The
Energy Net | The
Energy Net |
| 1981
Diablo Blockade Lawsuit
In I982, shortly after the Abalone Alliance held the largest civil disobediance action in U.S. history, the Pacific Legal Foundation convinced the county of San Luis Obispo to go after the assets of all AA members. The resulting lawsuit effectively throttled the Alliance. The County and its backers failed to win its case at any level of government. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court before being pulled. This was one of the first major attempts to silence opponents of an issue by legal threat. The Pacific Legal Foundation, a corporate sponsored legal firm specializing in legal radical attacks on progressives is still active today. Below is the final decision of SLO v. AA.
v. The ABALONE ALLIANCE, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Civ. B006572, Civ. B008233. Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, Jonathan M. Coupal and Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, for plaintiffs and appellants. Kathleen V. Fisher, Leigh R. Shields, Joanne Hoeper, and Morrison & Foerster, Richard A. Rothschild, San Francisco, Leonard Post, Oakland, and Western States Legal Foundation, for defendants and respondents. George William Pring, Denver, Colo., Fred H. Altshuler and Altshuler & Berzon, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and respondents.
WILLARD, Associate Justice. [FN*]
Three basic issues are presented for decision: (1) whether the
second amended complaint states a cause of action on behalf of
the County; (2) whether it states a cause of action on behalf of
other appellants; and (3) whether the order for payment of
attorneys' fees was proper.
A fourth issue was presented to the trial court and is argued in
the briefs. It is whether the First Amendment right of political
expression immunizes the alleged acts of defendants from civil
liability. This appeal can be determined on the basis of the
first three issues mentioned above. Therefore it is
inappropriate to decide the constitutional question. (Estate
of Johnson (1903) 139 Cal. 532, 534, 73 P. 424; People v.
Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667, 128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547
P.2d 1000; People v. Marsh (1984) 36 Cal.3d 134, 144, 202
Cal.Rptr. 92, 679 P.2d 1033.) As stated in Williams, "we
do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required
to do so to dispose of the matter before us." (People v.
Williams, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 667, 128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547
P.2d 1000.) A. The Parties. The appealing plaintiffs are the County; Countywide Coalition for Less Government, a California corporation said to be a coalition of groups and individuals, including taxpayers of the County and customers of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (hereinafter "PG & E"); People for Energy Progress, a California nonprofit corporation that supports the development of "all forms" of safe, economical and environmentally sound energy resources; and Vicky Roland, an individual who is a paying customer of PG & E and a taxp ayer of the County and of the State of California. PG & E is not a party to the litigation, and all parties alleged to be PG & E shareholders have withdrawn. The defendants are Abalone Alliance, an unincorporated association; American Friends Service Committee, and Greenpeace, organizations the nature of which is unknown to plaintiffs; three named individuals; and 30 Does. B. The First Cause of Action. The first cause of action makes allegations summarized in this section. During September 1981, a low-power operating license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was in effect for Diablo Canyon (a nuclear power project under construction by PG & E, the purveyor of electricity within San Luis Obispo County). Power shortages will occur throughout California if Diablo is blocked from providing electric power. Alliance has circulated a publication stating its goal is to prevent the Diablo nuclear power plant from going into operation, pursuing legal channels, and nonviolent direct action in the form of a blockade. Defendants erected a tent city on private land for their members and others. More than 100 San Luis Obispo County sheriff's deputies were required to protect people in the area, including defendants. On September 15, 1981, members of Alliance and others trespassed on someone's private property and blocked public roads. They forced their way onto "the grounds." Some workers were prevented from reaching their job sites at the plant, or their arrival was made more difficult. The workers were forced to stay overnight at the plant and sleep in unsuitable quarters such as national guard tents. Members of Greenpeace supplied a boat and landing craft in which individuals approached the plant by ocean and entered the grounds. Defendants intended this blockade to create additional costs to complete the plant, making completion infeasible or impossible. This was intentional interference with the contractual right of electric customer plaintiffs to receive service. Defendants' acts did require plaintiffs to incur expense. It also damaged property of PG & E, and caused PG & E expense that will be borne directly by its customers and shareholders. The County plaintiff was damaged in an amount in excess of $700,000 for costs that would not have been incurred but for the illegal acts of defendants. Plaintiffs who are residents of San Luis Obispo County have been damaged as taxpayers and paying customers of PG & E. Plaintiffs who are paying customers and shareholders of PG & E have been damaged because the costs incurred by PG & E will be borne either by paying customers or by PG & E "so as to harm the interests of its shareholders." These PG & E cost s are associated with damage to property, protection of property and employees, obtaining electricity from alternate sources, and increased construction costs. C. The Second Cause of Action.
The second cause of action incorporates the first cause of action
and in addition alleges that the actions of defendants are a
private nuisance to plaintiffs. [FN1]
The third cause of action incorporates the first and in addition
alleges that the acts of defendants interfered with the
contractual rights of the PG & E customer plaintiffs against PG &
E entitling such plaintiffs to electric service. It also alleges
that defendants made the contractual relationships between the
County and the County's own employees more burdensome.
E. The Fourth Cause of Action.
The fourth cause of action is stated to be in the alternative.
It incorporates almost all of the first cause of action and in
addition alleges that the actions of defendants constituted
"prima facia [sic ] ... tort. See Civil Code s 3523." [FN2]
The relief requested in the second amended complaint is a money
judgment against defendants jointly and severally for $2,981,000,
plus interest, attorneys' fees, costs and an injunction. The
request for injunction apparently was not pursued, has not been
argued in the briefs, and appears to be moot. A. Claims of the County. The County seeks to recover its costs incurred in its exercise of police power during the blockade. The case most nearly in point is City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe (9th Cir.1983) 719 F.2d 322, 323. The city of Flagstaff had sued the defendant railroad in tort to recover the cost of police, fire and other emergency services necessitated by a chemical spill. It was held that, in the absence of a statute expressly authorizing recovery of public expenditures, "the cost of public servi ces for protection from fire or safety hazards is to be borne by the public as a whole, not assessed against the tortfeasor whose negligence creates the need for the service." (Ibid.) Likewise, in District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc. (D.C.Cir.1984) 750 F.2d 1077, the court held that the District of Columbia could not recover the expenses of extraordinary emergency services and cleanup resulting from the crash of an Air Florida plane into the Potomac river. The court held that, in the absence of statutory authorization, the District failed to state a claim for relief: "Where emergency services are provided by the government and the costs are spread by taxes, the tortfeasor do es not anticipate a demand for reimbursement. Although settled expectations must sometimes be disregarded when new tort doctrines are needed to remedy an inequitable allocation of risks and costs, where a generally fair system for spreading the costs of accidents is already in effect -- as it is here through assessing taxpayers the expense of emergency services -- we do not find the argument for judicial adjustment of liabilities to be compelling." (Id., at p. 1080.) [FN3] The court went on to explain its reluctance to create new tort doctrine: "We are especially reluctant to reallo cate risks where a governmental entity is the injured party. It is critically important to recognize that the government's decision to provide tax-supported services is a legislative policy determination. It is not the place of the courts to modify such decisions. Furthermore, it is within the power of the government to protect itself from extraordinary emergency expenses by passing statutes or regulations that permit recovery from negligent parties. [Fn. omitted.]" (Ibid.)
It follows that the only issues are whether (1) there is specific statutory authority permitting the County to recover for public expenditures; or (2) the County has alleged a tort that would entitle it to compensatory damages that are not based upon expenditures for the benefit of the public. The County argues that there is express statutory authorization for it to recover its costs of abating the blockade as a public nuisance. There is, however, no such authorization found in the general public nuisance statutes under which the County purports to sue. (See Civ. Code, s 3479 et seq.) To the contrary, section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the general provision permitting government entities to abate public nuisance, has been squarely held not to authorize the government to recover the costs of abatement. (People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 923, 930, 171 Cal.Rptr 85.) [FN4] It was there held that counties cannot obtain damages for abating a public nuisance because the statutory scheme does not authorize them to do so. The opinion explains: "This action was brought under t he authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 731, which, inter alia, empowers a city attorney to bring a civil action 'to abate a public nuisance.' Abatement, however, is the sole relief that section 731 authorizes the city attorney to seek. This is evident when the above quoted language is compared to the first portion of the statute. That portion allows an action to be brought by 'any person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance.. ..' Suc h a person is expressly authorized to seek a judgment where 'the nuisance may be enjoined or abated as well as damages recovered therefor.' (Italics added.) It is clear that the Legislature intended that one type of litigant could seek abatement and damages, while the other type of litigant could obtain abatement only. A city attorney, in an action 'brought in the name of the people,' fits squarely and exclusively in the latter classification." (Ibid.)
The County argues that it is not seeking damages under section 731, but instead is proceeding under general statutes such as Government Code section 23004 ("A county may ... [s]ue and be sued."), Government Code section 27000 (obligating the County to "receive and keep safely" money) and Government Code section 53069.6 (requiring that County seek damages for negligent, wilful or unlawful damaging of public property). These general provisions do not prevail over the specific statutes governing abatement of a public nuisance. Nor by their terms do they authorize suits to recover costs incurred in exercising the police power. They provide no specific statutory authorization for the County to sue for public expenditures caused by the blockade. The County also argues that specific statutory authorization for its claim is found in the provisions of Streets and Highways Code sections 1480 and 1480.5, which provide for the removal of an "encroachment" at the owner's expense. An "encroachment" is defined therein as a "structure or object." These words refer to inanimate objects, not human beings. We find no express statutory authorization for the County's suit to recover public expenditures for abatement of the public nuisance claimed to have exist ed in this case. With regard to nuisance abatement, the County argues in its reply brief that the actions of appellants created a public nuisance as defined in Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480, authorizing the remedies specified in section 3491 ("1. Indictment or information; [P ] 2. A civil action; or, [P ] 3. Abatement."). The Civil Code goes on to provide that remedy by indictment or information is governed by the Penal Code (s 3492); abatement by a public body or officer is authorized by law (s 3494); and that "[a ] private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself, but not otherwise." (s 3493.) These Civil Code sections establish substantive rights and duties, but the details of procedure are governed by other codes. Abatement, as previously indicated, is governed by section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and, as discussed above, collection of damages by a public agency for abatement is not authorized. The question remains as to whether the County has stated a claim in tort for compensatory damages in alleging interference with contract and "prima facia [sic] ... tort." The County's theory for its interference with contract claim is that the blockade interfered with employment relationships between the County and its deputy sheriffs and other personnel by requiring additional services.
The complaint, however, necessarily implies that the contracts
with its personnel were fully performed. It alleges that more
services were required and payment for them was an increased
expense to the County. This is not the kind of "disruption of the
relationship" required to state a claim. (See Buckaloo v.
Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815, 827, 122 Cal.Rptr. 745, 537
P.2d 865.) [FN5]
B. Claims of the Non-County Plaintiffs.
There are two political organizations and one individual
plaintiff in addition to the County. [FN6]
These non-County plaintiffs assert damage claims for
public nuisance and "prima facia [sic ] ... tort."
1. Real Parties in Interest.
The non-County plaintiffs allege two general categories of harm.
They allege that they will suffer increased taxes as a result of
expenses for law enforcement and other public expenditures
incurred by the plaintiff County and the State of
California, [FN7] and they allege
that they will experience increased utility rates because PG &
E's costs will be passed on to them. These plaintiffs argue that
they, or, in the case of the organizations, their members, will
"ultimately pay t he costs" of the blockade.
Taxpayers do not have the right to sue for public expenditures
unless the public agency has: (1) a duty to sue; and (2)
refused to so do. (Silver v. Watson (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d
905, 909, 103 Cal.Rptr. 576; Elliott v. Superior Court
(1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 894, 897, 5 Cal.Rptr. 116; see generally
Dunn v. Long Beach L. & W. Co. (1896) 114 Cal. 605, 609,
46 P. 607.) Here, the County has chosen to sue and plaintiffs
have affirmatively alleged that the State has not refused to sue.
More im portant, plaintiffs have not alleged a duty by the State
or County to sue.
These non-County plaintiffs' claims of right to sue as ratepayers
suffer from the same defect. Their claims are wholly derivative
on behalf of PG & E. PG & E is entitled to sue for injuries to
the utility. (See, e.g., Pub. Util. Code, ss 7951-7953, ch. 4,
"Injury to Public Utility Property.")
Plaintiffs rely on Friendly Village Community Assn., Inc. v.
Silva & Hill Constr. Co. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 220, 225, 107
Cal.Rptr. 123, for the proposition that taxpayers and ratepayers
can sue because they "ultimately pay the costs...." There it was
held only that a homeowners' association did not have standing
because the individual homeowners were the real parties in
interest with respect to the alleged injuries to their real
property. (Ibid.)
2. Standing to Sue.
The two organizational plaintiffs allege no harm to themselves.
Rather, they seek to recover damages supposedly suffered by their
members and rely on a series of cases that suggest liberalizing
standing principles in order to insure that issues involving the
public interest are resolved. [FN8]
The cases relied on by plaintiffs sought declaratory or
injunctive relief which would inure to the benefit of the
plaintiff organizations' members.
[FN9] By c ontrast, the non-County plaintiffs here seek
damages for harm supposedly suffered by their members, but allege
no assignment of the damage claims of their members or even that
their members would in fact benefit from any award to the
organizations. The organizations, which allege no monetary
injury to themselves, are therefore not entitled to recover.
[FN9] The only exception is Daniels, supra, which
held that a union may sue for libel to recover damages for a
wrong done to the organization itself.
3. No Allegation of Special Damage.
An independent problem presented by the complaint of the
non-County plaintiffs is that they have not pled, as required,
that they were "specially damaged" in a different way than other
members of the general public. Section 3493 of the Civil Code
provides that "[a] private person may maintain an action for a
public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to himself, but not
otherwise." (Emphasis added.) This requirement has been
described as follows: "Where the nuisance alleged is not also a
private nuisance as to a private individual he does not have a
cause of action [for] public nuisance unless he alleges facts
showing special injury to himself ... or property of a character
different in kind from that suffered by the general public."
(Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1971) 22
Cal.App.3d 116, 124, 99 Cal.Rptr. 350.)
4. General Tort Liability.
Plaintiffs attempt to assert a general cause of action for "tort"
pursuant to Civil Code section 3523, which states, in its
entirety: "For every wrong there is a remedy." This section,
however, does not create substantive rights. "[This] wholesome
maxim of jurisprudence ... can obviously have no application to
any but legal wrongs or those wrongs for which the law authorizes
or sanctions redress." (Finch v. Western Nat. Bank (1914)
24 Cal.App. 331, 338, 141 P. 261; see also Fortenbury v.
Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 405, 410, 106 P.2d 411
("[T]he law does not invariably give relief against damage,
because in some circumstances the infliction of damage, though
intentional, is without legal remedy.").)
"[T]orts consist of the breach of duties fixed and imposed upon
the parties by the law itself, ..." (Prosser & Keeton, Torts,
supra, s 1, p. 4.) Whether intentional or negligent, a tort
"involves a violation of a legal duty, imposed by statute,
contract or otherwise, owed by the defendant to the person
injured. Without such a duty, any injury is 'damnum absque
injuria' -- injury without wrong." (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal.
Law (8th ed. 1974) s 5, p. 2306, and cases cited therein.)
Appellants rely on Civil Code section 1708 ("Every person is
bound ... to abstain from injuring the person or property of
another, or infringing upon any of his rights.") to aver that
defendants, by their acts of civil disobedience, breached a
universal duty to society at large and thus are liable in "tort."
Yet the California courts have explicitly rejected the concept of
universal duty. "'It must not be forgotten that "duty" got into
our law for the very purpose of combatting what was then feared
to be a dangerous delusion ... viz., that the law might
countenance legal redress for all foreseeable harm.'" (Dillon
v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d
912, quoting Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of Torts
(1967) p. 47.)
Plaintiffs rely on two cases in support of their claim for
"tort," Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation
(1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 816, 182 Cal.Rptr. 813, and Younan v.
Equifax Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 498, 169 Cal.Rptr. 478.
In Laguna Publishing, the court held that a newspaper
publisher had a direct right under the California Constitution to
recover damages for deprivation of his rights of free speech and
free press. The holding was explicitly limited to recovery for
infring ement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the California
Constitution. [FN10] Plaintiff's
purported right to unobstructed public roads and right to be free
from unnecessary expenditures of public funds under existing
contracts are not fundamental rights guaranteed by either the
California Constitution or United States Constitution.
Even if plaintiffs were real parties in interest and had
established standing to sue, they have not alleged a cause of
action in tort, and neither has the County.
C. Attorneys' Fees.
The trial court ordered appellants to pay respondents' attorneys
$82,500 as fees pursuant to the private attorney general statute,
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
[FN11] Appellants contend that the award was improper
because the litigation did not enforce important rights or confer
benefits on persons other than defendants. They also argue that
section 1021.5 permits fee awards to defendants only if the
litigation is frivolous. Moreover, they assert that the amount
req uested by defendants was so outrageous that no fees should
have been awarded.
Appellants contend that respondents did not enforce an important
right. First, they assert that no "new concepts" were involved
in the litigation. We need not determine whether this contention
is correct because there is no such requirement. The Supreme
Court in Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311,
193 Cal.Rptr. 900, 667 P.2d 704, held that enforcement of
established rights, as well as creation of new rights, can
justify a fee award.
Plaintiffs also urge that because they disclaimed any intent to
interfere with lawful protest, it follows that defendants'
efforts were unnecessary to protect the lawful right to protest.
Plaintiffs' intentions, however, are irrelevant. As the trial
court concluded, the inevitable effect of the continuation of
this lawsuit would be to chill large protests by substantially
escalating the risks involved. A person or organization
contemplating a mass protest in which civil disobedience is
involved might acc ept the risk of conviction of a misdemeanor
such as trespass. If this suit were successful, however, the
risks of monetary loss, jointly and severally imposed on each
defendant, could be enormous, and therefore unacceptable.
2. Significant Benefit.
The second requirement of section 1021.5 is that the litigation
confer a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary,
on a large class of persons or the general public. Plaintiffs
make two arguments on this criterion, one of them procedural and
one substantive. Their procedural argument is that the trial
court should have made a specific finding that a large class of
people was benefited. No finding on this matter was requested
and none is required. (Rees v. Department of Real Estate
( 1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 286, 291, 142 Cal.Rptr. 789, and cases
cited therein; Code Civ. Proc., s 634.) A "judgment will not be
set aside because of a failure to make an express finding upon
[an] issue if a finding on it, consistent with the judgment,
results by necessary implication from the express findings which
are made." (In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d
446, 462, 152 Cal.Rptr. 668, overruled on other grounds; In re
Marriage of Lucas (1980) 27 Cal.3d 808, 815, 166 Cal.Rptr. 8
53 , 614 P.2d 285.) In this case, the trial court's express
finding that defendants' litigation helped to preserve the
fundamental right of protest necessarily implies a finding that
defendants conferred a benefit on the general public.
Plaintiffs also contend that since only defendants' economic
interests were at stake, the litigation did not confer a
significant benefit on a large class of persons. This does not
mesh with the fact, discussed above, that defendants' success in
the litigation confirmed important principles limiting the risks
of political protest. In Rich v. City of Benicia (1979)
98 Cal.App.3d 428, 159 Cal.Rptr. 473, the court affirmed a fee
award because of the trial court's finding that important
environmental principles ("strong public policies") were involved
even though the underlying litigation was settled in terms
particularized to one single house and to the plaintiff's
participation in further planning activities. [FN12]
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that both
the necessity and financial burden of privately litigating this
suit made a fee award appropriate. Since this suit was brought
by a public entity (the County), the necessity of private rather
than public enforcement is evident. (Woodland Hills Residents
Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 941, 154
Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200.)
The "financial burden" criterion of section 1021.5 is met when
"the cost of the claimant's legal victory transcends his personal
interest, that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit
placed a burden on the plaintiff 'out of proportion to his
individual stake in the matter.'" (County of Inyo v. City of
Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 82, 89, 144 Cal.Rptr. 71,
quoted with approval in Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc.
v. City Council, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 941, 154 Cal.Rptr.
503, 59 3 P.2d 200.) Appellants, citing Woodland Hills,
argue that the trial court's failure to make a specific finding
on financial burden requires reversal. In Woodland Hills,
however, the Supreme Court remanded the case because the trial
court had made no ruling at all on the plaintiffs' entitlement to
fees under section 1021.5, which was enacted while the case was
on appeal. (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 925,
154 Cal.Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200.) In this case, the trial cour t
consid ered all the criteria imposed by section 1021.5 before
concluding that defendants were entitled to fees. Plaintiffs'
failure to request a specific finding on the "financial burden"
criterion waives any objection to the lack of a finding. (Rees
v. Department of Real Estate, supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at p. 291,
142 Cal.Rptr. 789.)
As stated in one of the exhibits submitted by plaintiffs to the
trial court, "PLF's purpose in bringing the suit was threefold:
(1) to insure that illegal means did not prevent the proper
regulatory process of testing and review; (2) to prevent
taxpayers and consumers from having to subsidize the group's
[defendant Abalone Alliance] illegal actions; and (3) to protect
the public interest, including the right of an employee to report
for lawful work."
Similarly, the motivation for defending this lawsuit cannot
reasonably be attributed exclusively to a desire by defendants to
protect their own pocketbooks. This is not a garden variety
damage suit. Just a few weeks after filing suit, plaintiffs
moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant Abalone
Alliance from planning or conducting any future blockades of
Diablo Canyon. If respondents had been interested solely in
avoiding pecuniary loss, they could readily have agreed to an
injunction. Instead, by vigorously resisting appellants' motion,
they indicated that their goals were not merely financial.
The file shows that defendants are anti-nuclear and environmental
activists concerned with a political goal -- "the termination of
the Diablo Canyon facility as a nuclear power plant." Since
defendants' goal in litigating this suit transcends their
personal self-interests, the "financial burden" criterion is
met.
4. Awarding Attorneys' Fees to Defendants.
Plaintiffs also suggest that defendants should be denied fees
because they were defendants rather than plaintiffs in the court
below. Section 1021.5, however, provides for a fee award to a
"successful party" and draws no distinctions between plaintiffs
and defendants. In the only California case on point, fees were
awarded to a successful defendant. (Wallace v. Consumers
Cooperative of Berkeley, Inc. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 836, 216
Cal.Rptr. 649.) While the defendant was also a
cross-complainant, f ees were awarded for all time spent on the
case, including time spent on defending plaintiff's separate
action for civil penalties, not just for litigating the cross-
complaint. The award of fees was upheld as a reasonable exercise
of discretion.
Allowing section 1021.5 fees only to complainants would not be
consistent with the express wording or purposes of the
statute.
5. Amount of Award.
Plaintiffs also contend that the fee award was excessive.
Defendants submitted to the trial court comprehensive records,
which itemized and explained time devoted to the case by
attorneys and paralegals for whom fees were claimed. They
multiplied the hours spent by each attorney and paralegal by a
reasonable hourly rate. The resulting "lodestar" figure was
$146,846.25, which defendants requested should be augmented by a
"multiplier" of 50 percent (see Serrano v. Priest (1977)
20 Cal.3d 25, 49, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303), resulting in
a total fee cl aim for $220,269.37. The trial court, after
reviewing the record, awarded $82,500 in attorneys' fees --
$75,000 for work on the merits of the case, plus $7,500 for time
spent establishing entitlement to fees. (See Serrano v.
Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d
985.) The court reasoned that defendants had not yet been
completely successful because some plaintiffs (the plant workers)
remained in the suit even though it had been dismissed insofar as
appellants we re concerned. T herefore, the trial court
concluded, defendants should recover only for the time reasonably
spent against the County, which the court determined was valued
at $75,000. The reduction was made without prejudice to the
right of defendants to move for fees against the undismissed
plant worker plaintiffs if defendants subsequently are successful
against them. The court did not use a multiplier.
This case was both complex and vigorously litigated. It was
ultimately resolved by demurrer, but not before extensive
litigation on a variety of issues, ranging from motions to
strike, to a request for preliminary injunction, to extensive
discovery litigation. In all, there were approximately 113
pleadings filed by the time the fee motion was decided.
The "'experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of
professional services rendered in his court, and while his
judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed
unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly
wrong.'" (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49,
141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303.) Here, the trial judge
reviewed the record and exercised his discretion reasonably. We
find that he did not abuse it. The judgment dismissing the second amended complaint insofar as appellants are concerned is affirmed. Likewise, the judgment ordering appellant County of San Luis Obispo to pay respondents' attorneys' fees of $82,500 is affirmed. STONE, P.J., and ABBE, J., concur.
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