date of the Agreement 
between the State and the Commission. The alternative groundwater 
standards were addressed in a separate Commission action (see 68 
FR 51516, August 27, 2003, and 68 FR 60885, October 24, 2003) and 
will be resolved prior to the Commission's final approval of an 
amendment to the Agreement with Utah. The NRC staff also 
concludes that Utah will not attempt to enforce regulatory 
matters reserved to the Commission.
 
(c) Evaluation of License Applications. Utah has adopted 
regulations compatible with the NRC regulations that specify the 
requirements which a person must meet in order to get a license 
to possess or use 11e.(2) byproduct material. Utah will use its 
general licensing procedures, along with the additional 
requirements in R313-24 specific to 11e.(2) byproduct material. 
Utah will use the NRC regulatory guides as guidance in conducting 
its licensing reviews.
 
(d) Inspections and Enforcement. The Utah radiation control 
program has adopted a schedule providing for the inspection of 
licensees as frequently as the inspection schedule used by NRC. 
The Program has adopted procedures for the conduct of 
inspections, the reporting of inspection findings, and the 
reporting of inspection results to the licensees. The Program has 
also adopted, by rule based on the Utah Revised Statutes, 
procedures for the enforcement of regulatory requirements.
 
(e) Regulatory Administration. The Utah Department of
Environmental 
Quality is bound by requirements specified in State law for
rulemaking, 
issuing licenses, and taking enforcement actions. The Program
has also 
adopted administrative procedures to assure fair and impartial 
treatment of license applicants. Utah law prescribes standards
of 
ethical conduct for State employees.
 
(f) Cooperation with Other Agencies. Utah law deems the
holder of 
an NRC license on the effective date of the proposed Agreement
to 
possess a like license issued by Utah. The law provides that
these 
former NRC licenses will expire either 90 days after receipt
from the 
Department of a notice of expiration of such license or on the
date of 
expiration specified in the NRC license, whichever is earlier.
 
Utah 
also provides for ``timely renewal.'' This provision affords the 
continuance of licenses for which an application for renewal has
been 
filed more than 30 days prior to the date of expiration of the
license. 
NRC licenses transferred while in timely renewal are included
under the 
continuation provision.
 
III. Staff Conclusion
Subsection 274d of the Act provides that the Commission
shall enter 
into an agreement under subsection 274b with any State if:
(a) The Governor of the State certifies that the State has a 
program for the control of radiation hazards adequate to protect
public 
health and safety with respect to the agreement materials within
the 
State, and that the State desires to assume regulatory
responsibility 
for the agreement materials; and
(b) The Commission finds that the State program is in
accordance 
with the requirements of subsection 274o, and in all other
respects 
compatible with the Commission's program for the regulation of 
materials, and that the State program is adequate to protect
public 
health and safety with respect to the materials covered by the
proposed 
Agreement.
 
On the basis of its draft assessment, the NRC staff
concludes that 
the State of Utah meets the requirements of the Act. The State's 
program, as defined by its statutes, regulations, personnel,
licensing, 
inspection, and administrative procedures, is compatible with
the 
program of the Commission and adequate to protect public health
and 
safety with respect to the materials covered by the proposed
amendment 
to the Agreement.
 
NRC will continue the formal processing of the proposed
amendment 
to the Agreement which includes publication of this Notice once
a week 
for four consecutive weeks for public review and comment.
 
Dated in Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of February, 2004.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Paul H. Lohaus,
Director, Office of State and Tribal Programs.
 
Appendix A--Amendment to Agreement Between the United States
Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and the State of Utah for Discontinuance
of 
Certain Commission Regulatory Authority and Responsibility
Within the 
State Pursuant to Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, as
Amended
Whereas, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission) entered into an 
Agreement on March 29, 1984 (hereinafter referred to the
Agreement 
of March 29, 1984) with the State of Utah under section 274 of
the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (hereafter referred to the 
Act) which became effective on April 1, 1984, providing for 
discontinuance of the regulatory authority of the Commission
within 
the State under chapters 6, 7, and 8 and section 161 of the Act
with 
respect to byproduct materials as defined in section 11e.(1) of
the 
Act, source materials, and special nuclear materials in
quantities 
not sufficient to form a critical mass; and
Whereas, the Commission entered into an amendment to the 
Agreement of March 29, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Agreement of March 29, 1984, as amended) pursuant to the Act 
providing for discontinuance of regulatory authority of the 
Commission with respect to the land disposal of source,
byproduct, 
and special nuclear material received from other persons which 
became effective on May 9, 1990; and
Whereas, the Governor requested, and the Commission agreed,
that 
the Commission reassert Commission authority for the evaluation
of 
radiation safety information for sealed sources or devices 
containing byproduct, source or special nuclear materials and
the 
registration of the sealed sources or devices for distribution,
as 
provided for in regulations or orders of the Commission; and
Whereas, the Governor of the State of Utah is authorized
under 
Utah Code Annotated 19-3-113 to enter into this amendment to the 
Agreement of March 29, 1984, as amended, between the Commission
and 
the State of Utah; and
Whereas, the Governor of the State of Utah has requested
this 
amendment in accordance with section 274 of the Act by
certifying on 
January 2, 2003, that the State of Utah has a program for the 
control of radiological and non-radiological hazards adequate to 
protect the public health and safety and the environment with 
respect to byproduct material as defined in section 11e.(2) of
the 
Act and facilities that generate this material and that the
State 
desires to assume regulatory responsibility for such material;
and
Whereas, the Commission found on [date] that the program of
the 
State for the regulation of materials covered by this amendment
is 
in accordance with the requirements of the Act and in all other 
respects compatible with the Commission's program for the
regulation 
of byproduct material as defined in section 11e.(2) and is
adequate 
to protect public health and safety; and
Whereas, the State and the Commission recognize the
desirability 
and importance of cooperation between the Commission and the
State 
in the formulation of standards for protection against hazards
of 
radiation and in assuring that the State and the Commission
programs 
for protection against hazards of radiation will be coordinated
and 
compatible; and
Whereas, this amendment to the Agreement of March 29, 1984,
as 
amended, is entered into pursuant to the provisions of the Act.
 
Now, Therefore, it is hereby agreed between the Commission
and 
the Governor of the State, acting on behalf of the State, as 
follows:
Section 1. Article I of the Agreement of March 29, 1984, as 
amended, is amended by adding a new paragraph B and renumbering 
paragraphs B through D as C through E. Paragraph B will read as 
follows:
``B. Byproduct materials as defined in Section 11e.(2) of
the 
Act;''
 
[[Page 7029]]
Section 2. Article II of the Agreement of March 29, 1984, as 
amended, is amended by deleting paragraph E and inserting a new 
paragraph E to implement the reassertion of Commission authority 
over sealed sources and devices to read:
``E. The evaluation of radiation safety information on
sealed 
sources or devices containing byproduct, source, or special
nuclear 
materials and the registration of the sealed sources or devices
for 
distribution, as provided for in regulations or orders of the 
Commission.''
Section 3. Article II of the Agreement of March 29, 1984, as 
amended, is amended by numbering the current Article as A by
placing 
an A in front of the current Article language. The subsequent 
paragraphs A through E are renumbered as 1 through 5. After the 
current amended language, the following new section B is added
to 
read:
``B. Notwithstanding this Agreement, the Commission retains
the 
following authorities pertaining to byproduct material as
defined in 
Section 11e.(2) of the Act:
1. Prior to the termination of a State license for such 
byproduct material, or for any activity that resulted in the 
production of such material, the Commission shall have made a 
determination that all applicable standards and requirements 
pertaining to such material have been met;
2. The Commission reserves the authority to establish
minimum 
standards governing reclamation, long-term surveillance or 
maintenance, and ownership of such byproduct material and of
land 
used as a disposal site for such material. Such reserved
authority 
includes:
a. The authority to establish terms and conditions as the 
Commission determines necessary to assure that, prior to
termination 
of any license for such byproduct material, or for any activity
that 
results in the production of such material, the licensee shall 
comply with decontamination, decommissioning, and reclamation 
standards prescribed by the Commission; and with ownership 
requirements for such materials and its disposal site;
b. The authority to require that prior to termination of any 
license for such byproduct material or for any activity that
results 
in the production of such material, title to such byproduct
material 
and its disposal site be transferred to the United States or the 
State of Utah at the option of the State (provided such option
is 
exercised prior to termination of the license);
c. The authority to permit use of the surface or subsurface 
estates, or both, of the land transferred to the United States
or 
the State pursuant to 2.b. in this section in a manner
consistent 
with the provisions of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control 
Act of 1978, as amended, provided that the Commission determines 
that such use would not endanger public health, safety, welfare,
or 
the environment.
 
d. The authority to require, in the case of a license for
any 
activity that produces such byproduct material (which license
was in 
effect on November 8, 1981), transfer of land and material
pursuant 
to paragraph 2.b. in this section taking into consideration the 
status of such material and land and interests therein, and the 
ability of the licensee to transfer title and custody thereof to
the 
United States or the State;
e. The authority to require the Secretary of the Department
of 
Energy, other Federal agency, or State, whichever has custody of 
such byproduct material and its disposal site, to undertake such 
monitoring, maintenance, and emergency measures as are necessary
to 
protect public health and safety, and other actions as the 
Commission deems necessary; and
f. The authority to enter into arrangements as may be 
appropriate to assure Federal long-term surveillance or
maintenance 
of such byproduct material and its disposal site on land held in 
trust by the United States for any Indian Tribe or land owned by
an 
Indian Tribe and subject to a restriction against alienation
imposed 
by the United States.''
Section 4. Article IX of the 1984 Agreement, as amended, is 
renumbered as Article X and a new Article IX is inserted to read:
``Article IX
In the licensing and regulation of byproduct material as
defined 
in Section 11e.(2) of the Act, or of any activity which results
in 
the production of such byproduct material, the State shall
comply 
with the provisions of Section 274o of the Act. If in such
licensing 
and regulation, the State requires financial surety arrangements
for 
reclamation and or long-term surveillance and maintenance of
such 
byproduct material:
A. The total amount of funds the State collects for such 
purposes shall be transferred to the United States if custody of 
such byproduct material and its disposal site is transferred to
the 
United States upon termination of the State license for such 
byproduct material or any activity that results in the
production of 
such byproduct material. Such funds include, but are not limited
to, 
sums collected for long-term surveillance or maintenance. Such
funds 
do not, however, include monies held as surety where no default
has 
occurred and the reclamation or other bonded activity has been 
performed; and
B. Such surety or other financial requirements must be 
sufficient to ensure compliance with those standards established
by 
the Commission pertaining to bonds, sureties, and financial 
arrangements to ensure adequate reclamation and long-term
management 
of such byproduct material and its disposal site.''
This amendment shall become effective on [date] and shall
remain 
in effect unless and until such time as it is terminated
pursuant to 
Article VIII of the Agreement of March 29, 1984, as amended.
 
Done in Rockville, Maryland, in triplicate, this [day] day
of 
[month, year].
 
For the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------
[insert Chairman's name], Chairman.
 
Done in Salt Lake City, Utah, in triplicate, this [day] day
of 
[month, year].
 
For the State of Utah.
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
------
Olene S. Walker, Governor.
[FR Doc. 04-3060 Filed 2-11-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 48 BBC: New Iran nuclear designs 'found' 
 
  Last Updated: Thursday, 12 February, 2004
 
[Satellite image of nuclear power reactor in Bushehr, Iran. 
Photo: Digitalglobe]                              

Tehran denies it has a nuclear weapons programme                                                               

UN nuclear inspectors in Iran have reportedly discovered 
undeclared designs for a key machine in the production of 
bomb-grade material. 

The uranium centrifuge designs resemble a European model, Western 
diplomats told Reuters news agency. 

A diplomat told the BBC that the news did not help Iran's 
credibility. 

The US has again accused Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons, while 
the Islamic republic insists its nuclear programme is for 
civilian purposes. 

"There's no doubt in our mind that Iran continues to pursue a 
nuclear weapons programme," US Under-secretary of State John 
Bolton told a security conference in Berlin. 

"They have not yet, in our judgment, complied even with the 
commitments they made in October to suspend their uranium 
enrichment activities." 

On Wednesday, US President George W Bush said international 
treaties intended to regulate the development of nuclear power 
must be strengthened to stop countries producing material which 
could be used for weapons. 

North Korea and Iran had both done this by exploiting loopholes 
allowing the enrichment and reprocessing of uranium for peaceful 
purposes, he said - and this had to be stopped. 

IAEA under pressure 

The diplomats who spoke to Reuters in Vienna - home of the UN's 
International Atomic Energy Agency - said IAEA inspectors had 
uncovered centrifuge blueprints. 

Last November Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment 
programme and permit tougher IAEA inspections of its nuclear 
facilities. 

An IAEA report the same month said Iran had admitted producing 
high-grade plutonium for peaceful purposes but the organisation 
concluded there was no evidence of a weapons programme. 

In December, Tehran signed a UN agreement which allowed tougher 
inspections of its nuclear industry. 

President Bush criticised the IAEA's methods, saying countries 
like Iran, who are suspected of breaking the rules, should not be 
allowed to sit on the committees that enforce them. 

The IAEA's head, Mohamed ElBaradei, has said he agrees that quick 
action is needed to stop terrorists getting hold of nuclear 
weapons. 

But, in an article for the New York Times newspaper, he said 
nuclear powers such as the US, along with Britain, France, Russia 
and China, should themselves "move towards disarmament". 
*****************************************************************
 49 WSJ Opinion: Assure stable energy with nuclear power 

10:49 PM 2/11/04 

Wisconsin's fast-growing appetite for power clearly demands a mix 
of new energy sources and improved power lines. Several companies 
plan new coal-burning and natural gas-fired plants, and a wind 
power farm is in the works, too. 

What's missing, for no good reason? Nuclear power. 

Wisconsin must stop ignoring this promising, clean and safe 
energy source. To that end, a legislative committee took an 
important step this week toward overturning the state's 20-year 
ban on new nuclear plants and streamlining the application 
process to build nuclear plants in Wisconsin. The Assembly Energy 
and Utilities Committee endorsement of a bill (AB 555) clears the 
way for a full Assembly vote. 

With the current legislative session racing toward adjournment in 
March, many lawmakers would like to see this admittedly 
controversial bill go quietly and quickly by the wayside. Bill 
sponsor state Rep. Michael Huebsch, R-West Salem, said he doesn't 
expect the measure to get through the full Assembly this 
legislative session, and the governor may veto it if it does. 

Such an outcome ill serves businesses and homeowners eager for a 
stable, long-term energy source. State politicians instead should 
eschew anti-nuclear politics that have held sway for two decades, 
and ease the restrictive policies that have resulted. Wisconsin 
and the nation already depend on nuclear power for about a fifth 
of all electricity production. More than 100 nuclear reactors 
remain in operation today, with a stellar overall safety record. 
But most of these plants are aging. Our state and nation need a 
new generation of efficient and safe nuclear plants that will 
help reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil - and ensure that 
Wisconsin will be able to reliably supply energy needed to 
sustain and encourage economic growth. 

Opponents say nuclear power is too expensive and too dangerous.

But given rising energy prices, especially in natural gas, 
nuclear is looking more and more competitive. And there hasn't 
been a serious problem at a U.S. nuclear plant in 25 years. 
Nuclear plants are cleaner than the coal and gas plants that 
provide most of our power by discharging their waste into our 
air. Nuclear waste, on the other hand, can be tucked away inside 
a mountain. Opponents also say the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste 
disposal site may never be licensed because - opponents claim - 
the Environmental Protection Agency's radiation standard for the 
site is inadequate. Guaranteeing safe storage for the next 10,000 
years isn't good enough for the anti-nuke crowd. 

The state Public Service Commission, which must approve 
construction of nuclear power plants, should stop making excuses 
meant to delay or derail the bill. Its objections could apply to 
any power plant application. Under the legislative measure, 
proposed nuclear plants would still be subject to the same 
approval requirements as conventional power plants. And all plant 
applications, not just nuclear, result in the hiring of 
consultants and yield other expenses. Huebsch might want to ease 
plant approval deadlines to meet PSC concerns, but not give in 
entirely. 

Future-focused states already are welcoming proposals for new 
reactors. Let's clear the way for clean, safe and reliable power 
by lifting Wisconsin's outdated ban on new sources of nuclear 
power. 
  
  Copyright � 2003 Wisconsin State Journal   
*****************************************************************
 50 SLO TRIB: Diablo Canyon adds $642 million annually to local economy, study says

San Luis Obispo Tribune:

 | 02/12/2004 | 

Projects at power plant in coming years will add $1 billion

 David Sneed The Tribune

AVILA BEACH - Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant contributes $642 
million each year to the economy of San Luis Obispo County. 

This is the main conclusion of a study released Wednesday of the 
economic impacts of the plant. The study also found that several 
projects at the plant, involving replacing large equipment, will 
contribute an additional $1 billion over the next seven years. 

"This is the first look at Diablo Canyon from an economic 
standpoint," said David Oatley, the plant's general manager. 

The study was done by the plant owner, Pacific Gas and Electric 
Co., and the Nuclear Energy Institute, a lobbying group. The 
results were reviewed by the UCSB Economic Forecast Project. 

The study comes as PG&E is beginning the difficult process of 
getting state and county approval for its controversial proposal 
to build an above-ground storage facility for highly radioactive 
spent fuel at the plant. 

One of the purposes of the study is to counteract arguments by 
nuclear watchdog groups that it would be better to shut the plant 
down, Oatley said. 

"I think that if Diablo Canyon went away, it would be drastically 
felt," he said. 

The study looked at the direct impact of the plant in terms of 
its payroll and local property taxes as well as the so-called 
ripple effect of this money coming into the county, said Bill 
Watkins, executive director of the Economic Forecast Project. 

The plant adds economic stability to the community by accounting 
for 9 percent of the county's property valuation. Property taxes 
paid by PG&E go mostly to the county and schools, but they also 
help fund more than 150 special districts. 

The plant also employs 1,400 workers who, on average, earn 60 
percent more than the countywide average wage. Employment at the 
plant has increased in recent years by 150 from a low of 1,250. 

Last year, the plant hired 47 new security guards to comply with 
increased security precautions required by federal regulators 
since the 2001 terrorist attacks. 

"Diablo Canyon jobs are some of the best-paying jobs in San Luis 
Obispo County," Watkins said. 

The study concluded that the plant's economic contribution will 
increase over the next seven years as the utility undertakes 
three large capital improvement projects that will add another $1 
billion. These include: 

� The first phase of the plant's spent fuel storage facility that 
will cost $56 million. 

� Replacement of the plant's steam turbines during refueling 
outages in 2005 and 2006 at a cost of $110 million. 

� Replacement of the plant's steam generators in 2008 and 2009 at 
a cost of $706 million. 

In addition to increasing the plant's tax valuation, these 
improvements will employ hundreds of additional part-time 
workers. For example, replacement of the steam generators will 
employ 200 welders, Oatley said. 

Critics of nuclear power admit that nuclear plants contribute 
significantly to local economies, but point out that nuclear 
power comes with the problem of safely handling dangerous nuclear 
fuel. 

"The community needs to look at that fact that the plant 
continues to be a potential terrorist attack target and that they 
plan to put more waste out there in a seismically active area," 
said Rochelle Becker with the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace. 
"What would happen to the economy if there was just one leak?" 

David Sneed covers environmental issues for The Tribune. E-mail 
story ideas and comments to him at dsneed@thetribunenews.com.   

*****************************************************************
 51 Ohio News Network: Davis-Besse Asks To Restart Plant                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
Toledo February 12, 2004

Davis-Besse operators will try again today to persuade federal 
regulators that the plant is ready to reopen after nearly two 
years of repairs and inspections.
                                
  Akron-based FirstEnergy plans to tell the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission that the plant can run safely after being shut down 
because of an acid leak that went undetected for year.
                                
   It was the most extensive corrosion ever at a U.S. nuclear 
reactor.
                                 
   The utility also will get the results of an NRC operations 
inspection.
                                
  Those same inspectors said in December that they didn't think 
Davis-Besse was ready to reopen because a two-week inspection 
revealed numerous operator errors at the plant.
                                 
 FirstEnergy promised to review the problems and managers spent 
the next ten days retraining workers.
                                
  � Associated Press and Dispatch Productions, Inc., 2004. All 
                                
- A <b>Dispatch Broadcast Group
*****************************************************************
 52 NRC: Nebraska Public Power District; Notice of Consideration of 
 
                         FR Doc E4-264 
[Federal Register: February 12, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 29)] 
[Notices] [Page 7023-7025] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr12fe04-93]                         
 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity 
for a Hearing The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility 
Operating License No. DPR-46 issued to Nebraska Public Power 
District (NPPD or the licensee) for operation of the Cooper 
Nuclear Station (CNS) located in Nemaha County, NE.
 
The proposed amendment would revise the CNS Technical 
Specifications (TSs) by adding a temporary note to allow a 
one-time extension of a limited number of TS Surveillance 
Requirements (SRs). The temporary note states that the next 
required performance of the SR may be delayed until the current 
cycle refueling outage, but no later than February 2, 2005, and 
it expires upon startup from the refueling outage. With the 
exception of one SR, the period of additional time requested 
occurs during the next planned refueling outage.
 
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations.
 
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. 
Under the Commission's regulations in title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Sec. 50.92, this means that 
operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed 
amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; 
or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 
CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below: 1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated? The requested action is a one-time extension of the 
performance of a limited number of TS SRs. The performance of 
these surveillances, or the failure to perform these 
surveillances, is not a precursor to an accident. Performing 
these surveillances or failing to perform these surveillances 
does not affect the probability of an accident. Therefore, the 
proposed delay in performance of the SRs in this amendment 
request does not increase the probability of an accident 
previously evaluated.
 
In general a delay in performing these surveillances does not 
result in a system being unable to perform its required function. 
In the case of this one-time extension request the relatively 
short period of additional time that the systems and components 
will be in service prior to the next performance of the SRs 
associated with this amendment request will not impact the 
ability of those systems to operate. Therefore, the systems 
required to mitigate accidents will remain capable of performing 
their required function. Additionally, the more frequent TS 
channel functional tests and surveillances performed on the 
systems associated with the requested surveillance extensions 
provide assurance that these systems are capable of performing 
their functions. No new failures are introduced as a result of 
this action and the consequences remain consistent with 
previously evaluated accidents. Therefore, the proposed delay in 
performance of the SRs in this amendment request does not involve 
a significant increase in the consequences of an accident.
 
Based on the above NPPD concludes that the proposed changes do 
not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
 
2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
 
[[Page 7024]] The requested action is a one-time extension of the 
performance of a limited number of TS SRs. This action does not 
involve the addition of any new plant structure, system, or 
component (SSC), a modification in any existing SSC, nor a change 
in how any existing SSC is operated.
 
Based on the above NPPD concludes that the proposed changes do 
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any previously evaluated.
 
3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety? The proposed change is a one-time extension of 
the performance of a limited number of TS SRs. Extending these 
SRs does not involve a modification of any TS Limiting Conditions 
for Operation. Extending these SRs does not involve a change to 
any limit on accident consequences specified in the license or 
regulations. Extending these SRs does not involve a change to how 
accidents are mitigated or a significant increase in the 
consequences of an accident. Extending these SRs does not involve 
a change in a methodology used to evaluate consequences of an 
accident.
 
Extending these SRs does not involve a change in any operating 
procedure or process.
 
The instrumentation and components exhibit reliable operation 
based on the three most recent performances of the 18-month SRs 
being successful, and the successful performance of related SRs 
with a shorter surveillance interval.
 
Based on the minimal additional period of time that the systems 
and components will be in service before the surveillances are 
next performed, as well as the fact that surveillances are 
typically successful when performed, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the margins of safety associated with these SRs are not 
affected by the requested extension.
 
Based on the above NPPD concludes that the proposed changes do 
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
 
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to 
determine that the amendment request involves no significant 
hazards consideration.
 
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the 
date of publication of this notice will be considered in making 
any final determination.
 
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should 
circumstances change during the notice period such that failure 
to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or 
shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license 
amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, 
provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments 
received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish 
in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for 
opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects 
that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
 
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page 
number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal 
workdays. Documents may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at 
the NRC's Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 
Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), 
Rockville, Maryland.
 
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
 
By March 15, 2004, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected 
by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in 
the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a 
petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a 
petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with 
the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing 
Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2.
 
Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714, 
which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, 
located at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland, or electronically on the Internet at 
the NRC Web site 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If there are 
problems in accessing the document, contact the Public Document 
Room Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, (301) 415-4737, or by 
e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. If a request for a hearing or petition for 
leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or 
an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the 
Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
 
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner 
in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the 
results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically 
explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with 
particular reference to the following factors: (1) The nature of 
the petitioner's right under the Act to be made party to the 
proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) 
the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also 
identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the 
proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting 
leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing 
conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended 
petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described 
above.
 
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement 
to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the 
contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each 
contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of 
law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the 
contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner 
intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The 
petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources 
and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the 
petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert 
opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show 
that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters 
within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The 
contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the 
petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a 
supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at 
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a 
party.
 
 
[[Page 7025]] Those permitted to intervene become parties to the 
proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting 
leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully 
in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to 
present evidence and cross- examine witnesses.
 
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when 
the hearing is held.
 
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue 
the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding 
the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place 
after issuance of the amendment.
 
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take 
place before the issuance of any amendment.
 
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the 
Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White 
Flint North, Public File Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland, by the above date. Because of the 
continuing disruptions in delivery of mail to United States 
Government offices, it is requested that petitions for leave to 
intervene and requests for hearing be transmitted to the 
Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile 
transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to 
hearingdocket@nrc.gov. A copy of the petition for leave to 
intervene and request for hearing should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and because of continuing 
disruptions in delivery of mail to United States Government 
offices, it is requested that copies be transmitted either by 
means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to 
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and 
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to Mr. John 
R. McPhail, Nebraska Public Power District, Post Office Box 499, 
Columbus, NE 68602-0499, attorney for the licensee.
 
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing 
will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, 
the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be 
granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 
2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d). For further details with respect 
to this action, see the application for amendment dated January 
30, 2004, which is available for public inspection at the 
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area O1 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the 
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) 
Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do 
not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing 
the documents located in ADAMS, should contact the NRC PDR 
Reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th 
day of February, 2004.
 
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Michelle C. Honcharik, Project Manager, Section I, Project 
Directorate IV, Division of Licensing Project Management, Office 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
 
[FR Doc. E4-264 Filed 2-11-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 53 Prague Post: Plant neighbors seek aid      

 Officials cite costs of living in nuclear facilities' shadows 

  Towns near nuclear power plants such as south Bohemia's
Temelin are requesting state subsidies for their proximity to
the structures.   

By Frantisek Bouc 
Staff Writer, The Prague Post The Prague Post -->
(February 12, 2004)

 Namest nad Oslavou Mayor Vladimir Merka had a gift ready for 
Vladimir Spidla when the prime minister visited the south 
Moravian town recently: iodine tablets and emergency evacuation 
instructions. 

In a town located about 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the 
Dukovany nuclear power plant, the tokens came with a clear 
message about the need for state subsidies for towns in such 
plants' security zones. 

Last September officials from Namest nad Oslavou and other towns 
located within 20 kilometers of Dukovany and the Temelin nuclear 
facility in southern Bohemia went to the Industry and Trade 
Ministry seeking compensation for their proximity to the plants. 
Under their proposal, 175 municipalities in the security zones 
would share around 200 million Kc ($7.7 million) annually. Merka 
said he decided to use the opportunity of Spidla's visit to make 
his unusually propped pitch for the plan. 

"I donated the prime minister iodine tablets and a copy of 
emergency instructions that authorities in the region distribute 
among local residents in order to instruct them what to do in the 
event of a nuclear accident," the mayor said. "It was not an 
attempt for some provocation in any way and I told that to Mr. 
Spidla beforehand. ... It was just to remind him of being in a 
special location -- in a safety zone of a nuclear power plant." 


Faith in safety 

According to Pavel Pittermann, spokesman for the State Office of 
Nuclear Safety, there's nothing unsafe about the safety zones. 
"From the point of view of radiation and other nuclear-security 
risks, there are no reasons to pay subsidies to those locations," 
he said, asserting that security measures at the Czech plants are 
among the best in the world. 

But Merka said it is not the threat of a meltdown, terrorist act 
or other nuclear emergency that prompted local officials to seek 
state aid. He said they have faith in the plants safety and 
security precautions. 


  NUCLEAR NATION 

Towns say the Dukovany and Temelin plants burden budgets
										   
  										   


"We've got nothing against nuclear energy. We just do not want to 
be [among] the poorest" regions in the country, Merka said. "In 
this location, around one-fourth of overall electricity output 
has been produced, but we still belong to the poorest regions 
with a high rate of unemployment. We're convinced that if we 
provide a unique output, we shall receive some benefits from it." 

Merka said that living in the shadow of a nuclear plant puts a 
burden on town budgets. "Additional cost for municipalities 
result from the need to provide public loudspeakers in streets, 
having backup energy sources ready in the event of evacuation and 
also distributing leaflets with emergency instructions to 
people," he said. Such added costs are even more difficult in 
view of his region's high unemployment, which dampens tax revenue 
and limits funds for developing towns' infrastructure. 

A decade ago energy provider CEZ, which operates the Dukovany and 
Temelin plants, helped create a good image for nuclear power due 
to its generous assistance for the neighboring towns, Merka said. 

"In the early '90s, CEZ was quite supportive of the development 
of the region and invested some 100 million Kc per year into the 
infrastructure. That's why ... people began perceiving the plant 
positively," the mayor said. The areas around Dukovany even 
experienced an increase in population, he said. 

But in recent years, the company has cut development aid 
drastically, offering only 4 million Kc to the Dukovany region 
last year, Merka said. 

CEZ spokesman Ladislav Kriz, however, puts the annual aid figure 
to both areas at 10 million to 20 million Kc. While the aid will 
continue to flow, he said, a reduction from the heady days of the 
past decade was inevitable. 

"We paid [the municipalities] 100 million Kc a year in the early 
'90s in order to make up for the lack of investment into the 
regions in the '80s, when similar subsidies [in the communist 
regime] were out of the question," Kriz said. 


Money by law 

Spidla, during his Namest nad Oslavou visit, said subsidies to 
the municipalities in the vicinity of nuclear power plants could 
be stipulated by a new energy law now being prepared. Martin 
Pecina, deputy minister of industry and trade, said the law could 
be drafted within six months but was not on a particularly fast 
track. "Right now, we've got other priorities related to our 
[European Union] accession" May 1, he said. 

"We wanted to speed up the process in order to find good 
locations for nuclear waste depositories, but representatives of 
all the selected places rejected talking about them," Pecina 
said, referring to the outcry last year from four south Bohemian 
and four south Moravian towns the government had identified as 
possible dump sites. 

Kriz said CEZ would oppose a law that singled out nuclear 
neighbors. "We cannot focus only on the nuclear sector, because 
security risks exists in other sectors, such as the chemical one, 
too," he said. 

Merka, while backing subsidies, said he did not think the 
subsidies should be tied to nuclear plant production, as is done 
in Slovakia, Hungary and Spain. "We don't want to push for 
increasing the price of energy," he said. "The 200 million Kc 
that we demand would be taken from useless promotion budgets and 
it would represent no more than one heller per kilowatt of 
electricity." � OPEN CONTRIBUTION -->

 Frantisek Bouc can be reached fbouc@praguepost.com
  
The Prague Post 					
*****************************************************************
 54 Newsday.com - DEP chief says changes needed at nuclear plant
 	 	 	
February 12, 2004, 6:12 AM EST

TRENTON, N.J. (AP) _ Deteriorating equipment at the Oyster Creek 
nuclear power plant must be replaced and security there enhanced 
before its operating license is renewed, the state's top 
environmental official has said. 

Problems found at the 34-year-old Lacey plant could warrant its 
closing when its license expires in 2009, DEP Commissioner 
Bradley M. Campbell said Wednesday. He said state officials have 
found that plant operators could fail to adequately inform 
residents about an accident there, and they are concerned about 
pipes and other components used in a system designed to cool 
steam used in the reactor process. 

"We have very serious concerns about the plant and particularly 
any anticipated effort to renew the license," Campbell told the 
Asbury Park Press of Neptune. Similar concerns have been raised 
in recent months by area residents and officials. 

Gina Scala, a spokeswoman for Exelon Nuclear, which operates the 
Ocean County plant, said the facility continues to meet strict 
federal security requirements. She also noted that Exelon spends 
$10 million each year to upgrade equipment, improve safety and 
increase efficiency. 

If Exelon decides to seek the 20-year license renewal, it must 
file the application by April or risk a shutdown if the request 
is still pending when the current operating license expires. 



Copyright � 2004, The Associated Press |  Article licensing and 
*****************************************************************
 55 [du-list] Fw: ICRP standards flawed
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:06:02 -0800

 
<x-flowed>

New evidence that official standards for radiation protection are not 
reliable for low level exposures (such as exposure to 
DU)---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Low Level Radiation Campaign email briefing

TV researcher in United Kingdom finds new cluster of childhood cancers and
leukaemia far worse
than Seascale
Credibility of present radiation protection standards is weaker than ever.
Massive implications for litigation and nuclear regulation.

Twenty years ago a TV programme revealed the existence of the now notorious
cluster of
childhood leukaemia at Seascale near Sellafield, the British nuclear
reprocessing plant. This was
"Windscale the Nuclear Laundry", made by James Cutler of Yorkshire
Television. The ensuing
political storm resulted in the Black Committee, whose report recommended a
new committee -
COMARE (Committee on Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment)

Now a researcher from HTV has found another cluster around the radioactively
contaminated
Menai Strait, which lies between the island of Anglesey and north Wales. The
cluster is more
severe than Seascale and its statistical strength is far greater. Like YTV,
HTV has identified the
children involved and has interviewed them and their parents in a
documentary which was
broadcast on the Welsh language channel S4C on 10th February.

In the seaside town of Caernarfon leukaemia in the  0 - 14 year old age
group is 28 times the UK
national average (compared with Seascale's 12-fold excess).
The excess risk is not confined to the town of Caernarfon. In the 34 wards
surrounding the Menai
Strait there were 6 cases of leukaemia in the 0-4 age group between
2000-2003, a Relative Risk
(RR) of 7.8. Between 1996 and 2003 there were 9 cases of brain and spinal
cancer; RR = 5.4.
The cancers include 3 cases of the rare eye cancer retinoblastoma on
Anglesey. All are teenagers.
In Conwy (another seaside town) there are two further cases, both under ten
years old.
Caernarfon has a further case, a child born in 1999 and diagnosed at age 3.
Retinoblastoma has been associated with radioactivity since the Seascale
cluster of leukaemia is
accompanied by a 20-fold excess of retinoblastoma in children of Sellafield
workers.
The relative risks for retinoblastoma in the HTV research are uncertain
because so far we only
have one of the diagnosis dates, but a conservative calculation shows that
excess risks for the
area, compared with average rates, are between 5 and 15-times (this covers
separate calculations
for Anglesey and the whole of the county of Gwynedd).
The statistical significance of all the results is high, so this is not a
chance occurrence (for the
detail see the report itself on <http://www.llrc.org>www.llrc.org).

In political and legal terms this discovery is highly significant. COMARE
has investigated the
Seascale cluster and has repeatedly advised that on "current knowledge" of
the relationship
between radiation and leukaemia, the level of dose local people were exposed
to should not have
caused so many cases. However, the "current knowledge" which COMARE cited is
the models
used by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), and
these have been
widely criticised for being too reliant on studies of the effects of acute
high dose external
radiation.
In January 2002 the European Committee on Radiation Risk 
(<http://www.euradcom.org>www.euradcom.org)
published a
volume of advice which modifies ICRP models to correct for their
shortcomings in respect of low
dose exposure. The ECRR has addressed a number of types of exposure where
the main hazard is
internal. New weighting factors address specific hazards from isotopes with
sequential decay
pathways, hot and warm particles, isotopes which bind to DNA, and isotopes
which change their
chemical nature upon radioactive decay. Such exposures are radically
different from acute high
dose external radiation.
The final report of a new UK Government committee, the Committee Examining
Radiation Risk
from Internal Emitters (CERRIE), is expected this year. CERRIE was set up in
2001 in an
attempt to resolve the outstanding scientific disagreements in this area,
including newly described
effects such as genomic instability (or at least to explain the
disagreements in language which
policy makers can understand).

The discovery of the new cancer cluster in Wales therefore stands in the
context of large
uncertainty about the degree of health hazard from radioactivity in the
environment.
It also adds to the wide range of observable effects which ICRP cannot
account for; other
examples are the increase in childhood leukaemia at the time of above-ground
weapons testing in
the 1950s and '60s, the sharp peak in infant leukaemia after Chernobyl, many
localised clusters
including Seascale itself, the other reprocessing plants and nuclear power
stations, and a wide
range of diseases following exposure of soldiers and civilians to depleted
Uranium dust.
This email briefing has been prepared for the many people around the world
who have particular
interests such as campaigning against the use of DU, or offering legal
advice to ex-service men
and women, or the decontamination of nuclear sites, or the decommissioning
of nuclear plant, or
the safe handling of low level wastes and recyclable materials. The basic
message is that the Menai
cluster is an extremely significant piece of evidence suggesting that it was
unwise for COMARE
to rely on  ICRP's advice to deny a causal link between radioactivity and
the Seascale cluster. If
ICRP is this seriously flawed it is useless for predicting the effects of
any low dose exposure
where people's bodies are put at risk of internal contamination. There are
massive implications for
litigation and many aspects of nuclear regulation.


Low Level Radiation Campaign
<mailto:bramhall@llrc.org>bramhall@llrc.org
+44 (0)1597 824771



To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to 
du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com.  In the body of the message type 
unsubscribe and send.


Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
ADVERTISEMENT
<http://rd.yahoo.com/SIG=12c72fbaf/M=267637.4521717.5694185.1261774/D=egroupweb/S=1705083269:HM/EXP=1076690826/A=1945638/R=0/*http://www.netflix.com/Default?mqso=60178383&partid=4521717>1d047f.jpg
1d04c1.jpg


----------
Yahoo! Groups Links
    * To visit your group on the web, go to:
    * 
<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/>http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/
    *
    * To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    * 
<mailto:du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe>du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com 

    *
    * Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the 
<http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>Yahoo! Terms of Service.

</x-flowed>


Attachment Converted: 1d047f.jpg: 00000001,23059f3a,00000000,00000000
Attachment Converted: 1d04c1.jpg: 00000001,23059f3b,00000000,00000000
*****************************************************************
 56 [du-list] Letter to Sen. Clinton re; DU
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:06:12 -0800

 
<x-flowed>

  Hi Tara,

Daschle's letter is great and Filner and Rodriguez are pressing for a GAO 
report!
I want any group to sign-on the Sen. Clinton's letter- I just need contact 
information.  We are going to send letters to the senators and then letters 
to the House Committees on Arms and Energy (to each member), so we can 
include non NY groups in that letter. I am including miltoxproj, and anyone 
you can get!!!! the more the merrier!
I don't know if I sent you the link for the 
letter...  <http://www.http//hvan.org/du.php>www.http//hvan.org/du.php


To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to 
du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com.  In the body of the message type 
unsubscribe and send.


Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
ADVERTISEMENT
<http://rd.yahoo.com/SIG=12c3c4cb7/M=267637.4521690.5694157.1261774/D=egroupweb/S=1705083269:HM/EXP=1076701819/A=1945637/R=0/*http://www.netflix.com/Default?mqso=60178397&partid=4521690>1d2c79.jpg
1d2cb7.jpg


----------
Yahoo! Groups Links
    * To visit your group on the web, go to:
    * 
<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/>http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/
    *
    * To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    * 
<mailto:du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe>du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com 

    *
    * Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the 
<http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>Yahoo! Terms of Service.

</x-flowed>


Attachment Converted: 1d2c79.jpg: 00000001,174c07b9,00000000,00000000
Attachment Converted: 1d2cb7.jpg: 00000001,174c07ba,00000000,00000000
*****************************************************************
 57 [du-list] (Fwd) Balkan Syndrome
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:05:55 -0800

 
<x-flowed>

------- Forwarded message follows -------
From:           	"Stefano Montanari"
<stefano.montanari29@tin.it>
To:             	<info@cadu.org.uk>
Subject:        	Balkan Syndrome
Date sent:      	Wed, 11 Feb 2004 15:02:28 +0100


Antonietta Morena Gatti is a physicist and bioengineer, and is
the founder and the director of the Laboratory of Biomaterials of
the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Italy). She is the
discoverer of the presence of micro- and nano-particles in
biological tissues and of their pathological effects. The European
Community appointed her Coordinator of the international
group in charge of the nanopathology study.

Stefano Montanari is a pharmacist and a scientific consultant. He
has collaborated with Dr Gatti for about 25 years.


THE SO-CALLED �BALKAN-SYNDROME�: A BIO-
ENGINEERING APPROACH

Dr Antonietta M. Gatti � Dr Stefano Montanari


It is a well-known fact, widely reported by media, that a non-
negligible number of veterans of the Gulf War (1990-91) showed
what according to medicine are mutually unrelated symptoms. Some
of those can be attributed to stress: headache, for example, or sleep
disturbance, or forgetfulness, or an impaired concentration. Other
symptoms like fatigue, muscle and joint pain, and shortness of breath
are somewhat harder to classify, but cancers, various and, in some
cases, extremely unusual diseases of the genitourinary system, an
increased incidence of birth defects among veterans� children and
disorders of the blood and the haemopoietic organs must be due to
causes that cannot be legitimately ascribed to stress. Other
pathologies Gulf War veterans are suffering from, like sudden death
and Lou Gehrig�s disease are under investigation as to their
meaningfulness.
But the problem is unfortunately wider and not limited to that group
of military population.
Very similar symptoms are being displayed by soldiers who served in
the former Yugoslavian territory during the so-called Balkan War,
made worse by an unusually high incidence of Hodgkin�s and non-
Hodgkin�s lymphomas. Staffers of humanitarian missions and
Yugoslavian residents as well are suffering from the same diseases.
Professor Edo Hasanbegovic, chief of the Paediatric Clinic of
Sarajevo, denounced how leukaemia is on the increase in children
throughout the Yugoslavian Federation, but mainly in children
coming from Velika, Kladusa and Buzim, towns located close to the
Croatian borderline.
An explanation to all that was offered when in March 2000 NATO
revealed that Depleted Uranium (DU) shells had been employed in
the Balkans and in 2001 traces of radioactivity were detected by the
United Nations Environment Protection agency not far from
Sarajevo, in a barracks at Han Pijesak and in two places inside a
factory in Hadzici.
It is a frequently observed fact that radioactivity is a triggering factor
to cancer, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki tought a painful lesson about
that. So, uranium was immediately seen as the obvious scapegoat to
blame.
For a better understanding, it is necessary to know that DU was used
to make a component of some shells used in that war, but
radioactivity played no role in that choice. High density and hardness
are the features that made those projectiles, called kinetic
penetrators, particularly fit for piercing even very thick armours. DU
is what is left over when most of the highly radioactive isotopes of
uranium are removed for use as nuclear fuel or nuclear weapons.
The DU used in armour-piercing munitions is also used in civilian
industry, primarily as ballast, for stabilizers in airplanes and boats.
As a matter of fact, uranium is a mixture of three isotopes: U235,
U234, and U238. When the content of U235 is below 0.711%, uranium is
classified as �depleted�, and the blend used in the Balkans contained
less than 0.2% of that isotope.
DU is approximately 40 percent less radioactive than natural
uranium and emits alpha and beta particles, and gamma rays. Alpha
particles can hardly pass through the skin, while beta particles are
blocked by most garments, and the amount of gamma rays, a form of
highly penetrating energy, emitted by DU is very low.
The radioactivity produced by those weapons is certainly not healthy,
but its full responsibility for such an unusual health situation looks at
least doubtful if observed from a scientific standpoint.
In addition to that, another piece of evidence is raising a further
doubt about the radioactive origin of the pathologies: A higher-than-
expected quantity of lymphomas and symptoms identical to those
suffered from by the Balkan War�s veterans was observed in Italian
soldiers who had never served in any theatre of war nor had ever
come near to radioactive weapons. The condition all those soldiers
shared was serving in firing grounds.
In the meantime, someone tried to blame the multiple vaccinations
soldiers underwent during the so-called Operation Desert Storm, but
without being able to give any scientific demonstration to that thesis.
As a matter of fact, in addition to the usual vaccines against tetanus-
diphtheria, hepatitis B, poliovirus, meningococcal, typhoid and
yellow fever, the American troops were treated with Botulinum
Pentavalent, unlicensed in the United States, intended to counteract
botulism.
Then they were treated with a vaccine against anthrax, a drug proven
to be teratogenic. In fact, women receiving it are warned not to have
children for at least three years.
Finally troops received Pyridostigmine bromide, not a vaccine, but a
pre-treatment against nerve agents. That drug, normally used for
myasthenia gravis, is not approved by the Food and Drug
Administration as a nerve gas antidote and its side effects are
potentially very dangerous.
But those medicines were administered to US troops only, while the
Gulf War Syndrome affected also civilians and soldiers of other
nationalities.
Thus, no answer was given to the question: why do people living in
theatres of war and soldiers working under particular conditions
contract those diseases with such an alarming frequency?
Our Laboratory of Biomaterials of the University of Modena and
Reggio Emilia (Italy) is engaged in checking bioptic and autoptic
samples coming from patients belonging in the classes described
above. It is an indisputable fact that all samples contain inorganic
micro- and nano-particles, while it may be interesting to observe that
none of them show any trace of uranium.
 >From the technical point of view, those very small fragments can be
detected by using an innovative technique of electronic microscopy
we developed and that has been already described in literature.
What we found were very small bits, sometimes agglomerated, of
simple or combined metals: Fe-Si, Cu-Cl-Zn, Si-Ti-Fe-Al, Si-Bi, Si-
Pb, Fe-Cu-Zn, Cr-Fe-Ni, Fe-Mn and, but just once, Zr alone.
The spherical shape, hollow in the larger sizes, of many particles
proves their formation under a very high temperature, a condition
compatible with that of the explosion of a DU shell.
DU projectiles hit very different targets, but specially buildings and
armaments like, for example, tanks, and when they do, the
temperature in the core of the explosion exceeds 3,000�C, which is
more than enough to have all solid matter sublime and, in some
cases, form new metal alloys. That gas expands over a large volume
of atmosphere, then, rapidly, the matter becomes solid again taking
the shape of very small spheres (down to 10-8 m diameter), stays
suspended in the air and is carried away over distances depending on
atmospheric conditions like wind, rain, snow and pressure. This
phenomenon was studied in 1977-78 at the US Air Force base of
Leglin (Fla).
After some time, all the air-borne particles fall slowly down and
settle on grass, vegetables, fruit or expanses of water where they
become inevitably a guest of food and drink to animals and men
alike. Even if that unwanted presence is known in advance � but very
often it is utterly ignored - getting rid completely of inorganic
particles can be very difficult. A good wash eliminates a great
quantity of debris from fruit or vegetables, but cauliflowers, for
example, cannot be cleaned thoroughly because of their rough
surface, while those particles that settle in the tissues of animals that
ate contaminated grass and men eat as meat can�t be taken away at
all.
Keeping in mind the well-known, even if never widely publicized,
phenomenon studied at Leglin and the new science of nano-
pathology, an explanation to the unanswered question becomes easy.
People present in firing grounds and in the theatres of war, and being
a soldier or a civilian makes no difference, breathe in micro- and
nano-particles while they are suspended in the air as an aerosol, then
eat and drink them along with vegetables and water.
We have amply demonstrated with our researches that once debris
that size (10-9 � 10-5 m) enter the body, be it via the digestive or the
respiratory system, they can easily negotiate the luminal tissues and
either be captured by the tissue itself which acts the way a filter
does, or be transported by the blood or the lymph until they end their
travel in some organ (for instance the kidneys and the liver). Lymph
nodes, for example, are the organs where lymphomas start and
develop and where, in all pathological cases checked, we found the
presence of inorganic particles. But also all the other pathologic
specimens we had the possibility to observe show clearly and without
any single exception the presence of debris.
It is important to underline that none of the particles we found is
biodegradable.
Just to give a further confirmation about the applicability of the
theory according to which the so-called Balkan Syndrome has an
environmental, nanopathological origin, particles found in the
diseased tissues of soldiers and civilians, and particles found in the
ground of the territories where the pathologies were contracted are
mutually compatible.
If no uranium was ever detected, that does not necessarily mean there
is none somewhere in the tissues of the patients. The fact is likely to
be due to its quantity, which is extremely scarce when compared with
the huge masses of the targets that sublime and that contain no such
element. It is also possible that uranium particles had been captured
by tissues but, probably because they did not reach a critical
threshold, did not trigger any disease and, as a consequence, we did
not have the chance to receive and study the samples.
In conclusion, DU�s responsibility is only indirect, and it is not its
radioactivity to blame, but the very high temperature that uranium
produces once the shells of which it is a component hit the mark.
It is then possible that the Balkan Syndrome has a multi-factorial
origin including radioactivity and vaccinations, but the main cause is
without any doubt a nanopathological one.

For further information about nanopathology
www.biomat.unimo.it/eng/nanopat.htm
------- End of forwarded message -------
******************************************************************************
***************
The Campaign Against Depleted Uranium, Bridge 5 Mill, 22a
Beswick Street,
Ancoats, Manchester, M4 7HR Tel./Fax.: +44 (0)161 273 8293
E-Mail info@cadu.org.uk     Website: http://www.cadu.org.uk

Affiliation costs to CADU are �8 a year unwaged/student and �10 a
year waged. For this you will receive campaigning materials and
CADU's quarterly newsletter. Our newsletter is also available free
of charge by E-Mail (send us a message with 'Subscribe CADU
News' as the subject). Please send your cheque draft or postal
order in � sterling to the address above.
******************************************************************************
***************


To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to 
du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com.  In the body of the message type 
unsubscribe and send.
Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
      http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
      du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
      http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
  

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 58 [du-list] quantity of DU used in Iraq
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:06:10 -0800

 
<x-flowed>
I am trying to find the actual source of claims that 2000 tons of DU was 
used in Iraq.

I see it referenced everywhere, but can't find any breakdown from an 
"official" source saying x tons from tanks, x tons from A-10's, and x tons 
from bunker busting bombs.

Can anyone please help?

Peace, Jonny




This email is intended only for the above named addressee(s). The 
information contained in this email may contain information which is 
confidential. The views expressed in this email are personal to the sender 
and do not in any way reflect the views of the company.

If you have received this email and you are not a named addressee, please 
contact the sender and then delete it from your system.


To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to 
du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com.  In the body of the message type 
unsubscribe and send.



----------
Yahoo! Groups Links
    * To visit your group on the web, go to:
    * 
<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/>http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/
    *
    * To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    * 
<mailto:du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe>du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com 

    *
    * Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the 
<http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>Yahoo! Terms of Service.

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 59 NRC: Search under Way for Radioactive Sources Missing from N.J. Site
 
News Release - Region I - 2004-00
 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Office of Public Affairs, Region I
  No. I-04-004   		        February 11, 2004   
  CONTACT:     Diane Screnci (610) 337-5330
 		Neil A. Sheehan (610) 337-5331   		   E-mail: opa1@nrc.gov  
  

Orange, N.J., construction site. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has sent inspectors to the site in response to the
loss of the sources, which was reported to the NRC on February
9. 

While the amount of radioactive material involved is not
significant, any individuals having direct contact with one or
both of the radioactive sources for a prolonged period of time
could potentially receive harmful amounts of radiation exposure.
The sources -- one holding 11 millicuries of cesium-137 and the
other holding 40 millicuries of americium-241 -- are less than
an inch in diameter. One is attached to the end of a shaft that
is inserted into the soil; the other source is short and
cylindrical. The Humboldt 5001 Series portable moisture density
gauge is used for various purposes, including measuring the
amount of moisture in soil. Measurements are made using the
device by projecting the radiation from the two sources into the
ground and then displaying the reflected radiation on a dial on
top of the gauge. 

A photo showing what the gauge and its parts look like can be
found at the bottom of this press release. 

Anyone with information regarding the whereabouts of the sources
is asked to contact the NRCs Headquarters Operations Center at
(301) 816-5100 at any time. It accepts collect calls. The NRC
also understands the company that owns the gauge, PMK Group,
Inc., is offering a reward for the sources. The company can be
reached at (908) 497-8900. 

The construction site is at the former Arcadian Gardens housing
project in East Orange. The site is bounded by Sussex Avenue to
the north, 9th Avenue to the south, 15th Street to the east and
Steuben Street to the west. At about noon on February 9, the
gauges operator left the area where the device was located.
When the operator returned at about 12:35 p.m., the crushed
remains of the gauge were found. However, most of the device
could not be found, most importantly the two radioactive
sources. 

On February 10, NRC inspectors performed surveys at the site
using radiation detectors. Meanwhile, workers at the site
removed soil in the area where the gauge was believed to have
been crushed. None of the searches yielded the sources. Also,
because two shipments of scrap metal were removed from the site
after the gauge was found to be damaged, the scrap yard where
the material was sent was contacted. The radiation monitors used
to check all incoming shipments did not detect any radioactive
material in recent shipments. 

The NRC will continue to review the event and assist with the
search for the missing sources. 

[Moisture Density Gauge]   



  


 	Last revised Thursday, February 12, 2004 	   
*****************************************************************
 60 Guardian Unlimited: U.N. Agency Eager to End

	 
	Thursday February 12, 2004 11:31 AM

	

By VANESSA GERA 

Associated Press Writer 

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - The head of the U.N. nuclear agency
demanded Thursday that the world's nuclear powers do more to
stop the spread of nuclear weapons, saying that he shares
President Bush's sense of urgency over the atomic black market. 

Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, called on the United States and the other
declared nuclear powers to relinquish their nuclear weapons as
part of a global effort to make it impossible for nuclear
weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists. 

``If the world does not change course, we risk
self-destruction,'' ElBaradei said in an op-ed piece published
Thursday in the New York Times. 

Bush argued in a speech Wednesday that international efforts to
combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction have been
neither broad nor effective enough and require tougher action
from all nations. 

``The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility
of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or
radiological or nuclear weapons,'' Bush said. 

Bush's remarks came after reports have surfaced of a clandestine
black market apparently headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who once
headed the nuclear program in Pakistan. 

Khan and middlemen in five countries allegedly supplied nuclear
technology and expertise to Iran - which denies running a
weapons program - and to Libya, which has owned up to having
weapons of mass destruction or programs to make them. 

Pakistani officials have also said Khan's network had supplied
North Korea. 

``I have the same concern and sense of urgency expressed by
President Bush to shore up the nonproliferation regime and
global security system,'' ElBaradei said in a brief statement
released by his headquarters in Vienna. 

However, Bush singled out the IAEA for criticism, calling for
the creation of a new agency committee to focus on safeguards
and verification and to ensure that nations comply with
international obligations. He also complained that nations such
as Iran, which has been under investigation for proliferation,
has been allowed to sit on the IAEA board of governors. 

The agency refused to comment directly on Bush's criticism and
referred instead to the op-ed piece. 

In the piece, ElBaradei suggested that the United States is
itself part of the problem of nuclear proliferation and urged
Washington and the five declared nuclear powers to fulfill their
obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to abandon
their nuclear weapons programs. 

``A fundamental part of the nonproliferation bargain is the
commitment of the five nuclear states recognized under the
nonproliferation treaty - Britain, China, France, Russia and the
United States - to move toward disarmament,'' ElBaradei wrote. 	 












Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004

Guardian Newspapers Limited
*****************************************************************
 61 NRC: Best Practices To Establish and Maintain a Safety Conscious Work 
 
                         FR Doc 04-3063 
[Federal Register: February 12, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 29)] 
[Notices] [Page 7025-7026] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr12fe04-94]                         
 
Environment; Request for Comments and Announcement of Public 
Meeting AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
ACTION: Request for comments and announcement of public meeting.
 
 
SUMMARY: The 1996 NRC Policy Statement, ``Freedom of Employees in 
the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of 
Retaliation,'' provides the agency's broad expectations with 
respect to licensees establishing and maintaining a Safety 
Conscious Work Environment (SCWE); that is, an environment in 
which employees are encouraged to raise safety concerns both to 
their own management and to the NRC without fear of retaliation. 
In a March 26, 2003 Staff Requirements Memorandum, the Commission 
directed the staff to develop further guidance, in consultation 
with stakeholders, that identifies ``best practices'' to 
encourage a SCWE. The NRC staff is now proceeding to develop that 
guidance.
 
As an initial step, the NRC will be holding a public workshop on 
February 19, 2004, at One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 
Pike, O- 1G16, Rockville, Maryland from 9 a.m.-4 p.m. to discuss 
multiple issues. These issues include: (1) The format such 
guidance should take; (2) Effective ways to encourage employees 
to raise safety concerns; (3) Effective processes to review and 
respond to concerns; (4) The scope of training on SCWE 
principles; (5) Tools to measure the health of the SCWE; (6) The 
role of the contractor; and, (7) The role of senior management in 
preventing claims of retaliation. To stimulate stakeholder's 
thinking and encourage a dialogue at the public meeting, the NRC 
has prepared for comment an outline of a ``Best Practices'' 
document. This document can be found on the NRC's Web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov by selecting What We Do, Allegations, and then 
Best Practices to Establish and Maintain a Safety Conscious Work 
Environment. This document is also available in ADAMS at 
ML040350487. In preparing this document, the staff reviewed the 
existing guidance provided in the 1996 Policy Statement, 
including the elements and attributes described therein of a 
healthy SCWE, and created a draft ``Best Practices'' outline that 
expands that guidance or adds new guidance where additional 
information would help describe best practices to meet the intent 
of each SCWE attribute.
 
The NRC's 1996 Policy Statement was directed to all employers, 
including licensees and their contractors, subject to NRC 
authority, and their employees. Hence, any further ``Best 
Practices'' guidance will also apply to this broad audience. It 
is important to note that the best practices outlined in this 
document may not be practical or necessary for all employers. 
Rather, the purpose of this guidance is to outline what has 
worked best at some larger licensees to maintain or improve a 
work environment and ensure its employees feel free to raise 
safety concerns.
 
 
DATES: The workshop will be held on February 19, 2004. The 
comment period expires on March 19, 2004.
 
 
ADDRESSES: The workshop will be held on One White Flint North, 
11555 Rockville Pike, O-1G16, Rockville, Maryland from 9 a.m.-4 
p.m. You may submit comments by any of the following methods. 
Comments submitted in writing or in electronic format will be 
made available to the public in their entirety on the NRC Web
 
[[Page 7026]] site. Personal information will not be removed from 
your comments. Mail comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives 
Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001. You may comment at NRC's Web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/regulatory/allegations/practices-ou 
tline.html , or by e-mail to: NRCREP@nrc.gov. Hand deliver 
comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 
7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays. Fax comments to: 
Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission at (301) 415- 5144. Publicly available documents 
related to this action may be viewed electronically on the public 
computers located at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), O1F21, 
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. 
The PDR reproduction contractor will copy documents for a fee. 
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's 
Electronic Reading Room at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, the 
public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access 
and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image 
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to 
ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the document located 
in ADAMS, contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397- 4209, 
301-415-4737, or e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT: Lisamarie Jarriel, Agency Allegations Advisor, Office of 
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, (301) 415-8529, e-mail LLJ@nrc.gov. Dated at 
Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of February, 2004.
 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
 
Frank J. Congel, Director, Office of Enforcement.
 
[FR Doc. 04-3063 Filed 2-9-04; 11:16 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 62 BBC: On the trail of the black market bombs 
 
  Last Updated: Thursday, 12 February, 2004
 
[Pakistani nuclear-capable missiles]                            
Pakistan began its nuclear programme in the 1970s                                                                

US President George W Bush has announced a series of proposals to 
try to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. 

His speech followed the admission by the father of the Pakistani 
bomb, Dr AQ Khan, that he had given nuclear secrets to other 
countries, believed to be Iran, North Korea and Libya. 

BBC News Online world affairs correspondent Paul Reynolds has 
been following the trail of the black market bombs. 

The story begins in the early 1970s. An ambitious young Pakistani 
metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan (known in the style of the 
sub-continent by his initials AQ) was working in the Netherlands 
for a Dutch company called Physics Dynamic Research Laboratory. 

Origins at Urenco 

FDO, as it was called, did research for a consortium called 
Urenco, set up by the British, Dutch and German governments to 
provide equipment to enrich uranium. 

[Abdul Qadeer Khan]                             
Dr Khan was pardoned, despite his dramatic revelations                                                                

Whether Dr Khan had gone there in order to get information needed 
to build a nuclear bomb is not known. What is known is that when, 
in 1974, India exploded its first nuclear device, he was well 
placed to help his own country. 

Specifically, he was able to get blueprints for a centrifuge made 
by Urenco. 

Centrifuges are metal tubes which spin uranium hexafluoride gas 
in order to separate out the uranium 235 which is needed to make 
a nuclear reaction. 

In this way uranium can be enriched to the level required for a 
nuclear power station but also to the higher levels needed for a 
nuclear bomb. Dr Khan had the higher ambition. 

According to Frits Veerman, a technical photographer who worked 
in the same office at FDO, Dr Khan kept blueprints in his house, 
where Mr Veerman sometimes went for tea and fried chicken. Later 
he wrote to Mr Veerman after he left the Netherlands in 1976 with 
the Dutch intelligence hard on his heels. 

Dr Khan asked Mr Veerman to get more details, opening one letter 
with the words: "Dear Frits, very confidentially I request you to 
help us." 

Khan back in Pakistan 

Armed with his blueprints, Dr Khan then set up the AQ Khan 
Research Laboratories near the Pakistani capital Islamabad and 
began to build the bomb, often getting supplies and equipment 
from European companies. In those days, controls were lax and in 
any event much of the equipment was dual use so its ultimate 
purpose could be hidden. Dr Khan was remarkably successful. 

At some stage, however, he ceased to be satisfied with confining 
his work to Pakistan. 

Whether this was because he realised that he could sell his 
expertise elsewhere, or whether he saw himself as a kind of 
nuclear mastermind countering American hegemony, is not really 
known. 

Nor is it known to what extent, if any, the Pakistani government 
knew about his extra curricula activities. He is believed to have 
helped North Korea, which supplied Pakistan with missiles. Such 
an exchange could hardly have taken place without government to 
government contacts. 

Trail to Libya 

What is known, in broad terms, is the trail which led from Dr 
Khan to Libya and it can probably be reckoned that a similar path 
led to Iran, though the Libyan connection was more sophisticated. 

President Bush himself laid out some of the evidence. 

What is known, in bro terms, is the trail which led from Dr Khan 
to Libya and it can probably be reckoned that a similar path led 
to Iran            
	 	   	
A key figure was BSA Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman living in 
Dubai whom Mr Bush called Dr Khan's "deputy and chief financial 
officer and money launderer". Mr Tahir, said Mr Bush, had set up 
a front company SMB Computers, to help the operation. 

Mr Tahir is said to have placed an order for centrifuge parts 
with a Malaysian company named by the CIA as Scomi Precision 
Engineering. The cover story was that the parts were for the oil 
and gas industry. 

Scomi said the actual order was placed by a British company in 
Dubai called Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) in which Mr Tahir 
had a partner named Paul Griffin. 

Mr Griffin has denied, in an interview with the Guardian 
newspaper, that he knew anything about the centrifuge order. 

In any event, the order went through and the parts were delivered 
to Dubai. 

Shipment stopped 

It was after they were loaded on a German ship the BBC China, 
bound for Libya in the late summer of 2003, that western 
governments struck. 

The ship was intercepted by the Germans and Italians and taken 
into an Italian port. There the "used machinery parts" listed as 
the cargo were found to be the centrifuges manufactured in 
Malaysia, probably to the designs of Dr Khan. 

Libya had already opened talks with the US and UK about 
abandoning its work on weapons of mass destruction, so it is 
curious that Libya should also have continued with this shipment. 
There have been suggestions that Libya tipped the British and 
Americans off as a sign of good faith. If not, they were acting 
in bad faith. 

Whatever the cause, the shipment was revealed. 

What was even more worrying was that Libya showed the Americans 
and British a design for a nuclear warhead, which is believed to 
have originated with Dr Khan as well. Mr Bush said the Khan 
network even sold raw uranium at one stage, though to whom is not 
clear. 

Iran's admission 

At the same time, Iran was having to admit that it, too, had 
acquired expertise from abroad. 

The Iran operation pre-dated the one with Libya and was less 
sophisticated because it seems that Dr Khan simply gave the 
Iranians surplus equipment. He had over-ordered some parts for 
his own needs, so he had something to sell. He had also developed 
new centrifuges which meant that the old ones could go on the 
market. 

One of them, which ended up in Iran, was apparently contaminated 
with enriched uranium. This was found by the United Nations 
nuclear agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
Iran was forced to admit either that it had processed the fuel 
itself or got it by accident. It chose the latter explanation, 
but that opened up the whole question of where it came from. 

Looking back, it was amazi that Dr Khan managed to carry on for 
so long            
	 	   	
Iran simply said it got the parts through a third party. But 
technical analysis has detected the hand of Dr Khan in the 
designs. 

Looking back, it was amazing that Dr Khan managed to carry on for 
so long. A former British envoy in Pakistan has said that he did 
challenge the Pakistani authorities about Dr Khan but was assured 
that all was in order. 

The unravelling of his network will partly make up for the 
previous intelligence failure but the lapse is highly worrying 
for western governments. That is why President Bush has proposed 
the new measures. 

Closing the loophole 

In particular they would close a loophole which allowed Dr Khan 
to operate internationally. 

Under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into 
effect in 1970, countries without nuclear weapons are allowed to 
develop nuclear power and, crucially, are allowed to make their 
own fuel. 

But enriching uranium beyond power station grade to weapons grade 
is no great technological feat and as long as you keep your 
activities a secret, you can get away with it. 

The United States now wants to confine fuel enrichment to those 
countries which already have the capacity to do it. 

In that way, everyone else would buy their fuel from recognised 
sources and there would be no other fuel enrichment going on. 

It would not necessarily stop another Dr Khan but it would make 
such an undertaking much more difficult. 
*****************************************************************
 63 ITAR-TASS: Containers of radioactive cesium discovered in Georgian city
 	 	 	 
[ITAR-TASS News Agency of Russia]     

12.02.2004, 14.30

[Containers of radioactive cesium (TASS Photo)] 
 
TBILISI, February 12 (Itar-Tass) -- Five containers filled with
radioactive cesium-137, dangerous for human health, have been
discovered at a gas filling station in the Georgian city of
Kutaisi. 

The station owners reported the incident to the Georgian State
Security Ministry, asking to take away the containers that were
used in industry more than 20 years ago. 

The radiation at the station was about 1,000 milliroentgens a
second, while the safe level is 10-20 milliroentgens. 
The containers were transported away to a safe place. 
An investigation into the incident has been launched. 

       
� ITAR-TASS. All rights reserved. You undertake not to copy,
*****************************************************************
 64 Las Vegas SUN: Nevada senator cites health hazard, wants nuke dump work to stop
 
 By KEN RITTER ASSOCIATED PRESS 

LAS VEGAS (AP) - Nevada state inspectors visited the
construction site of the nation's nuclear waste dump Thursday
where work continued despite Sen. Harry Reid's call for a
shutdown until officials determine whether rock tailings pose a
health hazard. 

"All work at Yucca Mountain should stop until we can gauge the
extent of this problem," Reid, D-Nev., said in a statement
accusing the Energy Department of rushing to build the
repository while failing to protect workers from potentially
toxic silica dust. 

Reid, who failed to marshal the votes to stop the project when
Congress approved it in 2002, said he wants a congressional
hearing on the health issue. 

Energy Department spokesman Joe Davis said the federal agency
has complied with air safety standards at the site 90 miles
northwest of Las Vegas, he said. 

"Since 1994, we have been - by state measures - in compliance,"
Davis said. "Our records indicate all air quality regulatory
limits have been met." 

Davis said work would continue and the agency welcomed more
inspections. 

The state, which is trying to stop Yucca Mountain, has authority
under the federal Clean Air Act to inspect tailing mounds as a
possible air quality hazard. 

Reid said he was "outraged" by what he called the Energy
Department's "obsession with keeping to a schedule" to open the
repository in 2010. 

The government wants to move 77,000 tons of the nation's most
radioactive waste from sites in 39 states to Nevada and entomb
it 1,000 feet below the volcanic ridge at the western edge of
the Nevada Test Site. 

Allen Biaggi, administrator for the Nevada Division of
Environmental Protection, said two state inspectors from Las
Vegas were expected to report the results of their inspections
on Friday. 

They were assigned this week to examine volcanic rock tailings
unearthed during excavation of a 5-mile long exploratory tunnel
from 1994 to 1997. 

The state action came after former Yucca Mountain workers blamed
lung problems on toxic dust inhaled during tunneling, and the
Energy Department acknowledged last month that workers might
have been exposed to fibrous silica dust. 

The federal agency said it was offering former workers free
health screenings for silicosis, a potentially deadly lung
disease. 

"If the material is dangerous in the tunnel, it very well could
be dangerous outside the tunnel," said Bob Loux, Nevada's top
state nuclear projects administrator. 

Davis said the DOE also was preparing a response to a Jan. 29
letter Reid sent Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham seeking
information about health and safety protection at the site. 

Sen. John Ensign, R-Nev., and Reps. Shelley Berkley, D-Nev., and
Jon Porter, R-Nev., backed Reid's call for Yucca Mountain work
to stop. 

Berkley compared Yucca Mountain workers with Nevada Test Site
workers who contracted silicosis after tunneling for underground
nuclear weapons tests. 

Congress in 2000 and 2001 set up compensation funds for nuclear
workers in Nevada and other states who contracted silicosis,
chronic beryllium disease or cancers that could be traced to
job-related exposures. 

Berkley said the lawmakers were researching whether Yucca
Mountain workers qualified for compensation under the nuclear
worker law. 

-- 


 
*****************************************************************
 65 NRC: NRC Considering Request by Utah to Amend its Agreement with Agency
 
News Release - 2004-02
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION   
  Office of Public Affairs     Telephone: 301/415-8200   
  Washington, DC 20555-0001     E-mail: opa@nrc.gov  
  No. 04-021     February 12, 2004   
  

request from Utah to amend its agreement under Section 274 of
the Atomic Energy Act to assume regulatory authority over
11e.(2) byproduct material within the state. If the request is
accepted, Utah will be the sixth state to assume this authority.
The other five states are Colorado, Illinois, Ohio, Texas and
Washington. 

Under the proposed amendment to the Utah Agreement, the NRC
would transfer to the state the responsibility for licensing,
inspection, enforcement and rulemaking activities for uranium
mill tailings and uranium milling operations. If the amendment
to the agreement is approved, four NRC licenses would be
transferred to Utahs jurisdiction. 

Before entering into the amended agreement, NRC would ensure
that the states program is adequate to protect the public
health and safety. It also will ensure that the program is
compatible with NRCs program for regulating the materials
covered in the amendment to the agreement. 

An announcement of the proposed amendment to the Utah Agreement,
along with a summary of the NRC draft assessment of the Utah
11e.(2) byproduct material program, will be published for public
comment for four consecutive weeks in the Federal Register.
Interested persons are invited to provide comments to Michael T.
Lesar, Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch, Division of
Freedom of Information and Publication Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001. 

Copies of the proposed amendment to the Utah Agreement, the
Governor of Utahs request and supporting documents, as well as
the NRC staff assessment are available on the NRCs Agency-wide
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). Help in using
ADAMS is available by contacting the NRC Public Document Room at
301-415-4737, or 1-800-397-4209, or by sending an e-mail message
to pdr@nrc.gov. These documents are also available for public
inspection at the NRC Public Document Room at 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Md.   



  


 	Last revised Thursday, February 12, 2004 	   
*****************************************************************
 66 Salt Lake Tribune: Possible hot-waste loopholes have lawmakers in knots 
 
February 12, 2004   
 
 By Judy Fahys 
 
    Radioactive waste policy has left leaders of the Utah
Legislature divided. 
 
    House Speaker Marty Stephens said Wednesday he wants
lawmakers to close loopholes in state law that might allow
unusually concentrated federal cleanup waste to be disposed of
at Envirocare of Utah. Senate President Al Mansell said there
are no loopholes to close. 
 
    "We have set the public policy," said Mansell, a Sandy
Republican, "and we let the regulators" implement it. 
 
    The comments came the day after a House committee shied away
from voting on a bill that would have given the governor and the
Legislature the final word -- rather than regulators -- on
whenever Envirocare seeks to accept hotter waste. 
 
    Stephens, a Farr West Republican and a candidate for
governor, said there is still some question about the state's
authority to curb radioactive waste going to Envirocare. He said
he hoped lawmakers would revive House Bill 145, the measure by
Rep. Stephen Urquhart, R-St. George, that the House Public
Utilities and Technology Committee snubbed on Tuesday. 
 
    Members of the Legislature's hazardous and radioactive waste
task force approved the bill's concept last fall, shortly after
Congress passed a law to help the federal government redefine
some highly concentrated radium sludge so that it could be
disposed of at Envirocare's mile-square landfill in Tooele
County. Public opposition later prompted Envirocare to withdraw
its application for the waste. 
 
    Both Mansell and Stephens have accepted campaign
contributions from Envirocare. In addition, Envirocare last year
rescued the Professional Golf Association's only Utah tournament
by promising millions of dollars to sponsor the event -- at
Mansell's country club. 
 
    fahys@sltrib.com
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
    
 
    
 
    
 
   
 
   
 
              
 
  
Copyright Salt Lake City Tribune
*****************************************************************
 67 Korea Herald: Court rules vote on Buan nuclear site can go ahead   

 (soyoung@heraldm.com) By Kim So-young

2004.02.13

    
      A local referendum on the troubled project to build a 
nuclear waste dump in the southwestern county of Buan can go 
ahead tomorrow as scheduled, a provincial court ruled yesterday. 

"We cannot block residents' voluntary voting as there is no legal 
provision prohibiting such a poll," the court said in its ruling, 
rejecting a demand by proponents of the nuclear project for the 
referendum's cancellation. 

The North Jeolla Provincial Government expressed regret over the 
decision, saying the vote would only add to confusion since it is 
not legally binding.

 But the outcome will likely affect the government's policy to a 
considerable extent if the turnout exceeds 80 percent. If it 
falls short of 60 percent, the impact will be minimal, observers 
predicted. 

The ruling gave impetus to protesters' efforts to persuade 
residents to participate in tomorrow's poll. Those on both sides 
expect 80 percent of voters to oppose the project but they made 
different forecasts on voter turnout.

 The government agreed late last year to allow Buan residents to 
hold a vote on the issue following continued violent protests 
against its designation of Wido as a nuclear dumpsite.

 Seoul has stepped back from its plan to build the facility there 
because of vehement opposition from local residents. 

Applications are now being accepted from other regions. 

Both sides have staged rallies in recent weeks, with opponents of 
the dump encouraging active participation in the referendum and 
dump supporters calling it illegal.

*****************************************************************
 68 Las Vegas RJ: NUCLEAR WASTE PROJECT: Reid urges Yucca halt 
 
Thursday, February 12, 2004

Inspectors must test for hazards from tailings, senator says By

STEVE TETREAULT and KEITH ROGERS REVIEW-JOURNAL 

  Photos by John Gurzinski.

Julio Herrera, right, grabs some scrap material Wednesday from 
Glen Jacobson while Kenny Noyes, left, hoists a piece of wood 
onto a train Wednesday inside the tunnel that loops through Yucca 
Mountain, 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas. 

Tailings from the construction of the five-mile Yucca Mountain 
tunnel are piled Wednesday east of the tunnel's north entrance. 
Workers say they have lung problems they attribute to toxic dusts 
inhaled while working on the nuclear waste dump.

Buildings and temporary structures stand adjacent to rock 
tailings Wednesday in the north portal area at Yucca Mountain. 
The tailings were unearthed during excavation of a five-mile 
tunnel.


Sen. Harry Reid on Wednesday called for an immediate shutdown of 
the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste project until inspectors can 
determine whether rock tailings piled near the repository tunnel 
pose health hazards. 

Reid, D-Nev., said the tunnel and other portions of the work area 
should be sealed off "until they can gauge what the problem is 
and determine whether it is safe." 

Department of Energy officials did not respond to a request for 
comment on Wednesday, and it was not known how much ongoing 
research is taking place at the site, 100 miles northwest of Las 
Vegas. 

Allen Biaggi, administrator of the Nevada Environmental 
Protection Division, said this week he was dispatching an 
inspector to examine volcanic rock tailings unearthed during 
excavation of the 25-foot diameter exploratory tunnel that was 
carved five miles into the mountain between 1994 and 1997. 

The tailings are piled about 30 feet high and stretch the length 
of at least two football fields east of the tunnel's north 
portal, adjacent worker facilities. 

Biaggi agreed to have the tailings inspected following 
allegations by former Yucca Mountain tunnel workers about lung 
problems they attributed to toxic dusts inhaled during work 
activity. 

State officials have the authority to inspect the material as a 
possible air quality hazard under the Clean Air Act. 

Reid said he was awaiting a response from Energy Secretary 
Spencer Abraham to a Jan. 29 letter inquiring about health and 
safety protections at the Yucca site. 

In the meantime, Reid said he planned to ask Environmental 
Protection Agency administrator Michael Leavitt and Labor 
Secretary Elaine Chao what resources are available to the state 
of Nevada and to workers who believe their health was harmed. 

The Energy Department acknowledged last month that workers may 
have been exposed to fibrous silica dust during tunnel excavation 
until respirator protections were improved and enforced. 

The department has offered free health screenings for silicosis, 
a disease that can progressively clog lung capacity and lead to 
death. 

But one former tunnel supervisor, Gene Griego of North Las Vegas, 
said the respirators offered little protection against 
small-diameter fibers of erionite, a mineral that can cause a 
fatal cancer. 

Meanwhile, the former federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration industrial hygienist who was a contractor on the 
Yucca Mountain Project said Wednesday he warned DOE officials 
about the hazards from erionite in the early 1990s before the 
tunnel-boring effort. 

Jacob Paz, who has a doctorate in environmental health science, 
said he wrote a memo in 1991 for a DOE contractor in Nevada 
advising that erionite is a carcinogen that poses an occupational 
health hazard at Yucca Mountain. 

"If you drill, you're going to have a problem," he said, 
recalling the memo. 

"What's happening here is there was a (lapse) in enforcement (by) 
DOE," said Paz, who in the past has alerted state officials about 
his conclusions on fibrous minerals in the vicinity of Yucca 
Mountain and the nearby Nevada Test Site Reid, born and raised in 
the mining town of Searchlight, said he was troubled by the 
reports. His father, also named Harry, was a hard-rock miner who 
suffered from silicosis. He committed suicide in 1972. 

"This isn't 50 years ago when people didn't quite understand 
about silica," Reid said. "I can't imagine they allowed this to 
happen to these men." 

Dry-drilling techniques were employed in the Yucca tunnel, former 
workers said. 

Although water would calm dust, scientists feared it would 
interfere with experiments testing how fluids traveled through 
the volcanic rock, the workers said. 

Three other members of Nevada's congressional delegation said 
they backed Reid's call for a site work stoppage. 

"I'd love to see that happen, but I don't expect it," said Sen. 
John Ensign, R-Nev. Ensign said he encouraged more inspections by 
state and federal authorities. 

Rep. Shelley Berkley, D-Nev., compared the Yucca Mountain 
employees with Nevada Test Site workers who contracted silicosis 
after tunneling for underground nuclear weapons tests. 

Congress in 2000 and 2001 passed bills offering $150,000 
compensation to nuclear workers in Nevada and other states who 
contracted silicosis, chronic beryllium disease or cancers that 
could be traced to job-related exposures. 

Berkley and Rep. Jon Porter, R-Nev., said they were researching 
whether Yucca Mountain workers might qualify under the nuclear 
worker law. 

"This is no different from the 1950s and 1960s when the 
government lied to test site workers and told them they were 
safe," Berkley said. 

"From a congressional standpoint, if this is one more example of 
shoddy work, we will elevate it to the other members (of 
Congress) so they realize what is happening," Porter said.
 
 
Copyright Las Vegas Review-Journal
*****************************************************************
 69 Guardian Unlimited: Undeclared Centrifuge Design

Thursday February 12, 2004 1:16 PM

By GEORGE JAHN 

Associated Press Writer 

VIENNA, Austria (AP) - In another apparent link to the nuclear
black market emanating from Pakistan, U.N. inspectors in Iran
have discovered undeclared designs of an advanced centrifuge
used to enrich uranium, diplomats said Thursday. 

The diplomats said preliminary investigations suggested that the
design matched drawings of enrichment equipment found in Libya
that was supplied through the network headed by Pakistani
nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. 

The revelations came a day after President Bush, in a keynote
speech, acknowledged loopholes in the international enforcement
system and urged the United Nations and member states to draw up
laws that spell out criminal penalties for nuclear trafficking. 

Khan, a national hero in Pakistan for creating a nuclear
deterrent against archrival India, confessed on Pakistani
television last week to masterminding a network that supplied
Libya, Iran and North Korea with nuclear technology. President
Pervez Musharraf then pardoned him. 

Beyond adding a link to the chain of equipment, middlemen and
companies comprising the clandestine nuclear network supplying
weapons-related technology to rogue governments, the find cast
doubt Tehran's willingness to open its nuclear activities to
international inspection. 

Accused of having nuclear weapons ambitions, Iran - which denies
the charge - agreed late last year to throw open its programs to
pervasive inspections by the Vienna-based International Atomic
Energy Agency and said it would freely provide information to
clear up international suspicions. 

But the diplomats, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said
Iran did not volunteer the designs. Instead, they said, IAEA
inspectors had to dig for them. 

``Coming up with them is an example of real good inspector
work,'' one of the diplomats told The Associated Press. ``They
took information and put it together and put something in front
of them that they can't deny.'' 

At less enriched levels, uranium is normally used to generate
power. Highly enriched, it can be used for nuclear warheads. 

Iran - which says it sought to make low enriched uranium - has
bowed to international pressure and suspended all enrichment.
But it continues to make and assemble centrifuges, a development
that critics say also throws into question its commitment to
dispel suspicions about its nuclear aims. 

The United States and its allies interpret enrichment suspension
as encompassing the whole process - including a halt in
assemblage of related equipment. U.S. State Department spokesman
Richard Boucher warned last month that failure by Iran to
indefinitely suspend ``all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities would be deeply troubling.'' 

The IAEA continues to negotiate with Iran on what constitutes
suspension, but Mohamed ElBaradei, the agency's director
general, also is known to be seeking a commitment from Iran to
stop and assembling centrifuges. 

The diplomats said Iran had not yet formally explained why the
advanced centrifuge designs were not voluntarily handed over to
the agency as part of its pledge to disclose all past and
present activities that could be linked to weapons. 

``They'll probably say it's an oversight,'' said one of them. 












Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004

Guardian Newspapers Limited
*****************************************************************
 70 Bellona: MOX plan delayed by Bush administration budget documents
 
The set-back-plagued US�Russian plan to destroy weapons grade 
plutonium in nuclear reactors has been delayed for at least 
another year, budget documents released last week by the White 
House show, leaving many experts on the US and Russian sides of 
the programme fearing that the job of destroying materials for 
thousands of nuclear bombs may never be accomplished.

Charles Digges, 2004-02-11 16:51

The plan was to have both countries build factories, in parallel 
progress, that could mix standard reactor grade uranium oxide 
with weapons-grade plutonium oxide�the material at the heart of 
many nuclear bombs�to be burned as a fuel called MOX in civilian 
reactors. It was conceived in the mid-1990's at a time of intense 
concern over the security of weapons materials in the former 
Soviet Union. 

Concern at the moment is even more intense, given that US war on 
terrorism might bring about the eventual use by terrorists of a 
radiological �dirty bomb,� and the high number of sites in Russia 
containing plutonium that remain poorly protected. 

Russia agreed to the plan in 2000, whose main stipulation was 
that the United States and Russia would destroy 34 tonnes a piece 
of weapons grade plutonium each side had flagged as 
surplus�though most sides possess much, much more. America has 
declared it has 100 tonnes of the material in stockpiles. Moscow 
has released no figures, citing state secrecy, but most estimates 
put Russia�s stocks at 150 tonnes. 

The point of the 2000 Plutonium Disposition Agreement, signed by 
then-US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir 
Putin was to ensure that weapons being disassembled by mutual 
agreement would never be rebuilt, and that the weapons plutonium, 
the hardest part of a nuclear bomb to make, could not be sold or 
stolen. 

But the Bush administration's budget plan for the US Department 
of Energy, or the DOE, released last week, said groundbreaking 
for a conversion factory planned for South Carolina had been 
delayed from July of this year until May 2005�the same year the 
US Cooperative Threat Reduction act contract runs out with 
Russia.

  US State Department leaving MOX programme to twist in the wind
  
  Continuing hang-ups and disagreements between the United States 
and Russia over their bilateral agreement to destroy in parallel 
progress their surplus plutonium are threatening to kill the 
non-proliferation initiative as the US Department of State 
further entrenches its stance on liability in US-Russian nuclear 
remediation programmes, US and Russian officials have said. 

Stiff liability arrangements required by the US

 The main reason for the setback is that the United States and
Russia are deadlocked on the liability rules for American
workers and contractors that would help build the Russian plant
near Tomsk in Central Siberia, and the United States, under the
terms of the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, cannot break
ground for its plant first. 

The 2000 agreement contains no liability language, saying only
that liability requirements between the two nations would be
worked out �at a later date.� 

Administration officials want to use terms written for early
nuclear agreements that protect American contractors from
practically all liability in case of accidents involving the
release of radioactive material. These terms, known as the 1992
Cooperative Threat Reduction act�s Umbrella Agreement, are so
sweeping that Russia is liable for everything from a nuclear
accident to US contractor falling down the stairs of his own
flat. Russia has refused these terms.

  MOX Eludes Mention at Evian G-8 Summit   

  Of all the nuclear issues that came under the scrutiny of the
Russian and American governments during last weekend�s Group of
Eight industrialised nations, or G-8, summit in Evian, France,
one important and urgent issue was almost entirely absent from
the agenda: plutonium disposition through MOX fuel�an oversight
some say could lead to the scrapping of the entire programme.

MOX�s empty pockets

 Another problem is that after almost seven years of effort,
Western nations have not raised the approximately $2 billion
that the Russians say they need to build and operate their
conversion plant. Even the 2002 Group of Eight summit in
Kananaskis, Canada, where member nations pledged Russia $20
billion over the next 10 years for nuclear dismantlement plans,
has failed to do the trick. Britain, a G-8 nation, said recently
that London was withholding any pledge toward the Russian MOX
facility until the liability issue was resolved. 

According to the latest US government figures, only $800m has
been donated toward the construction of the facility, which is
estimated to cost $2 billion. 

Original plans too hasty 
In 1997, when President Bill Clinton's energy secretary, Hazel
O'Leary, announced that the United States would rid itself of
weapons plutonium, she said burning it as fuel in specially
retrofitted civilian reactors might begin by 2002. But even
before the delay made clear in Bush�s budget of last week, the
American plant, estimated to cost nearly $4 billion, was
expected to begin producing fuel only in 2008. The DOE�s
eventual plan is to pay the Duke Power company to use the
plutonium in its reactors. 

The issue of delays is particularly delicate and pressing in
South Carolina, as the DOE has already been shipping
weapons-grade plutonium from its other weapons factories to its
Savannah River Site, near Aiken. 

In 2002, South Carolina sued the DOE in an unsuccessful effort
to prevent the shipments. The governor at the time, Jim Hodges,
said he wanted a binding agreement that the weapons plutonium
would be disposed of elsewhere if the plant was not built.
Hodges, who famously declared he would lie down in the highway
to block plutonium shipments from entering South Carolina, said
the new delay "leads me to believe there's no serious commitment
from the Bush administration," US press outlets reported.

  NNSA Chief Linton Brooks.   
  www.oakridger.com   

DOE nuclear officials say programme is still alive

 But administration officials say the plan is alive. 

"I'm absolutely confident we're going to resolve this," said
Linton Brooks, the under secretary of energy for nuclear
security and director of the National Nuclear Security
Administration. But he could not say when. 

"Nobody who tells you he can predict how long it will take is
worth listening to," he told the New York Times. 

He described the US-Russian impasse on liability as "a speed
bump as opposed to a death blow." The money, he said, would
follow quickly once an agreement on that issue was reached. 

But a State Department official acknowledged to Bellona Web that
"between the liability and details of financing, there's a lot
of things to iron out." 

Brooks, in earlier interviews with American media blamed
hold-ups in building a liability structure for the plutonium on
the instability of the Russian legal system. 

�The Russian legal system is not yet free from manipulation,�
Brooks told reporters late last month. 

One DOE official, however, debunked Brook�s claim in an
interview with Bellona Web. 

�That the Russian legal system is corrupt is not news, and it is
shocking that someone in Brooks� position would be at all
surprised or deterred by that,� said the official, on the
condition of anonymity. 

Brooks also brushed aside as �nonsense, just absolutely
nonsense,� the notion that the administration has been using
liability issues to achieve the slow death of the troubled and
troublesome MOX programme. 

The environmental response to MOX

 Some environmentalists, including the Bellona Foundation,
oppose turning weapons plutonium into reactor fuel. Dr. Ed
Lyman, a senior nuclear physicist with the Union of Concerned
Scientists and former director of the respected Washington based
anti-plutonium group, the Nuclear Control Institute, has argued
that a reactor accident would be more serious if the fuel was
MOX rather than simply uranium because the fuel's constituents
are more dangerous if released. 

In Europe, some plutonium is recovered from spent fuel for
reuse, and the Russians would like to do the same. 

Nuclear experts at Bellona have long said the plan would leave
Russia with a plutonium fuel fabrication factory that�after the
weapons plutonium is processed�could turn additional plutonium
into reactor fuel, encouraging the creation and circulation of
material that could be diverted into a closed plutonium fuel
cycle, wherein spent weapons grade plutonium fuel is recycled
for further use, posing an enormous proliferation hazard. 

The left over plutonium could also encourage the Russians to
further develop their breeder reactor technology�technology it
has had on the drawing board for years. Breeder reactors are
essentially reactors that run off their own spent fuel�a sort of
nuclear perpetual motion machine. But the technology is barely
tested and, according to groups like Bellona and Lyman�s,
extremely hazardous. The remaining plutonium could also be
stolen by a terrorist or militant group or diverted into a
weapons programme�an option that seems even more likely given
Russia�s ballyhooed nuclear war exercises. 

By contrast, a DOE spokesman who spoke to Bellona Web on Monday,
says the United States plans to bury American spent fuel,
including the plutonium. 

The plan for the South Carolina factory also faces hurdles. The
consortium of contractors the DOE chose to build it, an
affiliate of the Duke Power company�the Duke, Cogema, Stone and
Webster engineering firm which was formed specifically to design
the Russian and American MOX facilities�proposed to meet the
limits for radiation releases at the plant by pushing the
measurement boundary about five miles from the factory. 

The DOE insisted that the boundary be the factory site
perimeter, requiring changes to the safety analysis the
consortium must submit to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
win a license.   

  Publisher: Bellona Foundation, President: Frederic Hauge
Information: info@bellona.no, Technical contact:
webmaster@bellona.no
Telephone: +47 23 23 46 00 Telefax: +47 22 38 38 62  * P.O.Box
2141 Grunerlokka, 0505 Oslo, Norway
*****************************************************************
 71 BBC: Sellafield drops union post
 
  Last Updated: Thursday, 12 February, 2004
 
[View of Sellafield]                            
Workers staged a number of walkouts last year                                                              

British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) has put on hold plans to cut the 
number of union officials at Sellafield. 

The Amicus and GMB trade unions had accused the firm of a 
"vindictive attack" by planning to cut union officials posts. 

Union leaders threatened more industrial action if the proposal 
was not withdrawn. 

On Thursday, BNFL withdrew the plans and said it would consider 
the posts at the next review of employee relations. 

Pay deal 

Thousands of workers at the nuclear reprocessing plant in Cumbria 
staged a series of strikes at the end of last year in a row over 
the pay gap between white collar workers and manual staff. 

It was the first time in almost 30 years that the plant workers 
had staged a walkout. 

Last month, union members voted 6 -1 in favour of a deal that 
would see shift bonus rates for workers harmonised by October 
2006. 

On Wednesday evening, Amicus warned that if the proposals to cut 
the number of representatives from 11 to four were not withdrawn, 
then it and the GMB would hold another ballot for industrial 
action. 

BNFL had claimed it was reducing the number of officials from 
eight to six, following a review that began before the pay 
dispute. 

But the firm agreed with the national officers to consider the 
Sellafield trade union posts at the forthcoming review of 
employee relations at the site. 
*****************************************************************
 72 Las Vegas SUN: Reid seeks answers to Yucca dust

Today: February 12, 2004 at 9:48:21 PST 

By Suzanne Struglinski 
<suzanne@lasvegassun.com> and Cy Ryan 
<cy@lasvegassun.com>
 SUN CAPITAL BUREAU

 Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., plans to call and write letters to
Labor Secretary Elaine Chao and Environmental Protection
Administrator Mike Leavitt this week to air his concerns on dust
dangers to workers at Yucca Mountain.

 Two state inspectors were scheduled today to inspect rock and
dirt piles at Yucca Mountain to see if there is a hazard from
dust blowing off piles of rock left from digging the massive
tunnels where the Energy Department hopes to store highly
radioactive waste.

 The dust at Yucca Mountain became an issue last month when the
Energy Department started screening for silicosis among workers
who helped dig the current tunnels used for research. The silica
in the rock can be dangerous if inhaled through dust.

 Reid has said he thinks work at Yucca Mountain should stop
until the state inspections are completed, his spokeswoman,
Tessa Hafen, said this morning. She said the Energy Department
has not communicated with Reid since he expressed his concerns
to the agency two weeks ago, and he may request Senate hearings
on the subject.

 "This is indicative of DOE's total disregard for anyone's
health and safety in putting this project through," Hafen said.

 "DOE keeps making assurances that this project is safe, yet
they are not protecting their own workers. Silicosis is a 100
percent preventable disease and yet DOE is not the steps to
prevent it."

 Allen Biaggi, administrator of the state division, said
Wednesday most of the debris from the tunnel is rock. He said
his inspectors will determine if there is a potential for dust
if the wind comes up.

 He said because the site is remote from any community, the
public is not endangered. But blowing dust could affect the
health of workers at the site.

 "Nobody would be at risk except the workers," he said.

 "If there is a problem, we will request they take action,"
Biaggi said. He said the federal agency could plant vegetation
over the soil and rock, place a crust on it so it doesn't blow,
put a cover on it or keep it watered.

 Asked how the inspectors would know if there is a problem if
there is no wind, Biaggi said they will be able to determine if
there are particles that could be carried away by a breeze.

 Energy Department spokesman Allen Benson said the government
does has a dust suppression program and monitors the area.
"Let's see what the state inspectors find," Benson said.

 
 
*****************************************************************
 73 El Nuevo Herald: NRC Study Says Storage Facility Adequate

 AP Wire | 02/12/2004 | 

JOHN HEILPRIN

 Associated Press

WASHINGTON - The risks of storing more used radioactive fuel rods 
from nuclear power plants underwater in adjacent pools are less 
than previously thought despite the new specter of terrorism, 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials said Thursday. 

Farouk Eltawila, who directs NRC's division of systems analysis 
and regulatory effectiveness, told a National Academy of Sciences 
panel that "previous NRC studies are overly conservative" and 
don't "take advantage of all the work that we have done the past 
25 years." 

The new classified study, which has not yet been peer-reviewed, 
will be shown to the scientific panel on Friday. The study shows 
that more spent fuel rods can be stored safely in pools of water 
next to reactors and that the storage facilities are well 
protected against potential terrorist attacks, Eltawila said. 

The storage pools are typically about 25 feet wide by 20 feet 
high, constructed to allow for convective cooling and with racks 
for storing the rods. 

The implications of the new study are that power companies would 
not have to spend money transferring the fuel rods to dry storage 
casks until they can be buried at a permanent repository now 
under construction at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. 

"Not only does it cost too much, it's not necessary," said John 
Vincent of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's top trade 
group. 

Although he hasn't yet seen the study, Princeton University 
professor Frank von Hippel called its conclusion an attempt to 
save electric power companies billions of dollars. He said 
allowing more high-density storage of nuclear waste will only 
heighten the terrorism risks. 

"It's very sad," said von Hippel, a frequent critic of the 
nuclear industry and its regulators. "The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has been captured by the industry." 

The National Academy panel is meeting this week at Congress' 
request to review the safety and security of commercial nuclear 
spent fuel until a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain is 
completed sometime during the next decade. 

Von Hippel and German scientist Klaus Janberg pointed to their 
own research showing that the risks are greater than the NRC 
believes. They also noted that Germany and Switzerland require 
their spent fuel pools to be built inside containment buildings, 
a feature that the United States doesn't require. 

ON THE NET 

The National Academies: http://www.nationalacademies.org

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: http://www.nrc.gov  
*****************************************************************
 74 JoongAng Daily: Buan to hold vote on nuclear facility

by Seo Hyung-sik iamfine@joongang.co.kr> 

2004.02.13 
 
BUAN COUNTY, North Jeolla �� Residents of Buan county, where the
government had proposed building a nuclear waste disposal
facility, will hold a nonbinding referendum tomorrow on whether
or not they endorse the project.

 In July last year, Buan's governor, Kim Jong-gyu, bid for the
project, ignoring the county council's opposition, and the
central government then announced its plan to build the facility
on the county's Wido island. But Buan residents staged
frequently violent protests until the government withdrew the
plan in December and opened the bidding process to allow other
regions to apply for the facility. 

The county government and a local civic group supporting the
project had asked a court to bar the referendum. The Jeonju
District Court yesterday rejected their request. The referendum
thus will take place tomorrow, as originally planned.

 But the county and the civic group denounced the decision,
saying that holding a referendum against the will of the
county's governor should be considered illegal. The group also
said that tomorrow it would launch unspecified efforts to try to
prevent the referendum from taking place. 

The referendum will not be legally binding, but rather is a way
for the government to confirm whether the residents oppose the
project. The number of eligible voters is 51,000 and the
committee administering the referendum said more than one third
of the voters should cast ballots to make it effective. 

*****************************************************************
 75 DW: Germany, China Close to Deal on Plutonium Plant Sale 

| Current Affairs | Deutsche Welle | 12.02.2004
 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Soon producing plutonium in China?                                      

The controversial sale of a German plutonium plant to China is 
nearing completion, according to news reports. The deal will 
include an agreement for regular checks to ensure the plant is 
not used for military purposes.
  
The German foreign ministry on Thursday denied reports that 
closure of the sale was immediate, saying that officials were 
continuing to review the proposed sale. In its Thursday edition, 
the daily Berliner Zeitung had reported that the German 
government was close to reaching agreements with both China and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would 
conduct regular control visits to the plant to make sure 
plutonium produced there is not used for military purposes. 
  
According to news reports, experts from the German economics 
ministry are currently working with IAEA officials in Vienna to 
reach an agreement on this issue. It remains unclear who would 
pay for IAEA control visits. 
  
Such an agreement is crucial to secure support from the junior 
coalition partner in the German government, the Greens. German 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, a member of the Greens party, 
will have to give his approval for the sale. Many party members 
oppose the deal and an announcement of the sale is therefore 
likely to be postponed until parliamentary elections in the city 
state of Hamburg, which will take place on Feb. 29. 
  
Reliable assurances needed 
  
Gernot Erler, a deputy parliamentary leader of the governing 
Social Democrats, said he didn't expect a decision until March. 
"The Chinese have to give us reliable assurances to render our 
concerns irrelevant," Erler told Financial Times Deutschland. 
  
German industrial giant Siemens had asked the government to grant 
permission for the sale of the disassembled plant in Hanau near 
Frankfurt last year. The plan emerged during German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder's December trip to China and provoked outrage 
among nuclear energy opponents. The German government, which has 
begun phasing out nuclear energy at home, said it will approve 
the sale unless concerns about military use cannot be eliminated. 
  
The European Union still has an arms embargo against China in 
place, but Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac have 
come out in support of scrapping it. DW staff (win)                                                               
			
*****************************************************************
 76 FOX5 Las Vegas - Hazardous Waste On Valley Roads?

February 12, 2004   

(KVVU, Las Vegas)-Truckloads of radioactive waste rolling through 
the valley? 

A possible scenario for Yucca Mountain. 

It's a danger Nevadans are fighting to prevent.

To ease some concerns, Nevada officials and the government have a 
handshake agreement.  Trucks are allowed to bring in nuclear 
waste, just not through the valley.  

Yesterday, a Henderson woman drove along side 4 flat bed trucks, 
each carrying two car-sized canvas bags, marked radioactive. The 
trucks headed North on 215, toward the Nevada Test Site. 

"I'm going down the highway and I'm thinking 'oh my gosh what if 
there was an accident.' My kids were with me. What's going to 
happen with my kids," stated Patrice Martinez. 

Each year, the test site accepts 12 hundred shipments of 
radioactive waste. 

The Department of Energy tells it's shippers to follow routes 
that detour around Las Vegas. 

A D.O.E. spokesperson states that the flatbeds Patrice Martinez 
saw were not government hired. But the Governor's Office says 
it's skeptical of those claims. 

Peggy Maze Johnson said this incident is proof the D.O.E. 
couldn't track the 70 thousand tons of waste it wants to send to 
Yucca Mountain, 90 miles from Vegas. 

"If there's a truck out there, with radioactive waste signs on 
it, and the D.O.E. doesn't know anything about it, what does that 
tell you about their tracking system?" says Peggy with Citizen 
Alert. "They don't seem to care that there is a community here, 
kids.  They don't seem to care about them." 

The D.O.E. does admit previous shipments have come through the 
valley. In June of 2000, waste was shipped along Craig Road and 
Cheyenne Avenue. 

The Governor's Office estimates one or two shipments every year 
comes through the valley.

(Copyright 2004. All Rights Reserved.)   

      All content � Copyright 2001 - 2004 WorldNow and KVVU. All
*****************************************************************
 77 Whitehaven News: WE'RE THE UNCLEVERLY HILLBILLIES!
 
 Published in The Whitehaven News on 12/02/2004 

A WHITEHAVEN councillor thinks the government regards all West 
Cumbrians as hillbillies, who will accept the nation's nuclear 
waste without question.

County Coun Ronnie Calvin was chairing the Copeland Area 
Committee, last week, when he backed a call to stop the area 
being steam-rollered into becoming a nuclear dustbin.

Coun Calvin said: �We have always tried to support nuclear, but 
they are trying to bring back Nirex by stealth.'�

The meeting had received a report from County planning officer, 
Shaun Gorman, who said there were shortcomings in a proposed 
environmental impact statement for moth-balling the Calder Hall 
nuclear reactors. 

He said the plan was to leave the reactors on a care and 
maintenance basis for 90 years, to await the gradual decay of 
their radioactivity.

He was backed in his concerns, Coun Tim Knowles, who said: �I am 
not concerned about the technical issues, but to be blunt, the 
way the waste is being destined is pre-judged. The way the 
government is doing its consultations is very one-sided. 

�The government has just announced its views on waste 
substitution, the net effect of which is larger volumes of waste 
at Sellafield.

� The LMU is developing a programme predicated on a clean-up 
across the UK and, surprise, surprise, the waste all ends up at 
Sellafield. 

�It was the same on the submarine nuclear waste. If we are not 
careful the nuclear waste issue will already be decided by the 
sheer scale of agreements already reached. People are now 
starting to say once again we are the nuclear dustbin.� 

Coun Simon Leyton pointed out: �We now have the expertise, which 
can be exported and used to make the waste safe at its source, 
rather than bring it to Sellafield.�

*****************************************************************
 78 Whitehaven News: Bully for BNFL
 
Friday, February 13th 2004                    

JACK STOPFORTH, Published in The Whitehaven News on
12/02/2004 

OUR success in securing the Headquarters of the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority for West Cumbria offers the best 
prospect for high added value jobs. The NDA itself will employ 
some 200 people as contract negotiators/managers or as part of 
the national environmental restoration and decommissioning 
effort. More importantly, however, is the fact that the 
headquarters will manage a budget of around �48 billion and we 
are confident that a number of contractors and subcontractors 
will gravitate toward the area to benefit from that process. 
Important ancillary benefits will include a boost to the telecom 
and broadband infrastructure and possible improvements to the 
physical infrastructure of the area. Also we anticipate related 
developments in education and training, whether at Westlakes 
Science Park or elsewhere. Other job opportunities will arise 
from the continuing growth of Whitehaven as a retail centre and 
tourism destination.

SELLAFIELD will remain a major employer over that period even if 
the most pessimistic changes in the nuclear sector occur. Other 
energy related employment could be anticipated in pursuit of the 
Government's renewables programme and, speaking personally, I 
would not rule out a nuclear new build programme. Other jobs will 
be stimulated by improved infrastructure provision (especially 
broadband), better Higher and Further Education opportunities and 
the consolidation of West Cumbria as a service centre and tourism 
destination.

I DISLIKE the defeatist tone of this question. West Cumbria has a 
lot going for it and should be more bullish about its assets. The 
area is extraordinarily beautiful; it has a dedicated Urban 
Regeneration Company well supported by local government and the 
Regional Agencies; it has an international lead in nuclear and 
related environmental technology and it has one of the most 
successful Science and Technology Parks in the UK. EU funding may 
be more problematic for the UK generally as the Union expands 
eastwards and we will need to increase productivity and 
competitiveness through investment in education and training but 
these challenges are hardly unique to Cumbria.

IF an elected regional assembly comes about and if it maintains 
the strong focus on Cumbrian economic issues shown by the North 
West Development Agency, then it will make a difference. An 
elected Regional Assembly should enable the region to benefit 
from a greater share of national and EU investment and ensure 
that it is invested with the benefit of local knowledge. We will 
face competition for funding from the Metropolitan areas of 
Manchester and Liverpool but also from well organised lobbies in 
Lancashire and Cheshire, too. So let's compete.

CIIA regularly markets Cumbria's skills base and other assets in 
the South East and elsewhere, including overseas. Business� skill 
requirements are evolving constantly and even in West Cumbria we 
have several examples of companies with skill shortages. A key 
answer lies in ensuring that the provision of training and 
education at every level is better synchronised to the needs of 
employers both in Cumbria and generally. The Cumbria LSC, Lakes 
College, Westlakes Research Institute, the schools and private 
training providers are working increasingly closely to provide 
such synchronicity.

See previous answers.

NOT all service sector jobs are poorly paid and many offer career 
advancement in return for hard work. Some jobs in the business 
services related to the work of the NDA and many industrial 
occupations resulting from NDA contracts will enjoy salaries 
comparable to those at Sellafield. However, it would be na�ve to 
believe that if we see major job losses at Sellafield we can 
easily replace them. The �BNFL factor� has meant that despite 
higher than national average unemployment in West Cumbria, the 
area has had high wage rates for those in employment. The loss of 
these high added value jobs is a root cause of Cumbria's falling 
GDP per capita figures and is being recognised by the Authorities 
as a particular problem to be addressed through investment in 
infrastructure, education and training.

THE public investment represented by EU funds, West Lakes 
Renaissance URC, Rural Regeneration Cumbria and the other public 
agencies is already very considerable � amounting to hundreds of 
millions of pounds. As successes such as Vertex and the NDA have 
demonstrated, this public investment will attract private sector 
and other public money in its wake. At least as important as the 
funding is the ability of the public and private sector to work 
closely together to ensure that it is invested strategically and 
effectively.

1 A revived nuclear build programme based on safe and proven 
technology;

2 A successful NDA demonstrating world leadership in all aspects 
of environmental restoration;

3 An education and training infrastructure that supports learners 
as well as promoting economic growth;

4 A thriving service sector economy in West Cumbria based on a 
highly successful tourism industry and making the most of 
broadband technology to provide cost effective service employment 
for people throughout the County.

I BELIEVE we can achieve our aspirations if we assume a positive 
mind-set and make things happen.

*****************************************************************
 79 Whitehaven News: BNFL INVESTS HEAVILY IN FUTURE WORKFORCE SKILLS 
 
Published
in The Whitehaven News on 12/02/2004 

PREDICTIONS regarding future employment at Sellafield are largely 
based on a socio-economic impact study produced by consultants 
ERM as part of the BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue. 

This study was based upon information available at the time of 
its inception (early 2003) and, I must point out, these figures 
are not cast in stone. Many factors could affect future 
employment levels, including the decommissioning programmes, 
priorities etc. 

What is fair to assume is that a high level of employment is 
predicted for the next 15 years, and I believe most companies in 
the UK would be delighted with such an order book. The nature of 
our business allows for an unusual degree of forward planning, 
which gives us as a community the luxury of time to plan for 
other forms of economic activity to sit alongside a thriving 
nuclear clean-up business.

As you know, BNFL is actively involved in economic regeneration 
initiatives such as the WCDA, West Lakes Renaissance, the CIIA 
etc. We have made significant financial investment in these 
initiatives and have seen excellent results from long-term 
projects such as the Westlakes Science Park. In addition, we have 
invested heavily in the local skills base, both in terms of 
training and education of our existing workforce, and in 
encouraging schools and colleges who will provide the highly 
skilled, highly qualified workforce of the future. Some examples 
of our commitment in this area are as follows:

Financial support to the LIFT project which has ensured that 
every high school in our travel-to-work area has, or is about to 
get, Specialist College Status. West Cumbria is the only area in 
the country, to my knowledge, that can make this boast;

An annual programme of financial and HR support to local schools, 
aimed at promoting the teaching of science, engineering and 
technology (Yottenfews Environmental Project, Visitors Centre 
educational programmes, LIFT Science Week events, Young Engineers 
Clubs, provision of science equipment, mentoring schemes, Science 
Ambassador initiative, teaching aids etc);

Support to Gen II, helping develop community apprenticeships over 
and above the requirements of our industry;

Staff time, experience and expertise in support of a wide range 
of educational projects.

My personal belief is that investing in the skills and education 
of our youngsters will help create the vibrant economy of the 
future that we all desire. To this end, I would like to see West 
Cumbria as the skills capital of Europe for the development of 
clean-up technologies. Real innovation in cleaning up historic 
legacies (both in the nuclear and other chemical industries) will 
be big business in the future. In West Cumbria we have a 
power-house of innovation based in our BNFL Technology centre. 
This, allied with a major facility for developing the skills to 
support delivery of the technology, could be big business.

Fortunately, a lot of work is underway to convert these ideas 
into reality � a Nuclear Skills Project is being developed under 
the aegis of the North West Development Agency. Steve Fletcher, 
the project manager based at Westlakes, is producing some very 
radical ideas to take this forward.

Other elements of our future economy should be based around 
entrepreneurial skills and the development of small businesses. 
Again, we at BNFL have long been involved in the Prince's Trust, 
whose youth business arm helps youngsters to turn their business 
ideas into reality.

These are just a few of the activities we have supported over the 
years and which have made a real difference to the economic 
well-being of this area. 

What I would like to see happen in 10 -15 years' time? I see BNFL 
with a long-term contract to manage the Sellafield site, which 
would be the focus for a world-leading environmental clean-up 
business. Alongside this, there could be new nuclear reactors 
creating clean, sustainable energy.

I would also love to see a national Nuclear Skills Academy 
providing the education and training needed by this highly 
sophisticated clean-up business and supporting the requirements 
of the West Cumbrian-based NDA.

West Cumbria would also have clusters of suppliers providing 
services to this vibrant market and, on the basis of this order 
book, supplying other industries world-wide.

And, with so many highly-skilled and highly-paid professionals 
living in the area, there will be the need for a strong and 
entrepreneurial service provision to support their life styles.

 I believe that this is achievable, and the onus is on us all to 
make the best use of the next few years to ensure that these 
opportunities are made to happen. 

*****************************************************************
 80 [du-list] Fw: Three Minutes to Midnight: The Impending Threat
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:05:59 -0800

 
<x-flowed>

----- Original Message -----
From: <mailto:threeminuteslist_reply@mailhost.groundspring.org>NPRI 
Communications
To: <mailto:tara@miltoxproj.org>tara@miltoxproj.org
Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 8:34 AM
Subject: Three Minutes to Midnight: The Impending Threat of Nuclear War

<http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/../>1cfcb4.jpg



Dear Friends and Colleagues:



NPRI was pleased to host Three Minutes to Midnight: The Impending Threat of 
Nuclear War in Washington, DC last month.  Bringing together scientists, 
policy makers and activists from all different points of view on the issue 
of nuclear weapons, this was an unprecedented gathering which promises to 
further our mission of creating consensus for a nuclear-free future. In a 
free flowing dialog between supporters of nuclear weapons and opponents, 
and an active and interested audience with critical questions for the 
panelists, key issues of public policy were brought forward, discussed and 
analyzed.



For those of you who were unable to attend Three Minutes to Midnight: The 
Impending Threat of Nuclear War, or were able to attend and would like to 
have an archive of the proceedings, NPRI is pleased to announce that the 
entire conference is now available on CD audio, and we are taking orders 
for the DVD which will be available in just a few short weeks.



This is a valuable educational resource for those looking for the latest 
data and debate on nuclear issues.  Topics covered included:


    * The Medical and Ecological Implications of Nuclear War
    * Reflections on the War Experience: Bobby Muller, President of the 
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
    * The Hair Trigger: How a Nuclear War Could Start
    * Nuclear Plans and Nuclear Targeting After the Cold War
    * Nuclear Labs and Nuclear Development, Post Cold War
    * The Manhattan Project and Beyond
    * Regional Nuclear Dangers
    * Understanding Nuclear Challenges: The Role of the Media



Speakers included Dr. Helen Caldicott, Dr. William Arkin, Dr. Bruce Blair, 
General Charles Horner, Dr. C. Paul Robinson, Greg Mello, Dr. Raymond 
Jeanloz, Professor Anatoly Diakov, Jacqueline Cabasso, Dr. Robert Galluci, 
Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy and others.



Individual segments of the conference can be purchased on CD audio or DVD, 
or you can purchase the entire conference in either format at a substantial 
discount. If you prefer to not order online, you may also download an order 
form and fax or mail it to NPRI. Individual DVDs are $40, or $15 for CD 
audio. The entire set can be purchased for $280 on DVD or $100 on CD.



<http://www.3minutestomidnight.org/Portals/57ad7180-c5e7-49f5-b282-c6475cdb7ee7/audio_cds.htm>Click 
here to order online via credit card



Or visit 
<http://www.3minutestomidnight.org/>http://www.3minutestomidnight.org and 
click on "Order Audio and Video"





Best regards,



Charles Sheehan-Miles

Executive Director

Nuclear Policy Research Institute
1cfcd7.jpg

You are subscribed to this list as tara@miltoxproj.org. Click 
<mailto:leave-threeminuteslist-1988778C@mailhost.groundspring.org>here to 
unsubscribe, or send email to 
leave-threeminuteslist-1988778C@mailhost.groundspring.org.


To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to 
du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com.  In the body of the message type 
unsubscribe and send.



----------
Yahoo! Groups Links
    * To visit your group on the web, go to:
    * 
<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/>http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/
    *
    * To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    * 
<mailto:du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com?subject=Unsubscribe>du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com 

    *
    * Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the 
<http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/>Yahoo! Terms of Service.

</x-flowed>


Attachment Converted: 1cfcb4.jpg: 00000001,009bcbca,00000000,00000000
Attachment Converted: 1cfcd7.jpg: 00000001,009bcbcb,00000000,00000000
*****************************************************************
 81 Daily Times EDITORIAL: Disarmament is the only effective measure against
proliferation 
 
February 13, 2004    

Speaking at the National Defence University in Washington on 
Wednesday, President Bush has reminded the world that nuclear 
weapons pose the �greatest threat before humanity today�. Bush 
also outlined some proposals to prevent the weapons from falling 
into the hands of �terrorists�: �I�ve made clear to all the 
policy of this nation: America will not permit the terrorists and 
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world�s most dangerous 
weapons,� he said. In the speech, he also accused publicly, for 
the first time, Pakistani scientist Dr AQ Khan of running a 
network that has sought to spread WMD know-how. All of this is 
true � nuclear weapons pose the biggest threat to mankind and the 
fear of their proliferation is real. No one can, or will, fault 
the statement as it stands. Yet, some facts need to be considered 
before the world, especially the United States, embarks on a plan 
to fight proliferation.

Like it or not, nuclear weapons remain still the currency of 
power. No state reflects this reality more than the United 
States, which refused, even after the end of the Cold War, to 
review its doctrine of first-use of such weapons in case of a 
conflict. When President Kennedy�s administration began efforts 
to control proliferation, which ultimately resulted in the 
signing on July 1, 1968 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
during the Johnson administration, the effort was geared towards 
first controlling horizontal proliferation and then moving 
towards disarmament. Except for five nuclear-weapon states, 
declared legitimate NWS under the treaty, every other state was 
to remain non-nuclear and sign the treaty. All except four � 
India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba � accepted the norm against 
proliferation (Cuba joined the treaty in November 2002). But the 
bargain, as enshrined in article VI of the NPT, was that the 
nuclear Club of Five would negotiate in good faith and move 
towards disarmament. This aspect of the norm against 
proliferation seems to have been long forgotten.

India did not sign the NPT precisely because it would not accept 
it short of a global application; Pakistan refused because it 
would not go out on a limb and sign it until India did; Israel 
would not do so because by then it had developed its capability 
clandestinely. Cuba was the odd one out and didn�t sign because 
the treaty was US-sponsored.

The point really is that proliferation cannot be checked 
effectively until the norm against it is applied globally and 
then wedded to legal and coercive measures to put down those 
actors � state or non-state � that might seek such technologies 
to create mischief. This point is amply proven by the 
second-generation nuclear-weapon states � Israel, India and 
Pakistan. One can be sure that despite verifiable monitoring and 
international policing some actors would always try to gatecrash 
into the nuclear club.

A good opportunity to strengthen the norm was September 1998 when 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was to be ratified. That 
opportunity was lost because of the refusal by the US Senate to 
ratify the treaty. That it should have done so a few months after 
India and Pakistan had struck a blow to the norm and while the 
Clinton administration was engaged in talks with both to get them 
to sign it left the whole regime badly mauled. This was followed 
by the US insistence on developing Ballistic Missile Defence and 
talk of getting out of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Both things have 
since happened under the Bush administration. The 2002 Nuclear 
Posture Review talks of the need to develop a low-yield bunker 
buster bomb termed the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. The RNEPs 
are to be integrated into the US war-fighting arsenal. In May 
2003 the US Senate Armed Services Committee lifted the ban on the 
Spratt-Furse Amendment and thus ended the 10-year ban on research 
into TNWs (tactical nuclear weapons). In November of the same 
year, the administration gave a final go-ahead to the project to 
develop such munitions. The move has fuelled fears among critics 
that it would push other states down the same path. The 
proponents, however, argue that it provides the US with 
�offensive deterrence� capability which is necessary in view of 
the fact that some actors cannot be deterred through possession 
of strategic nuclear weapons.

None of this portends well for the future of nonproliferation. 
There is need for the states to reduce the salience of nuclear 
weapons and related research. Of course policing is important and 
the eight nuclear-weapon states, as also other states, must join 
hands to develop ways to counter the threat. Bush�s proposal to 
seek UN resolution to criminalise nuclear proliferation and get 
nuclear suppliers to not sell any know-how or technology without 
full inspections are important as is the PSI (Proliferation 
Security Initiative). But it is important to remember that there 
is an interactive dynamics between the legal and the coercive. 
Moreover, the norm cannot be fully developed until there is 
equality on this score. Developing tactical nukes is not the best 
way to go about it.

The need of the hour is to begin with the short- to long-term 
measures. In the short term it is important to devise ways to 
prevent and intercept proliferation. This is essentially a 
cooperative security paradigm and it cannot be effective until 
the Bush administration gets down from its high pedestal. Every 
state is important in this regard and such efforts cannot just be 
seen in the context of effective projection of US power. But in 
the long term, the United Nations has to come in to seek what the 
Club of Five originally agreed to: disarmament. That guarantee 
was reiterated in the 2000 Review Conference of NPT. On the good 
authority of Bush himself, proliferation is the biggest danger 
facing the world; so the issue of disarmament can no longer be 
swept under the carpet. The US must take the lead. * Home | 
Editorial           


      EDITORIAL: Disarmament is the only effective measure 
against proliferation Op-ed: Who best safeguards the national 
economic interest? �Ravian Op-ed: Heroes and national humiliation 
�Munir Attaullah Op-ed: Make it big as a settler! �Uri Avnery 
Op-ed: Europe needs its own Security Council �Antonio Missiroli 
and �Martin Ortega Second opinion: Genius of Allama Ehsan Elahi 
Zaheer �Khaled Ahmed�s Urdu Press Review PURPLE PATCH: The Road 
to Serfdom �Friedrich Von Hayek Letters: Zahoor's Cartoon:   

  

  
            
Daily Times - All Rights Reserved Site developed and hosted by 
WorldCALL Internet Solutions

  


*****************************************************************
 82 Hi Pakistan: Time for nuclear rethink - 

By Praful Bidwai     --> 
 
February 13 2004     
    
How the mighty have fallen! Some months ago, nobody could have 
accused Dr A Q Khan of any impropriety, leave alone corruption, 
without being branded "anti-Pakistan". "The Father of the Islamic 
Bomb" was above reproach. No honour was too high for him.

Today, the metallurgist and former head of Khan Research 
Laboratories stands disgraced. He has been accused of, and 
confessed, to serious nuclear proliferation-related offences, in 
particular, selling Pakistan�s best-kept military secrets to 
North Korea, Iran and Libya. Investigators interrogating KRL 
personnel, especially since high US officials met and briefed 
President Pervez Musharraf in October, have found evidence of 
large-sale corruption in KRL. Dr Khan had to seek pardon and was 
granted it �- conditionally.

Going by what has been reported in the international and 
Pakistani media, especially the contents of official briefings to 
journalists published in the press, Dr Khan ran a secret network 
ramified across three continents to covertly transfer nuclear 
technologies and components. This involved manufacturing 
precision components for uranium centrifuges in a factory in 
Malaysia. Crucial to it were middlemen from Germany, Holland and 
Sri Lanka, and shipments of forbidden materials through Dubai. 
Lubricating it were enormous sums of money.

These disclosures mark a breakthrough in investigations into the 
global clandestine commerce in nuclear technology. They point to 
an elaborate, complex and purposive effort � perhaps the most 
successful in the world since the collaboration between Israel 
and apartheid South Africa in the 1970s � to defy national and 
international controls on nuclear transfers.

They also raise serious questions about the international 
black-market (or "Wal-Mart") in materials to make 
mass-destruction weapons, whose potential International Atomic 
Energy Agency director-general Mohamed ElBaradel acknowledges: 
"It�s obvious that the international export controls have 
completely failed in recent years. A nuclear black-market has 
emerged, driven by fantastic cleverness. Designs are drawn in one 
country, centrifuges are produced in another, they are then 
shipped via a third country and there is no clarity about the 
end-user ..."

As seen from India, these disclosures have polarised opinion in 
Pakistan. Right-wing religious hardliners see them as an attempt 
to "humiliate" a "national hero", who "saved" Pakistan from 
India. Liberal opinion has a more sober view. It recognises that 
the world cannot condone KRL�s activities.

Both currents of opinion are uncomfortable with the line that the 
Pakistani government was wholly innocent of any involvement with 
the illicit transfers; these were the work of "individual 
scientists" driven by "personal greed".

The army-controlled security apparatus has always exercised close 
surveillance upon nuclear facilities and personnel. As Pervez 
Hoodbhoy, a Quaid-i-Azam University physicist and nuclear 
analyst, says: "Since its inception, Pakistan�s nuclear programme 
has been squarely under army supervision [with a] multi-tiered 
security system ... Diplomatic immunity was insufficient to 
prevent a physical roughing up of the French ambassador to 
Pakistan some years ago when he journeyed to a point several 
miles from the enrichment facility."

Opinions diverge. MMA sympathisers and conservative nationalists 
would want all the rogue scientists and army officers to be 
brought to book. Others would like to put a lid on the whole 
thing and "close the file" quickly � "in the national interest". 
(Many in India, including the government, are similarly disposed. 
New Delhi does not want to rock the "peace process" boat. Until 
last week, it maintained an uncharacteristic silence on the whole 
issue. This was broken by a low-key statement.)

Yet, the conservatives, and many liberals, share one common 
assumption. They believe that nuclear weapons are instruments of 
national self-defence and provide security. This is the criterion 
around which to judge how far Islamabad should go towards 
accommodating to US pressure � without compromising its nuclear 
"self-esteem".

A strong case exists for full disclosure and accountability � 
especially if nuclear controls are to be durable in South Asia 
and the world is to learn lessons from the past. But it is 
equally important to question the equation between nuclear 
weapons and security. Nuclear weapons are not rational 
instruments of war. These mass-annihilation weapons are meant to 
be used against non-combatant civilians � in violation of all 
rules of warfare. Nuclear weapons have no strategic "positive" 
value of their own. They can at best play a negative role � via 
deterrence.

Deterrence is a gravely flawed doctrine. It assumes a symmetrical 
understanding of what constitutes "unacceptable damage", and 
complete mutual transparency about two adversaries� capabilities 
and doctrines. It requires that there be no accident, strategic 
miscalculation, or panic response, no unauthorised use, no leaks. 
These assumptions are clearly unrealistic. In practice, 
deterrence has never provided lasting security.

Nuclear weapons possession does not necessarily improve a 
nation�s military power or ability to compel an adversary to 
behave in a certain way. Thus, the mightiest nuclear state failed 
to prevent China from entering the Korean War. The US also had to 
beat an ignominious retreat from Vietnam. The USSR did the same 
from Afghanistan. British and French nukes did not affect the 
Suez war. Nor did Britain�s nuclear armaments prevent Argentina 
from crossing swords with it over the Falklands.

In fact, not having nuclear weapons might give one greater 
protection vis-a-vis the nuclear powers. Whether or not nuclear 
weapons will be used is determined by politics. World opinion 
wouldn�t support their use against a non-nuclear state.

The time has come to face the plain truth. The nuclear 
proliferation danger is real � everywhere. Huge quantities of 
enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium routinely pass 
through civilian nuclear facilities the world over. Plutonium, 
only 5 to 8 kilos of which is enough to make a Nagasaki-type 
bomb, is traded in amounts such as tonnes between Japan and 
Europe alone. There are large quantities of MUF ("material 
unaccounted-for") in the world�s reprocessing facilities. The 
IAEA admits this. There are willing proliferators too in the 
former Soviet Union in the shape of hundreds of unemployed 
nuclear scientists.

IAEA inspections cannot take care of all of these sources of 
leaks. Yet they are the sole physical controls on global 
movements of nuclear materials. The proliferation danger will 
remain so long as nuclear weapons and power-generation programmes 
exist. There is no method of eliminating the danger � short of 
total nuclear disarmament and shift to non-hazardous power 
technologies.

Pakistan�s and India�s ultimate interest lies in global nuclear 
disarmament. In the short run, it lies in tighter controls and 
nuclear weapons reduction. US experts like Michael Krepon 
recently told the US Senate foreign relations committee that 
material to make "dirty bombs" could be easily procured from 
poorly guarded labs in India and Pakistan; both countries are 
"very vulnerable" to leaks. The Bomb and its makers have brought 
disgrace to South Asia. The Bomb is no asset for Pakistan or 
India. It�s a liability. The sooner we rid ourselves of it, the 
better.
 					     							 				 				   				 				
Copyright 1996-2002 . Hi Pakistan. All rights reserved.
*****************************************************************
 83 Indian Express: World may be headed for nuclear destruction

Thursday, February 12, 2004   

 Reuters

 Vienna, February 12: The head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog said 
on Thursday the world could be headed for destruction if it does 
not stop the spread of atomic weapons technology, which has 
become widely accessible. 

In an opinion piece in the New York Times, Mohamed ElBaradei 
wrote that nuclear technology, once virtually unobtainable, is 
now obtainable through "a sophisticated worldwide network able to 
deliver systems for producing material usable in weapons." 

Above all ElBaradei echoed President Bush's call in a speech on 
Wednesday for states to tighten up the control of their 
companies' nuclear exports to proliferators. 

ElBaradei, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
director-general, said the world must act quickly because 
inaction would a create a proliferation disaster. 

"The supply network will grow, making it easier to acquire 
nuclear weapon expertise and materials. Eventually, inevitably, 
terrorists will gain access to such materials and technology, if 
not actual weapons," he wrote. 

"If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction," 
ElBaradei said. 

The father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted 
last week that he and scientists from his Khan Research 
Laboratory in Pakistan leaked nuclear secrets. 

They are believed to have been part of a global nuclear black 
market organized to help countries under embargo such as Iran, 
North Korea and Libya skirt international sanctions and obtain 
nuclear technology that could be used to make weapons. 

The massive illicit network has touched on at least 15 countries 
around the world. 

ElBaradei said the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
the global pact aimed at stopping the spread of atomic weapons, 
needed to be revisited and toughened to bring it in line with the 
demands of the 21st century. 

He said it should not be possible to withdraw from the NPT, as 
North Korea did last year, while the tougher inspections in the 
NPT Additional Protocol should be mandatory in all countries. 
Currently fewer than 40 of the more than 180 NPT signatories have 
approved the protocol. 

ElBaradei said that the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a 
40-nation group of countries that work together to prevent the 
export of peaceful nuclear technology to countries that might 
want weapons, needed to be transformed into a binding treaty. 

"The current system relies on a gentlemen's agreement that is not 
only non-binding, but also limited in its membership: it does not 
include many countries with growing industrial capacity," he 
wrote. 

"And even some members fail to control the exports of companies 
unaffiliated with government enterprise," he added. 

ElBaradei called for the production of fissile material for 
weapons to be halted and enrichment technology restricted. 

He said people who assist proliferators should be treated as 
criminals and states should eradicate loopholes that enable 
sensitive exports to slip past regulators. 

He also called on the atomic weapons states who signed the NPT -- 
the United States, China, Russia, Britain and France -- to move 
toward disarmament as called for in the pact. 

In a clear jab at the United States, which plans to forge ahead 
with research into the so-called mini nukes, ElBaradei said the 
world must drop the idea that nuclear weapons are fine in the 
hands of some countries and bad in the hands of others. 

"We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally 
reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass 
destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for 
security -- and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and 
postulate plans for their use," he said.

 

More World HeadlinesHave info on Iraqi weapons? Contact CIASorry, 
you're wrong Musharraf: US I will stop Khan's N-black market: 
BushSixth cloned baby born in Australia Scientists clone human 
embryosUS allocated $700 mn to Pak to boost security   
  

� 2004: Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.
*****************************************************************
 84 Albuquerque Tribune: Labs look to nuke juice for space missions                    

By Sue Vorenberg

Tribune Reporter

 "Impulse drive, Mr. Scott."

 Scientists controlling robotic space missions could be using 
variants of the familiar Star Trek command to control robotic 
spacecraft within a decade, New Mexico nuclear lab researchers 
think.

 By using nuclear energy, space vehicles will be able to roam the 
solar system at a leisurely pace and visit individual planets or 
moons for months at a time, say a group of Los Alamos and Sandia 
national laboratories scientists.

 "Chemical propulsion - which is what most space systems use 
today - can get you to the far planets, but you don't have enough 
power to stop and visit," said Jim Lee, a Los Alamos scientist. 
"They actually only have enough power that you can basically just 
fly by and wave, maybe take a few readings or pictures. Nuclear 
power, on the other hand, will let us stick around for a while."

 Scientists at the two labs are helping the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and private industry design a new stable 
of nuclear energy systems that could be deployed on a variety of 
future space missions, Lee said.

 "I think what we're doing here - kind of like the Wright 
brothers - is creating the first form of impulse drive for our 
Starship Enterprise," Lee said. "We haven't figured out how to do 
warp drive, but this will let us slowly move around a solar 
system in the same way that they do on Star Trek."

 Both labs have experimented with nuclear power technology for 
spacecraft since the 1950s. In the past year, however, they've 
refocused their efforts to make designs that are more practical 
and less expensive, said Mike Houts, a Los Alamos scientist.

 The soonest such a reactor might be launched is in 2011 on 
NASA's Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter mission, which will explore four 
of Jupiter's moons - each the size of a small planet with varying 
environments and geologies, Houts said.

 Protests that nuclear power would be inherently dangerous have 
met the labs' work on the technology, but the nuclear power 
sources would be activated only after the craft is out in space, 
the scientists say.

 "It's important to note that these vehicles aren't launched with 
nuclear power," said Paul Pickard, a Sandia scientist. "They're 
launched with chemical systems, and the reactor is turned on much 
later - when the craft is far away from the Earth's biosphere."

 Until now, space vehicles have been powered by chemical engines, 
radioisotopes and solar power.

 The problem with solar energy is that beyond the asteroid belt - 
toward planets like Jupiter and Saturn - the sun's rays aren't 
strong enough to power a craft, Lee explained.

 Chemical energy is also a problem because it is heavy and 
quickly used up. And radioisotopes, such as plutonium - which 
provide energy in the form of heat and natural radioactive decay 
- can only provide a limited amount of energy, perhaps enough to 
power several light bulbs, he added.

 "With nuclear power we get about a million times more power than 
we do with chemical or other energy types," Pickard said. "With 
it, we can run a spacecraft for years at a time. We could do a 
10-year mission. That's impossible to conceive of any other way."

 Paradoxically, in manned space travel the use of nuclear engines 
could save astronauts from exposure to excessive radiation, 
Pickard said.

 "There's a lot of natural radiation in space anyway, from a 
variety of sources," he said. "When you think of manned missions 
to places like Mars, you want to minimize the time astronauts are 
in space and exposed to that radiation. The ironic thing is that 
we can reduce their exposure to radiation by using nuclear 
propulsion to speed their trip."

� The Albuquerque Tribune. 
*****************************************************************
 85 DOE: Record of Decision: Final Environmental Impact Statement for the 
 
                         FR Doc 04-3096 
[Federal Register: February 12, 2004 (Volume 69, Number 29)] 
[Notices] [Page 6967-6972] From the Federal Register Online via 
GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr12fe04-49]                         
 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project, 
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM AGENCY: National 
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.
 
ACTION: Record of decision.
 
 
SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) is issuing this record of decision 
on the proposed replacement of the existing Chemistry and 
Metallurgy (CMR) Building at Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico. This record of decision is 
based upon the information contained in the ``Environmental 
Impact Statement for the Proposed Chemistry and Metallurgy 
Research Building Replacement Project, Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico'', DOE/EIS-0350 (CMRR EIS), 
and other factors, including the programmatic and technical risk, 
construction requirements, and cost. NNSA has decided to 
implement the preferred alternative, alternative 1, which is the 
construction of a new CMR Replacement (CMRR) facility at LANL's 
Technical Area 55 (TA- 55). The new CMRR facility would include a 
single, above-ground, consolidated special nuclear 
material-capable, Hazard Category 2 laboratory building 
(construction option 3) with a separate administrative office and 
support functions building. The existing CMR building at LANL 
would be decontaminated, decommissioned, and demolished in its 
entirety (disposition option 3). The preferred alternative 
includes the construction of the new CMRR facility, and the 
movement of operations from the existing CMR
 
[[Page 6968]] building into the new CMRR facility, with 
operations expected to continue in the new facility over the next 
50 years.
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the 
CMRR EIS or record of decision, or to receive a copy of this EIS 
or record of decision, contact: Elizabeth Withers, Document 
Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, Los Alamos Site Office, 528 
35th Street, Los Alamos, NM 87544, (505) 667-8690. For 
information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process, contact: Carol M.
 
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance 
(EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, 
SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at 
(800) 472-2756.
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background The NNSA prepared this 
record of decision pursuant to the regulations of the Council on 
Environmental Quality for implementing NEPA (40 CFR parts 
1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA implementing procedures (10 CFR part 
1021). This record of decision is based, in part, on information 
provided in the CMRR EIS.
 
LANL is located in north-central New Mexico, about 60 miles (97 
kilometers) north-northeast of Albuquerque, and about 25 miles 
(40 kilometers) northwest of Santa Fe. LANL occupies an area of 
approximately 25,600 acres (10,360 hectares), or approximately 40 
square miles (104 square kilometers). NNSA is responsible for the 
administration of LANL as one of three National Security 
Laboratories. LANL provides both the NNSA and DOE with mission 
support capabilities through its activities and operations, 
particularly in the area of national security.
 
Work at LANL includes operations that focus on the safety and 
reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and on 
programs that reduce global nuclear proliferation. LANL's main 
role in NNSA mission objectives includes a wide range of 
scientific and technological capabilities that support nuclear 
materials handling, processing and fabrication; stockpile 
management; materials and manufacturing technologies; 
nonproliferation programs; and waste management activities. LANL 
supports actinide (any of a series of elements with atomic 
numbers ranging from actinium-89 through lawrencium-103) science 
missions ranging from the plutonium-238 heat source program 
undertaken for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) to arms control and technology development.
 
The capabilities needed to execute NNSA mission activities 
require facilities at LANL that can be used to handle actinide 
and other radioactive materials in a safe and secure manner. Of 
primary importance are the facilities located within the CMR 
building and the plutonium facility (located in TAs 3 and 55, 
respectively). Most of the LANL mission support functions require 
analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC), 
and actinide research and development support capabilities and 
capacities that currently exist within facilities at the CMR 
building and that are not available elsewhere. Other unique 
capabilities are located within the plutonium facility. Work is 
sometimes moved between the CMR building and the plutonium 
facility to make use of the full suite of capabilities they 
provide.
 
The CMR building is over 50 years old and many of its utility 
systems and structural components are deteriorating. Studies 
conducted in the late 1990s identified a seismic fault trace 
located beneath one of the wings of the CMR building that 
increases the level of structural integrity required to meet 
current structural seismic code requirements for a Hazard 
Category 2 nuclear facility (a Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility 
is one in which the hazard analysis identifies the potential for 
significant onsite consequences). Correcting the CMR building's 
defects by performing repairs and upgrades would be difficult and 
costly. NNSA cannot continue to operate the assigned LANL 
mission- critical CMR support capabilities in the existing CMR 
building at an acceptable level of risk to public and worker 
health and safety without operational restrictions. These 
operational restrictions preclude the full implementation of the 
level of operation DOE decided upon through its 1999 record of 
decision for the ``Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for 
Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory'' 
(DOE/EIS-0238) (LANL SWEIS). Mission-critical CMR capabilities at 
LANL support NNSA's stockpile stewardship and management 
strategic objectives; these capabilities are necessary to support 
the current and future directed stockpile work and campaign 
activities conducted at LANL. The CMR building is near the end of 
its useful life and action is required now by NNSA to assess 
alternatives for continuing these activities for the next 50 
years. NNSA needs to act now to provide the physical means for 
accommodating continuation of the CMR building's functional, 
mission-critical CMR capabilities beyond 2010 in a safe, secure, 
and environmentally sound manner.
 
Alternatives Considered NNSA evaluated the environmental impacts 
associated with the proposed relocation of LANL AC and MC, and 
associated research and development capabilities that currently 
exist primarily at the CMR building, to a newly constructed 
facility, and the continued performance of those operations and 
activities at the new facility for the next 50 years. The CMRR 
EIS analyzed four action alternatives: (1) The construction and 
operation of a complete new CMRR facility at TA- 55; (2) the 
construction of the same at a ``greenfield'' location within 
TA-6; (3) and a ``hybrid'' alternative maintaining administrative 
offices and support functions at the existing CMR building with a 
new Hazard Category 2 laboratory facility built at TA- 55, and, 
(4) a ``hybrid'' alternative with the laboratory facility being 
constructed at TA-6. The CMRR EIS also analyzed the no action 
alternative. These alternatives are described in greater detail 
below.
 
Alternative 1 is to construct a new CMRR facility consisting of 
two or three new buildings within TA-55 at LANL to house AC and 
MC capabilities and their attendant support capabilities that 
currently reside primarily in the existing CMR building, at the 
operational level identified by the expanded operations 
alternative for LANL operations in the 1999 LANL SWEIS. 
Alternative 1 would also involve construction of a parking 
areas(s), tunnels, vault area(s), and other infrastructure 
support needs. AC and MC activities would be conducted in either 
two separate laboratories (constructed either both above ground 
(construction option 1) or one above and one below ground 
(construction option 2)) or in one new laboratory (constructed 
either above ground (construction option 3) or below ground 
(construction option 4)). An administrative office and support 
functions building would be constructed separately.
 
Alternative 2 would construct the same new CMRR facility within 
TA- 6; the TA-6 site is a relatively undeveloped, forested area 
with some prior disturbance in limited areas that is referred to 
as a ``greenfield'' site.
 
Alternatives 3 and 4 are ``hybrid'' alternatives in which the 
existing CMR building would continue to house administrative 
offices and support functions for AC and MC capabilities 
(including research and development) and no new administrative 
support
 
[[Page 6969]] building would be constructed. Structural and 
systems upgrades and repairs to portions of the existing CMR 
building would need to be performed and some portions of the 
building might be dispositioned. New laboratory facilities (as 
described for alternative 1) would be constructed either at TA-55 
(alternative 3) or at TA-6 (alternative 4).
 
Under any of the alternatives, disposition of the existing CMR 
building could include a range of options from no demolition 
(disposition option 1), to partial demolition (disposition option 
2), to demolition of the entire building (disposition option 3).
 
The no action alternative would involve the continued use of the 
existing CMR building with some minimal necessary structural and 
systems upgrades and repairs. Under this alternative, AC and MC 
capabilities (including research and development), as well as 
administrative offices and support activities, would remain in 
the existing CMR building. No new building construction would be 
undertaken. AC and MC operational levels would continue to be 
restricted and would not meet the level of operations determined 
necessary for the foreseeable future at LANL in the 1999 SWEIS 
record of decision.
 
Preferred Alternative In both the draft and the final CMRR EIS, 
the preferred alternative for the replacement of the existing CMR 
building is identified as alternative 1 (construct a new CMRR 
facility at TA-55). The preferred construction option would be 
the construction of a single consolidated special nuclear 
material (SNM) capable, Hazard Category 2 laboratory with a 
separate administrative offices and support functions building 
(construction option 3). (Special nuclear materials include 
actinides such as plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 
or 235, and any other material that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission determines to be special nuclear material.) NNSA's 
preferred option for the disposition of the existing CMR building 
is to decontaminate, decommission and demolish the entire 
structure (disposition option 3). Based on the CMRR EIS, the 
environmental impacts of the preferred alternative, although 
minimal, would be expected to be greater than those of the no 
action alternative. Construction option 3 would have less impact 
on the environment that implementing construction options 1 or 2; 
and disposition option 3 would have the greatest environmental 
impact of the disposition options analyzed.
 
Environmentally Preferable Alternative The Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ), in its ``Forty Most Asked Questions 
Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations'' (46 FR 18026, 2/23/ 81) with 
regard to 40 CFR 1505.2, defined the ``environmentally preferable 
alternative'' as the alternative ``that will promote the national 
environmental policy as expressed in NEPA's section 101''. 
Ordinarily, this means the alternative that causes the least 
damage to the biological and physical environment; it also means 
the alternative which best protects, preserves, and enhances 
historic, cultural, and natural resources. The CMRR EIS impact 
analysis indicates that there would be very little difference in 
the environmental impacts among the action alternatives analyzed 
and also that the impacts of these action alternatives would be 
small. After considering impacts to each resource area by 
alternative, NNSA has identified the no action alternative as the 
environmentally preferable alternative. The no action alternative 
was identified as having the fewest direct impacts to the 
physical environment and to cultural and historic resources. This 
is because no construction-related disturbances would exist and 
none of the CMR building would be demolished, as would be the 
case under any of the action alternatives analyzed for the 
proposed action, including the preferred alternative. Therefore, 
the no action alternative would have the fewest impacts.
 
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives NNSA analyzed the potential 
impacts that might occur if any of the four action alternatives 
or the no action alternative were implemented for land use and 
visual resources; site infrastructure; air quality and noise; 
geology and soils; surface and groundwater quality; ecological 
resources; cultural and paleontological resources; 
socioeconomics; human health impacts; environmental justice; 
waste management and pollution prevention. NNSA considered the 
impacts that might occur from potential accidents associated with 
the four action alternatives, and the no action alternative as 
well, on LANL worker and area residential populations. NNSA 
considered the impacts of each alternative regarding the 
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources, and the 
relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity. The CMRR 
EIS analyses identified minor differences in potential 
environmental impacts among the action alternatives including: 
Differences in the amount of land disturbed long term for 
construction and operations, ranging between about 27 and 23 
acres disturbed during construction and between 10 and 15 acres 
disturbed permanently during operations; and differences in the 
potential to indirectly affect (but not adversely affect) 
potential habitat for a federally-listed threatened species and 
the potential to have no affect on sensitive habitat areas; 
differences in the potential to affect human health during normal 
operations and during accident events; differences in waste 
volumes generated and managed; and differences in transportation 
accident dose possibilities. A comparison of impacts is discussed 
in the following paragraphs.
 
Construction Impacts Alternative 1 (Construct New CMRR Facility 
at TA-55; Preferred Alternative): The construction of a new 
SNM-capable Hazard Category 2 laboratory, an administrative 
offices and support functions building, SNM vaults and other 
utility and security structures, and a parking lot at TA-55 would 
affect 26.75 acres (10.8 hectares) of mostly disturbed land, but 
would not change the area's current land use designation. The 
existing infrastructure resources (natural gas, water, 
electricity) would adequately support construction activities. 
Construction activities would result in temporary increases in 
air quality impacts, but resulting criteria pollutant 
concentrations would be below ambient air quality standards. 
Construction activities would not impact water, visual resources, 
geology and soils, or cultural and paleontological resources. 
Minor indirect effects on potential Mexican spotted owl habitat 
could result from the removal of a small amount of habitat area, 
increased site activities, and night-time lighting near the 
remaining Mexican spotted owl habitat areas. The socioeconomic 
impacts associated with construction would not cause any major 
changes to employment, housing, or public finance in the region 
of influence. Waste generated during construction would be 
adequately managed by the existing LANL management and disposal 
capabilities.
 
Alternative 2 (TA-6 Greenfield Alternative): The construction of 
new SNM-capable Hazard Category 2 and 3 buildings, the 
construction of an administrative offices and support functions 
facility, SNM vaults and other utility and security structures, 
and a parking lot at TA-6 would affect 26.75 acres (10.8 
hectares) of undisturbed
 
[[Page 6970]] land, and would change the area's current land use 
designation to nuclear material research and development, similar 
to that of TA-55. Infrastructure resources (natural gas, water, 
electricity) would need to be extended or expanded to TA-6 to 
support construction activities. Construction activities would 
result in temporary increases in air quality impacts, but 
resulting criteria pollutant concentrations would be below 
ambient air quality standards. It would alter the existing visual 
character of the central portion of TA-6 from that of a largely 
natural woodland to an industrial site. Once completed, the new 
CMRR facility would result in a change in the visual resource 
contrast rating of TA-6 from Class III (undeveloped land where 
management activities do not dominate the view) to Class IV 
(developed land where management activities dominate the view). 
Construction activities would not impact water, biotic resources 
(including threatened and endangered species), geology and soils, 
or cultural and paleontological resources. The socioeconomic 
impacts associated with construction would not cause any major 
changes to employment, housing, or public finance in the region 
of influence. Waste generated during construction would be 
adequately managed by the existing LANL capabilities for handling 
waste. In addition, a radioactive liquid waste pipeline might 
also be constructed across Two Mile Canyon to tie in with an 
existing pipeline to the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment 
Facility (RLWTF) in TA-50.
 
Alternative 3 (Hybrid Alternative at TA-55): The construction of 
new Hazard Category 2 and 3 buildings, the construction of SNM 
vaults and utility and security structures, and the construction 
of a parking lot at TA-55 would affect 22.75 acres (9.2 hectares) 
of mostly disturbed land, but would not change the area's current 
land use designation. The existing infrastructure would 
adequately support construction activities. Construction 
activities would result in temporary increases in air quality 
impacts, but resulting criteria pollutant concentrations would be 
below ambient air quality standards. Construction activities 
would not impact water, visual resources, geology and soils, or 
cultural and paleontological resources.
 
Minor indirect effects on Mexican spotted owl habitat could 
result from the removal of a small amount of habitat area, 
increased site activities, and night-time lighting near the 
remaining Mexican spotted owl habitat areas. The socioeconomic 
impacts associated with construction would not cause any major 
changes to employment, housing, or public finance in the region 
of influence. Waste generated during construction would be 
adequately managed by the existing LANL capabilities for handling 
waste.
 
Alternative 4 (Hybrid Alternative at TA-6): The construction of 
new Hazard Category 2 and 3 buildings, the construction of SNM 
vaults and utility and security structures, and the construction 
of a parking lot at TA-6 would affect 22.75 acres (9.2 hectares) 
of undisturbed land, and would change the area's current land use 
designation to nuclear material research and development, similar 
to that of TA-55. Infrastructure resources (natural gas, water, 
electricity) would need to be extended or expanded at TA-6 to 
support construction activities. Construction activities would 
result in temporary increases in air quality impacts, but would 
be below ambient air quality standards. The existing visual 
character of the central portion of TA-6 would be altered from 
that of a largely natural woodland to that of an industrial site. 
Once completed, the new CMRR facility would result in a change in 
the visual resource contrast rating of TA-6 from Class III to 
Class IV. Construction activities would not impact water, visual 
resources, biotic resources (including threatened and endangered 
species), geology and soils, or cultural and paleontological 
resources. The socioeconomic impacts associated with construction 
would not cause any major changes to employment, housing, or 
public finance in the socioeconomic region of influence. Waste 
generated during construction would be adequately managed by the 
existing LANL capabilities for handling waste. In addition, a 
radioactive liquid waste pipeline may also be constructed across 
Two Mile Canyon to tie in with an existing pipeline to the RLWTF 
at TA-50.
 
Impacts During the Transition From the CMR Building to the New 
CMRR Facility Under the Action Alternatives During a 4-year 
transition period, CMR operations at the existing CMR building 
would be moved to the new CMRR facility. During this time, both 
CMR facilities would be operating, although at reduced levels. At 
the existing CMR building, where restrictions would remain in 
effect, operations would decrease as CMR operations move to the 
new CMRR facility. At the new CMRR facility, levels of CMR 
operations would increase as the facility becomes fully 
operational. In addition, the transport of routine onsite 
shipment of AC and MC samples would continue to take place while 
both facilities are operating. With both facilities operating at 
reduced levels at the same time, the combined demand for 
electricity, and manpower to support transition activities during 
this period might be higher than would be required by the 
separate facilities. Nevertheless, the combined total impacts 
during this transition phase from both these facilities would be 
expected to be less than the impacts attributed to the expanded 
operations alternative and the level of CMR operations analyzed 
in the LANL SWEIS.
 
Also during the transition phase, the risk of accidents would be 
changing at both the existing CMR building and the new CMRR 
facility. At the existing CMR building, the radiological material 
at risk and associated operations and storage would decline as 
material and equipment are transferred to the new CMRR facility. 
This material movement would have the positive effect of reducing 
the risk of accidents at the CMR building. Conversely, at the new 
CMRR facility, as the amount of radioactive material at risk and 
associated operations increases to full operations, the risk of 
accidents would also increase. However, the improvements in 
design and technology at the new CMRR facility would also have a 
positive effect of reducing overall accident risks when compared 
to the accident risks at the existing CMR building. The expected 
net effect of both of these facilities operating at the same time 
during the transition period would be for the risk of accidents 
to be lower than the accident risks at either the existing CMR 
building or the fully operational new CMRR facility.
 
Action Alternatives--Operations Impacts Relocating CMR operations 
to a new CMRR facility located at either TA-55 or TA-6 within 
LANL would require similar facilities, infrastructure support 
procedures, resources, and numbers of workers during operations. 
For most environmental areas of concern, operational differences 
would be minor. There would not be any perceivable differences in 
impact between the action alternatives for land use and visual 
resources, air and water quality, biotic resources (including 
threatened and endangered species), geology and soils, cultural 
and paleontological resources, power usage, and socioeconomics. 
Additionally, the new CMRR facility would use existing waste 
management
 
[[Page 6971]] facilities to treat, store, and dispose of waste 
materials generated by CMR operations. All impacts would be 
within regulated limits and would comply with Federal, State, and 
local laws and regulations. Any transuranic (TRU) waste generated 
by CMRR facility operations would be treated and packaged in 
accordance with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste 
acceptance criteria and transported to WIPP or a similar type 
facility for disposition by DOE.
 
Routine operations for each of the action alternatives would 
increase the amount of radiological releases as compared to 
current restricted CMR building operations. Current operations at 
the CMR building do not support the levels of activity described 
for the expanded operations alternative in the LANL SWEIS. There 
would be small differences in potential radiological impacts to 
the public, depending on the location of the new CMRR facility. 
However, radiation exposure to the public would be small and well 
below regulatory limits and limits imposed by DOE Orders. The 
maximally exposed offsite individual would receive a dose of less 
than or equal to 0.35 millirem per year, which translates to 
2.1x10-7 latent cancer fatalities per year from routine 
operational activities at the new CMRR facility. Statistically, 
this translates into a risk of one chance in 5 million of a fatal 
cancer for the maximally exposed offsite individual due to these 
operations. The total dose to the population within 50 miles (80 
kilometers) would be a maximum of 2.0 person-rem per year, which 
translates to 0.0012 latent cancer fatalities per year in the 
entire population from routine operations at the new CMRR 
facility. Statistically, this would equate to a chance of one 
additional fatal cancer among the exposed population every 1,000 
years.
 
Using DOE-approved computer models and analysis techniques, 
estimates were made of worker and public health and safety risks 
that could result from potential accidents for each alternative. 
For all CMRR facility alternatives, the results indicate that 
statistically there would be no chance of a latent cancer 
fatality for a worker or member of the public. The CMRR facility 
accident with the highest risk is a facility-wide spill of 
radioactive material caused by a severe earthquake that exceeds 
the design capability of the CMRR facility under Alternative 1. 
The risk for the entire population for this accident was 
estimated to be 0.0005 latent cancer fatalities per year.
 
This value is statistically equivalent to stating that there 
would be no chance of a latent cancer fatality for an average 
individual in the population during the lifetime of the facility. 
Continued operation of the CMR building under the no action 
alternative would carry a higher risk because of the building's 
location and greater vulnerability to earthquakes. The risk for 
the entire population associated with an earthquake at the CMR 
building would be 0.0024 latent cancer fatalities per year, which 
is also statistically equivalent to no chance of a latent cancer 
fatality for an average individual during the lifetime of the 
facility.
 
As previously noted, overall CMR operational characteristics at 
LANL would not change regardless of the ultimate location of the 
replacement facility and the action alternative implemented.
 
Sampling methods and mission operations in support of AC and MC 
would not change and, therefore, would not result in any 
additional environmental or health and safety impacts to LANL. 
Each of the action alternatives would generally have the same 
amount of operational impacts. All of the action alternatives 
would produce equivalent amounts of emissions and radioactive 
releases into the environment, infrastructure requirements would 
be the same, and each action alternative would generate the same 
amount of radioactive and non-radioactive waste, regardless of 
the ultimate location of the new CMRR facility at LANL. Other 
impacts that would be common to each of the action alternatives 
include transportation impacts and CMR building and CMRR facility 
disposition impacts. Transportation impacts could result from: 
(1) The one-time movement of SNM, equipment, and other materials 
during the transition from the existing CMR building to the new 
CMRR facility; and (2) the routine onsite shipment of AC and MC 
samples between the plutonium facility at TA-55 and the new CMRR 
facility. Impacts from the disposition of the existing CMR 
building and the CMRR facility would result from the 
decontamination and demolition of the buildings and the transport 
and disposal of radiological and non-radiological waste 
materials. All action alternatives would require the relocation 
and one-time transport of SNM equipment and materials. Transport 
of SNM, equipment, and other materials currently located at the 
CMR building to the new CMRR facility at TA-55 or TA-6 would 
occur over a period of two to four years. The public would not be 
expected to receive any measurable exposure from the one-time 
movement of radiological materials associated with this action. 
Impacts of potential handling and transport accidents during the 
one-time movement of SNM, equipment, and other materials during 
the transition from the existing CMR building to the new CMRR 
facility would be bounded by other facility accidents for each 
alternative. For all alternatives, the environmental impacts and 
potential risks of transportation would be small.
 
Under each action alternative, routine onsite shipments of AC and 
MC samples consisting of small quantities of radioactive 
materials and SNM samples would be shipped from the plutonium 
facility at TA-55 to the new CMRR facility at either TA-55 or 
TA-6. The public would not be expected to receive any additional 
measurable exposure from the normal movement of small quantities 
of radioactive materials and SNM samples between these 
facilities. The potential risk to a maximally exposed individual 
(MEI) member of the public from a transportation accident 
involving routine onsite shipments of AC and MC samples between 
the plutonium facility and CMRR facility was estimated to be very 
small (3.7x10-10), or approximately 1 chance in 3 billion. For 
all action alternatives, the overall environmental impacts and 
potential risks of transporting AC and MC samples would be small.
 
Action Alternatives--CMR Building and CMRR Facility Disposition 
Impacts All action alternatives would require some level of 
decontamination and demolition of the existing CMR building. 
Operations experience at the CMR building indicates some surface 
contamination has resulted from the conduct of various activities 
over the last 50 years.
 
Impacts associated with decontamination and demolition of the CMR 
building are expected to be limited to the creation of waste 
within LANL site waste management capabilities. This would not be 
a discriminating factor among the alternatives.
 
Decontamination, and demolition of the new CMRR facility would 
also be considered at the end of its designed lifetime operation 
of at least 50 years. Impacts from the disposition of the CMRR 
facility would be expected to be similar to those for the 
existing CMR building.
 
No Action Alternative: Under the no action alternative there 
would be no new construction and minimal necessary structural and 
systems upgrades and repairs. Accordingly, there would be no 
potential environmental impacts resulting from new construction 
for this alternative. Operational impacts of continuing CMR
 
[[Page 6972]] operations at the CMR building would be less than 
those identified under the expanded operations alterative 
analyzed in the 1999 LANL SWEIS due to the operating constraints 
imposed on radiological operations at the CMR building.
 
Comments on the Final Environmental Impact Statement NNSA 
distributed approximately 400 copies of the final EIS to 
Congressional members and committees, the State of New Mexico, 
various American Indian tribal governments and organizations, 
local governments, other Federal agencies, and the general 
public.
 
NNSA received one comment letter from the Pueblo of San Ildefonso 
regarding NNSA's responses to Pueblo concerns related to the 
draft CMRR EIS that focused primarily on the spread of 
contamination present in the canyons around LANL onto land owned 
by the Pueblo. This issue is beyond the scope of the CMRR EIS but 
will be addressed by NNSA through other means already established 
for LANL, such as the environmental restoration project, rather 
than through the NEPA compliance process.
 
Decision Factors NNSA's decisions are based on its mission 
responsibilities and the ability to continue to perform 
mission-critical AC and MC operations at LANL in an 
environmentally sound, timely and fiscally prudent manner. Other 
key factors in the decision-making process include programmatic 
impacts and overall program risk, and construction and 
operational costs.
 
LANL's CMR operations support a wide range of scientific and 
technological capabilities that support, in turn, NNSA's national 
security mission assignments. Most of the LANL mission support 
functions require AC and MC, and actinide research and 
development support capabilities and capacities that currently 
exist within the CMR building. NNSA will continue to need CMR 
capabilities now and into the foreseeable future, much as these 
capabilities have been needed at LANL over the past 60 years. 
Programmatic risks are high if LANL CMR operations continue at 
the curtailed operational level now appropriate at the aging CMR 
building. CMR operations at LANL need to continue seamlessly in 
an uninterrupted fashion, and the level of overall CMR operations 
needs to be flexible enough to accommodate the work load 
variations inherent in NNSA's mission support assignments and the 
general increase in the level of operations currently seen as 
necessary to support future national security requirements.
 
The CMR building was initially designed and constructed to comply 
with the Uniform Buildings Codes in effect at the time. The CMR 
building's wing 4 location over a seismic trace would require 
very extensive and costly structural changes that would be of 
marginal operational return. Construction costs are estimated to 
be less for building and operating a new CMRR facility over the 
long term than the cost estimated for making changes to the aging 
CMR building so that the building could be operated as a nuclear 
facility at the level of operations required by the expanded 
operations alternative selected for LANL in the 1999 LANL SWEIS 
ROD over the next 50 years. Life cycle costs of operating a new 
CMRR facility at TA-55 are less than the costs would be of 
operating a totally upgraded CMR building over the next 50 years. 
Reduced general occupation costs of maintaining the new CMRR 
facility (such as heating and cooling the building to maintain 
comfortable personnel working conditions) given the reduction in 
occupied building square footage over that of the existing CMR 
building, and reduced security costs (for maintaining Perimeter 
Intrusion Detection Alarm Systems (PIDAS) and guard personnel) 
due to the co-location of the CMRR facility within the existing 
security perimeter of the plutonium facility thereby eliminating 
the need for maintaining a separate duplicative security system 
at the CMR building both would significantly reduce general 
operating costs for the new facility.
 
Mitigation Measures Based on the analyses of impacts provided in 
the CMRR EIS, no mitigation measures were identified as being 
necessary since all potential environmental impacts would be 
substantially below acceptable levels of promulgated standards. 
Activities associated with the proposed construction of the new 
CMRR facility would follow standard procedures for minimizing 
construction impacts, as would demolition activities.
 
Decisions NNSA has decided to implement the preferred 
alternative, alternative 1, which is the construction and 
operation of a new CMRR facility within TA-55 at LANL. The new 
CMRR facility would include two buildings (one building for 
administrative and support functions, and one building for Hazard 
Category 2 SNM laboratory operations), both of which would be 
constructed at above ground locations (construction option 3). 
The existing CMR building would be decontaminated, decommissioned 
and demolished in its entirety (disposition option 3). However, 
the actual implementation of these decisions is dependent on DOE 
funding levels and allocations of the DOE budget across competing 
priorities.
 
Issued in Washington, DC, this 3rd day of February, 2004.
 
Linton Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security 
Administration.
 
[FR Doc. 04-3096 Filed 2-11-04; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

 
*****************************************************************
 86 DenverPost.com - EDITORIALS: Keep close eye on Rocky Flats
 			
 The federal government may be about to break a crucial promise 
to Colorado. 

When the U.S. Department of Energy said it would close and clean 
up Rocky Flats by 2006, it also pledged to monitor hazardous 
wastes that will be left at the former nuclear bomb trigger 
factory. Among them are radioactive dust in the soil, and 
thousands of feet of underground drain pipes that may contain 
hazardous wastes. It's paramount that the feds keep tabs on air 
and water quality and other possible environmental effects. 

The technical work likely will fall to the Colorado Department of 
Public Health and Environment. But political visibility and 
attention also will be important to ensuring that Uncle Sam keeps 
his word at Rocky Flats. The site is located along Colorado 93 
between Golden and Boulder. 

The most effective organization in this regard is the Rocky Flats 
Coalition of Local Governments (RFCLG), representing seven 
communities closest to site: Boulder and Jefferson counties and 
the cities of Arvada, Boulder, Broomfield, Superior and 
Westminster. In the future, the DOE might be tempted to shrug off 
concerns of the other citizens' groups interested in Rocky Flats, 
but it can't ignore the united voice of the area's elected 
leadership. 

The DOE has funded the group for five years as part of an effort 
to help nearby communities make an economic transition after the 
site's closure. But in its proposed budget for the coming year, 
the DOE wants to end the $250,000 a year it pays for the 
coalition's staff and offices. 

To the feds, a quarter of a million dollars is peanuts, but to 
the affected communities, it's a lot of money. Local governments 
just can't afford the tab. 

Worse, because the funding cut-off would be abrupt and 
unexpected, the coalition hasn't had time to come up with an 
alternative plan. So if Congress OKs the budget cut, the 
coalition will close its doors - signifying a major loss of 
political clout on Colorado's most serious environmental cleanup 
project. 

U.S. Rep. Mark Udall, a Boulder Democrat whose district includes 
Rocky Flats, says he'll try to get the funds restored. The rest 
of Colorado's congressional delegation should support his effort. 

The coalition needs about a year to switch from depending 
entirely on DOE money to finding another funding source, or 
forming an alliance with other organizations that also are 
interested in Rocky Flats. 

The DOE should fund the coalition at least for the next year, 
giving the organization time to develop new plans. 

Frankly, the U.S. government's credibility is at stake. The DOE 
has many nuclear sites nationwide that also need enormously 
complex cleanup work. By honoring its promises to Colorado, the 
federal government would signal other states that the DOE can be 
trusted and that they can, like Colorado did, find cooperative 
solutions to extraordinarily difficult environmental problems.
		   	 	
 		   			 
Editorials alone express The Denver Post's opinion. 

*****************************************************************
 87 SF Chronicle: 2 ex-workers sue Livermore lab /
 Pair who questioned project's safety allege wrongful termination
 
        Thursday, February 12, 2004

Revelations of financial mismanagement and allegations about the 
mistreatment of whistle-blowers have surfaced at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, the Bay Area nuclear weapons lab 
managed by the University of California. 

The developments come as UC officials are on the brink of a 
possible national competition that could decide whether they 
continue to operate three national labs including Livermore. 

On Tuesday, two former lab employees filed suit in Alameda County 
Superior Court alleging wrongful termination for raising safety 
questions about the lab's hottest project, the National Ignition 
Facility, a superlaser for investigating nuclear fusion. 

Also, late last week, UC settled out of court for $3.9 million 
after an investigation by the U.S. Energy Department into reports 
of inappropriate billings for workers' hours. UC has run the lab 
under contract from the Energy Department for half a century. 

Congress recently voted to require national competitions for five 
national labs, including three run by UC -- Livermore, Los Alamos 
in New Mexico and Lawrence Berkeley in Berkeley. The decision 
followed financial and managerial scandals at Los Alamos, 
including accusations that the lab retaliated against 
whistle-blowers. 

Texas joins competition 

Last week, the University of Texas regents took a big step toward 
joining the competition: They voted to spend $500,000 to explore 
a bid to take over the Los Alamos nuclear weapons lab in New 
Mexico. University officials refused to rule out the possibility 
of seeking contracts to run Livermore and Lawrence Berkeley as 
well. 

The UC regents have not formally decided whether to join the 
competition for any of the three contracts. 

UC spokesman Chris Harrington stressed Wednesday that the two 
recent cases are unrelated and that UC is continuing to take 
"aggressive steps to continuously improve the management of these 
institutions." 

In Tuesday's suit, Les Miklosy and Luciana Messina say "there 
were serious potential safety problems in the (laser) target 
chamber and ... the entire project was being run in a 
non-scientific manner," according to a statement issued by their 
Oakland attorneys, J. Gary Gwilliam and Jan Nielsen. 

"It is high time that someone took a close look at how the lab 
treats their employees," the attorneys say. 

When Miklosy, a computer scientist, "tried to meet with his 
manager to discuss his concerns, he was abruptly terminated 
without warning" on Feb. 28. Later, Messina -- who also agreed 
there were serious problems within the National Ignition Facility 
project -- quit in the belief that she, too, would be fired. 

"The NIF project is a death march. It is poorly managed, does not 
practice good engineering procedure, is a waste of taxpayer 
money," Miklosy said in a statement issued by his attorney. 
"There are serious potential safety risks and real operational 
control issues in the nuclear facility that are not being 
addressed." 

Response to allegations 

In his reply Wednesday, Harrington said the ignition venture "is 
one of the most thoroughly reviewed scientific projects in the 
nation. Since 2000, NIF has met and exceeded all of its 
milestones. It gets high marks for project management, for 
engineering safety, for technical achievement." 

Regarding the allegation of retaliation against a whistle-blower, 
Harrington said, "The University of California has taken 
aggressive steps to ensure that employees have the options and 
the opportunity to make claims in a safe and secure environment 
without fear of retaliation." 

In a statement, Livermore spokeswoman Susan Houghton said Miklosy 
"was terminated for performance reasons. His performance 
deficiencies were noted well before he raised any issues 
regarding NIF." Messina would not have been fired and would still 
be working at Livermore if she hadn't quit, Houghton said. 

Livermore's investigation of Miklosy's concerns "concluded that 
his allegations were not valid and that the NIF project was 
adhering to appropriate standards," Houghton said. 

Gwilliam, Miklosy's attorney, disputed Houghton's statement. 
Before what he characterized as Miklosy's sudden termination last 
February, the lab "had never raised any serious performance 
concerns ... no written warnings. They hadn't threatened to 
terminate him or anything." 

$3.9 million settlement 

Meanwhile, the Energy Department said Monday that UC had agreed 
to pay $3. 9 million in a settlement for "labor mischarging" 
after an investigation by the Energy Department's Office of 
Inspector General and the lab's negotiations with the U.S. 
Justice Department. 

From 1994 to 1998, UC personnel working at Livermore's 
energy-research division charged clerical and other workers' 
hours in "projects with limited funds" to "various unrelated 
projects" also funded by the Energy Department, according to the 
department's statement. 

"As part of the settlement, the University of California denied 
any wrongdoing," the Energy Department said. 

�2004 San Francisco Chronicle
*****************************************************************
 88 Oakland Tribune: Feds halt mock assaults on labs
 
Article Last Updated: Thursday, February 12, 2004 -
 		   	 	
Delay suspiciously close to show on lax nuclear safety measures
By Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER

The Bush administration is putting off test assaults on Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and other U.S. nuclear-weapons 
sites on the eve of a "60 Minutes" report on lax nuclear 
security. 

The U.S. Department of Energy attributed the delay to the 
discovery by a federal safety official in Livermore that 
standard, military-issue smoke bombs might pose a health risk. 

The Energy Department declined, however, to identify the official 
or the nature of the health risk. 

The postponement comes as Congress considers the Bush 
administration's request for a $124 million increase in security 
funds for the first major boost in security at its nuclear 
weapons labs and factories after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. 

In response to increasing terrorist threats to U.S. weapons 
facilities, intelligence officials advised the Energy Department 
to expect as many as double the number of attackers and greater 
sophistication of attacks. 

But spending on additional security officers and heavier 
firepower won't begin until mid-2005, nearly four years after 
Sept. 11. 

CBS' "60 Minutes" is to air a report Sunday on security 
vulnerabilities in the nation's weapons complex and whether the 
Energy Department's security testing candidly reflects the 
adequacy of defenses at sites such as Livermore. 

U.S. military forces, police and private security officers have 
used white and colored versions of the smoke canisters for 
decades. Studies by the U.S. Army and the Energy Department have 
cleared them for outdoor use. Security forces at Energy 
Department sites routinely use the smoke bombs in practice and 
test assaults, known as "force-on-force" exercises, to obscure 
the advance of mock terrorists. 

Energy Department spokesman Joe Davis said his agency is 
evaluating the Army study and performing tests on the smoke. 

"We postponed the test until we could understand the health 
effects of the exposure," he said. 

Federal officials ordered the delay on the eve of four test 
attacks on Lawrence Livermore nuclear-weapons lab by a mock 
terrorist force. It was to be the first test of Livermore's 
recovery from understaffing and undertraining problems dating to 
2000. The terrorist hijackings of 2001 indirectly worsened those 
deficiencies. Livermore increased its security patrols, driving 
up overtime, and turnover among its security force skyrocketed. 
The lab lost officers faster than it could replace them and could 
not spare enough for training. 

The Energy Department warned Livermore four months ago of the 
impending performance tests as part of a broad, annual review of 
security, including computer security, protection of classified 
information, alarm systems and other defenses. 

The lab's security executives brought training back up to federal 
standards since last summer. Then in January, they ramped up 
internal practice assaults in preparation for the Energy 
Department tests, spending more than $80,000 in overtime to stage 
six such practices a week. 

"We're ready to go, we want to go and we are willing to go," said 
Livermore spokeswoman Susan Houghton. "Our guys have been 
training for this. We believe it's important and we're ready to 
rise to the occasion to show what we can do." 

Postponement of the test due to tainted smoke bombs raised 
eyebrows among critics of Energy Department security. They said 
the timing was curiously close to the original planned airing 
last Sunday night of a report on the CBS news magazine show "60 
Minutes" on security at U.S. nuclear weapons sites. 

The report, delivered by "60 Minutes" correspondent Ed Bradley, 
mentions Livermore prominently. It also features an embarrassing 
failure of security tests at the Energy Department's Y-12 site, a 
Tennessee facility where the nation machines highly enriched 
uranium and stores 5,000 thermonuclear secondaries, the fusion 
stage of H-bombs. 

In a November interview with Bradley, the nation's top 
nuclear-weapons executive, Linton Brooks, said he was confident 
in security at the Y-12 site. A few weeks later, the site failed 
half of its test attacks, allowing the Energy Department's mock 
terrorists in at least one case to steal more than enough highly 
enriched uranium to fashion the simplest kind of nuclear weapon, 
a primitive design thought especially attractive to terrorists. 

"I find it to be too much of a coincidence that with a '60 
Minutes' report regarding performance tests that they would 
cancel performance tests that shows the lab's ability to handle a 
real-world threat," said Mathew Zipoli, vice president of the 
union for Livermore's security officers. 

A Livermore scientist explained potential health risks of the 
smoke bombs to lab security officers last week, using a slide 
presentation dated in 2002. 

"It's kind of disingenuous," said Peter Stockton, former senior 
adviser on security at the Energy Department and investigator for 
the watchdog group the Project on Government Oversight. "They 
know that part of the '60 Minutes' piece is on Livermore, and 
they don't want to add fuel to the fire in losing a 
force-on-force out there." 

The Energy Department's Davis denied any relationship between 
postponement of its security tests and the news program. 

"People that are unfamiliar with our safety protocols for these 
tests are free to make accusations that are not based in 
realities," Davis said. "Our responsibility is to make sure our 
employees and contractors are safe on our sites and we're going 
to do that."

�1999-2003 by MediaNews Group, Inc. and ANG Newspapers
*****************************************************************
 89 U.S. Newswire - U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science
Unveils 20-Year Vision for the Future of Basic Research
 
 2/12/04 9:00:00 AM 

To: National Desk, Science Reporter 

Contact: Jeff Sherwood of the U.S. Department of Energy, 
202-586-5806 or , or 301-980-5088 (at AAAS annual meeting) 

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 /U.S. Newswire/ -- The U.S. Department of 
Energy's Office of Science today unveiled its Strategic Plan, 
which charts a course for science over the next two decades that 
promises dramatic increases in knowledge and scientific 
achievements. The DOE's Office of Science is the nation's largest 
supporter of the physical sciences and a major contributor to 
other vital areas of basic research that underpin national 
security and economic prosperity. 

"Major advances in science including new materials, advanced 
computational simulations and new ways to produce energy, 
underpin all of the Department of Energy's missions," Secretary 
of Energy Spencer Abraham said. "DOE's Office of Science has 
developed a bold Strategic Plan that holds the promise of 
leapfrogging our current capabilities and keeping the United 
States in a leadership position in the international competition 
for new ideas and technologies." 

The plan sets seven short-term (5-10 year) scientific priorities: 
the ITER fusion science experiment, scientific discovery through 
advanced scientific computing, using nanoscale science for new 
materials and processes, microbial genomics, physics to explore 
the basic forces of creation, exploring new forms of nuclear 
matter, and developing the facilities for the future of science. 

The plan also sets seven long-term (10-20 year) scientific goals 
in the areas of: science for energy; harnessing biology for 
energy and environment; fusion; fundamentals of energy, matter 
and time; nuclear physics research from quarks to the stars; 
computation for the frontiers of science; and, building resource 
foundations for new science. 

The Office of Science Strategic Plan has been developed so that 
progress toward these and other scientific programs can be 
tracked over the next two decades. The plan lays out "Strategic 
Timelines" for DOE's Office of Science basic research programs 
that project over the next 20 years the science that could be 
delivered. The plan also includes 'Key Indicators of Success' 
that are tied to the Office of Science's goals, its FY 2005 
budget, and the performance of its program managers. The plan is 
linked to the Office of Management and Budget Program Assessment 
Rating Tool (PART) process and contains performance metrics that 
are directly linked to the PART review. 

"This Strategic Plan will enable us to help accomplish the 
missions of the Department of Energy in national security, energy 
and environment, while building upon five decades of scientific 
excellence and providing a blueprint for scientific discovery 
well into the 21st Century," Secretary Abraham said. 

Dr. Raymond L. Orbach, Director of DOE's Office of Science said, 
"Our emphasis on the emerging area of nanoscience, for example, 
requires advances in new analytical tools and the creation of 
entirely new ways of conducting science that could lead to major 
breakthroughs in energy production and environmental cleanup, all 
of which are outlined in our Strategic Plan. Similarly, we have 
mapped a path forward in plasma science that could result in a 
commercially viable fusion energy option that would be a huge 
step toward making our Nation energy independent for centuries to 
come. 

We worked very closely with the U.S. scientific community to 
identify the scientific programs the Office of Science should 
pursue over the next two decades that will enable our Nation to 
stay at the forefront of innovation." 

The Office of Science Strategic Plan is a companion to the 
previously released document, Facilities for the Future of 
Science: A Twenty-Year Outlook. Both documents look ahead to the 
needs of the U.S. scientific community over the next two decades 
and identify the steps that the DOE's Office of Science must take 
to ensure that the U.S. scientific enterprise remains at the 
forefront of innovation and discovery, and that DOE's vital 
missions are accomplished. 

Both the Office of Science Strategic Plan and the Facilities for 
the Future of Science: A Twenty-Year Outlook are available on 
compact disk, in printed versions and can be downloaded at the 
Office of Science website . 

DOE's Office of Science is the single largest supporter of basic 
research in the physical sciences in the nation and ensures U.S. 
world leadership across a broad range of scientific disciplines. 
The Office of Science also manages 10 world-class national 
laboratories with unmatched capabilities for solving complex 
interdisciplinary problems, and it builds and operates some of 
the nation's most advanced R&D user facilities, located at 
national laboratories and universities. These facilities are used 
by more than 19,000 researchers from universities, other 
government agencies, and private industry each year. 

/� 2004 U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/ 			 		   		   			 		   		   
*****************************************************************
 90 [du-list] AGI Save Corp. Major Melis" lobby in Sardinia
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 15:06:03 -0800

 
<x-flowed>


---------------------------------------------------------------------~
->

http://www.agi.it/english/news.pl?doc=200401311507-1089-RT1-CRO-0-NF11
&p age=0&id=agionline-eng.oggitalia

AGENZIA GIORNALISTICA ITALIA

URANIUM: "SAVE CORP. MAJOR MELIS", LOBBY IN SARDINIA

(AGI) - Cagliari, Italy, Jan 31 - He's not even 30 years old and
already the Hodgkin's lymphoma that he caught whilst on peace missions
to Bosnia and Macedonia at the end of the nineties is killing him in a
hospital bed in Cagliari. Corporal Major Valery Melis, from Quartu
Sant'Elena is in intensive care after having had an immediate stem
cell transplant in a Milanese centre. Around fifty friends and
relatives are taking action on his behalf and today they have decided
to protest in front of the Sardinia military headquarters. They want
the affliction to be officially recognised as linked to service
because Valery only got his operation thanks to a collection and he
needs to be urgently transferred, preferably by military plane, to a
specialist hospital in England or the United States. Friends for the
young soldier have started a campaign by internet so that his case is
given due recognition and e-mails are being sent to the Italian
president, the prime minister and to the ministers of defence and
health. The Committee of Parents to Soldiers who Died during Peacetime
and the ANA-Vafaf (the National Association for Assistance to Enlisted
Victims from the Armed Forces and their Families) are also fighting on
his behalf. A few days ago, the president, Falco Accame, sent an
appeal to the head of State, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, attributing the
young man's affliction as being due probably to uranium. Accame wrote,
"Maybe he will be able to get the treatment he has needed for some
time now thanks only to your assistance. At the time of writing, more
than 20 soldiers have died and 200 are stricken and there are
countless cases where soldiers (and non-soldiers) have had babies with
deformities at birth". Valery said that since he was diagnosed with
the disease in 1999 after his final four-month long mission to
Macedonia, "No military personnel have ever come to pay me a visit.
Nobody ever told me not to worry, that they were doing something for
me". His case was also made public by a friend, Lieut. Cristiano
Pireddu, with letters to the daily papers and the TV channels. Pireddu
was then suspended from service. A few days later someone wrote the
words "Do justice to people who's got uranium" near the entrance of
the Military HQ in Via Torino in Sardinia. Valery Melis had also
helped write it. The MP, Piergiorgio Massidda, presented a paper to
the prime minister and the ministers of health and defence. "It would
seem that Valery Melis has been completely forgotten by all the
official bodies," wrote the Sardinian-born minister, "and left to
fight this terrible illness alone, without enough financial help from
the State. Even today, it has not been recognised as the result of
military service. They even suspended his salary to begin with, whilst
the refunds for his medical costs have been ridiculous. We must find
out what happened and the reasons for the delays and/or the lack of
practical assistance for Valery Melis". (AGI) .







Yahoo! Groups Links

To visit your group on the web, go to:
  http://groups.yahoo.com/group/duxyu/

To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
  duxyu-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
  http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/



------- End of forwarded message -------
*********************************************************************************************
The Campaign Against Depleted Uranium, Bridge 5 Mill, 22a Beswick Street,
Ancoats, Manchester, M4 7HR Tel./Fax.: +44 (0)161 273 8293
E-Mail info@cadu.org.uk     Website: http://www.cadu.org.uk

Affiliation costs to CADU are �8 a year unwaged/student and �10 a year 
waged. For
this you will receive campaigning materials and CADU's quarterly 
newsletter. Our
newsletter is also available free of charge by E-Mail (send us a message with
'Subscribe CADU News' as the subject). Please send your cheque draft or postal
order in � sterling to the address above.
*********************************************************************************************


To unsubscribe from this groups send a message to 
du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com.  In the body of the message type 
unsubscribe and send.
Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
      http://groups.yahoo.com/group/du-list/

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
      du-list-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
      http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
  

</x-flowed>
*****************************************************************
 91 Google News Alert - nuclear
 
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 13:05:33 -0800 (PST)

 
BUSH Proposes Major New Initiatives To Stop Nuclear Proliferation
Radio Free Europe - Prague,Czech Republic
US President George W. Bush, declaring that terrorists armed with nuclear
material could pose "the greatest threat to mankind," is proposing a new
initiative ...
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/2/63E9B332-5AF6-4018-9446-22BB937A5BD2.html>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/2/63E9B332-5AF6-4018-9446-22BB937A5BD2.html>

NUCLEAR watchdog hits grim note
New Zealand Herald - Auckland,New Zealand
VIENNA - The head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog says the world
could be headed for destruction if it does not stop the spread of atomic
weapons ...
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3548977&thesection=news&thesubsection=world>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm%3FstoryID%3D3548977%26thesection%3Dnews%26thesubsection%3Dworld>

UN nuclear watchdog calls for tighter export controls on atomic ... 
Channel News Asia - Singapore
VIENNA : UN nuclear watchdog head Mohamed ElBaradei backed a call by US
President George W. Bush for tighter controls to curb smuggling of atomic
technology ...
<http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/70829/1/.html>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/70829/1/.html>

THE waning threat of nuclear weapons
Business Standard - New Delhi,India
... Though some countries have renounced their programmes, others still
aspire to have nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, while others could
move to acquire ...
<http://www.business-standard.com/today/story.asp?Menu=26&story=34226>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://www.business-standard.com/today/story.asp%3FMenu%3D26%26story%3D34226>

MALAYSIA: Bush Overplaying Nuclear Role
Kansas City Star (subscription) - Kansas City,MO,USA
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia - Malaysia's leader on Thursday questioned US intelligence
on this country's role in a global nuclear trafficking network, and said
the ...
<http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/nation/7938373.htm>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/nation/7938373.htm>

US warns Iran over nuclear plans
BBC News - London,England,UK
The United States is considering action over what it says is Iran's continued
pursuit of nuclear weapons, a senior administration official has said.
...
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3483799.stm>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3483799.stm>

IAEA Finds Evidence of Nuclear Capability in Iran
Voice of America - USA
Diplomats in Vienna say IAEA inspectors in Iran have found evidence of
a nuclear capability that the country did not reveal in its recent disclosures,
which it ...
<http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=D5D2CA16-8E50-47D3-992F28F2CF276D4D>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm%3FobjectID%3DD5D2CA16-8E50-47D3-992F28F2CF276D4D>

FBI in SA for nuclear probe
News24 (subscription) - South Africa
Johannesburg - A US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) team are in South
Africa to continue a probe of an illegal nuclear technology network involving
a ...
<http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1483016,00.html>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1483016,00.html>

RUSSIA to launch nuclear deterrence exercise: Putin
Xinhua - China
... the current military-strategic balance of forces in the world "is maintained
largely due to the power and level of development of Russia's strategic
nuclear ...
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-02/13/content_1312225.htm>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-02/13/content_1312225.htm>

INTELLECTUALS from nuclear nations speak out
United Press International - USA
... 11 (UPI) -- The Nuclear Policy Research Institute hosted a panel Wednesday
at the National Press Club in Washington that focused on three countries
refusing to ...
<http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20040211-044114-6582r>
See all stories on this topic:
<http://news.google.com/news?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=utf8&client=google&num=30&newsclusterurl=http://www.upi.com/view.cfm%3FStoryID%3D20040211-044114-6582r>

This daily-once News Alert is brought to you by Google News (BETA)...
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Remove this News Alert:
http://www.google.com/newsalerts/remove?s=92d1672a1b037a07&hl=en

Create another News Alert:
http://www.google.com/newsalerts?hl=en

Try Google News:
http://news.google.com/
    
*****************************************************************

NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107 this 
material is distributed without profit or payment to those who 
have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for 
non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more 
information go to: 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml> 
    
*****************************************************************